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C h a p t e r  1
Policy-making institutions often differ on what issues to attend on their agendas and 
how to handle such problems. These differences are induced in part by the designs 
of institutions. This is how it happens at least in national political systems, as has 
been extensively demonstrated (e.g. Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Baumgartner et 
al., 2009). But how does it occur in the European Union (EU)? Our knowledge on 
how political institutions in this political system act and react in agenda setting and 
the policy process is still limited. The EU can be seen as a unique political system, 
but whether it really differs from countries in how it attends policy problems is 
an empirical question (Carammia et al., 2012:43).
Some scholars have argued that the EU has a “peculiar institutional constellation” 
not found in any country (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011:53). When we observe 
its institutional framework, a puzzling phenomenon becomes evident: two EU 
institutions3 perform a similar role in agenda setting. The European Commission4 shall 
3 A so-called EU institution is a political body established by the Treaties and is central in EU policymaking. 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, in force since 2009, the European Union has seven institutions: the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, the European Council, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors (art. 13). 
When the European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1952 with the Treaty of Paris, only the first 
four institutions were considered. However, they had different names: High Authority, Common Assembly, 
Special Council, and Court of Justice, respectively (art. 7). In 1958, when the European Economic Community 
was established with the Treaty of Rome, the names changed. The terms were similar to the current ones (art. 
4). Later, the other institutions were established by following treaties. For instance, the European Council was 
introduced in the Community framework by the Single European Act in 1987 and appointed an EU institution 
by the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, acknowledging that changes have happened over time and in order to make the 
argumentation in this study simple, herein these political bodies are called by their current names and referred 
to as ‘institutions’. Also for the same reasons, herein the previous European Community and Communities are 
referred to as ‘European Union’, which was established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty.             
4 Herein referred to as ‘the Commission’.  
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“take appropriate initiatives” to promote the general interest of the EU, according 
to the Treaty (TEU:art. 17). Likewise, the European Council “shall define the general 
political directions and priorities” (TEU: art. 15). In this sense, the Commission is 
the formal agenda setter, as it has the responsibility to initiate policy proposals, and 
the European Council is the  informal agenda setter, as it is in charge of providing 
political guidelines. When we continue observing other EU institutions, we also 
identify duplicate functions in further stages in the policy-making process5, such as 
in decision making where the European Parliament6 and the Council of the European 
Union7 have “jointly” a legislative role (TEU: art. 14, 16). Thus, perhaps the point that 
the Commission and the European Council have a similar function in agenda setting 
is not the most striking feature per se because we know that the EU is “a complex 
system of overlapping jurisdictions” (Majone, 2002:380). The institutional setup of 
the EU has been designed in such a way that the functions of its political institutions 
are not clearly separated and most roles are shared, in order to balance different 
interests (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011:53–55). 
The actual puzzle is the overlapping role of the Commission and the European Council 
together with the fact that their institutional designs are different. Considering 
the  internal organization and characteristics of these institutions, we can identify 
that they are different at least in two ways. They have distinct political attributes (one 
institution has considerably more political authority than the other) and information-
processing capacities (one institution can handle many more issues simultaneously 
than the other). To provide some clarity on this observation, the Commission has 
a lower political profile than the European Council, which is “the highest political body 
in the European Union” (Alexandrova et al., 2012). In addition, the European Council 
has very limited resources to process issues in comparison with the Commission, 
which has a much broader agenda capacity. These constraints are not entirely 
surprising, given that organizations in other political systems are largely designed 
with limitations to avoid monopoly of power (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). 
In short, the European Council and the Commission8 have a similar role, but are 
equipped with different institutional resources. How do these differences impact 
5 Roughly speaking, four stages can be distinguished in the policy-making process: agenda setting, 
decision making, the budgetary stage, and implementation. For more precise phases, see for instance 
Hogwood and Peters, 1983:8.
6 Herein referred to as ‘the Parliament’.
7 Herein referred to as ‘the Council’.
8 Note that hereafter, when both institutions are discussed together, most of the time the European 
Council will be mentioned first and, consequently, the Commission second. This sequence is done to keep 




the way they behave in agenda setting? Do the institutions set the agenda differently, 
according to their different designs? Or do they do it in the same way, according to 
their similar roles? 
Research has traditionally looked at the nature of EU institutions as intergovernmental 
or supranational organizations (e.g. Moravcsik, 1993; Marks et al., 1996; Pollack, 
2003). In this sense, the European Council and the Commission have been commonly 
studied in terms of the distinct interests they represent, whether from the member 
states or the EU as a whole, respectively. These studies have looked at the implications of 
the collaboration schemes between the different types of institutions for EU integration. 
However, work on the differences in their institutional designs and the effect on how 
they attend policy issues is scarce (Alexandrova, 2014, 2017). We know little about 
the impact of the architectures of the two institutions on agenda setting. Existing 
studies have mainly observed the information-processing capacities of the European 
Council (Alexandrova et al., 2012; Elias and Timmermans, 2014; Carammia et al., 
2016). There are agenda-setting studies on the Commission in other areas such as 
framing (e.g. Rhinard, 2010; Daviter, 2011), but little work has explored the effect 
of its design on this stage in the policy process (Princen, 2009). Research has hardly 
compared the patterns of the institutions. Therefore, there is gap in the EU policy-
making literature because we practically lack knowledge on how similar or different 
the logics of the Commission and the European Council are in setting the agenda. This 
is important to know also because these processes have implications for policymaking.
Further, another intriguing feature of the EU’s setup is that, while the individual roles 
of the two institutions are officially established, their interplay in agenda setting 
is not formalized. This contrasts with the case of the other EU institutions whose 
interactions are regulated by the Treaty. For some unknown reason, the designers 
of the EU have not officialized the relationship between the European Council and 
the Commission. The Treaty only indicates that, “[i]n carrying out its responsibilities, 
the Commission shall be completely independent (…) [and] shall neither seek nor 
take instruction from any government or other institution, body, office or entity” 
(TEU: art. 17). But whether this is meaningful for the Commission’s relationship with 
the European Council is unknown. We do not know whether these institutions are 
expected to interact in the first place and, if so, how this is supposed to occur.
In the meanwhile, scholars have argued and speculated about the way the relationship 
between the institutions happens, pointing to all directions. Some authors have 
claimed that the European Council exerts important control on the Commission 
(Werts, 2008; Ponzano et al., 2012). Others have argued that the Commission is 
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independent (Marks et al., 1996; Nugent, 2001), suggesting that it is influential. 
A different stream in the discussion has considered that their interaction is reciprocal 
(Alexandrova, 2014; Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). So far there has been little 
empirical research done on their interplay to endorse the points in the discussion 
(e.g. Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014; Alexandrova, 2017). 
As has been noted by scholars, “research that systematically analyses the relationship 
between the Commission and the European Council, before and after Lisbon, is 
scarce”(Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:21). The few systematic studies available 
have been limited to analyze their interaction during only some years in this century 
(Alexandrova, 2014, 2017; Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). However, there is no 
research that covers their behaviors over a longer period of time that can inform 
the academia on the underlying trend of their interplay. 
Consequently, most of what scholarly work has been doing is practically to imagine 
situations. This is tricky because continuing like this can eventually make us fall into 
“the trap of the ‘Nirvana Fallacy’” (cf. Demsetz, 1969; Cram, 2002), in which we 
compare the real world to a world that does not necessarily exist, the Nirvana, and 
then arrive at the conclusion that the real world is somehow deficient. It is thus 
important to explore in detail and discover more about the actual dynamics between 
the institutions. This is also relevant to do because the logics of the interaction of 
the European Council and the Commission have consequences for the formation of 
EU policies and shifts in them. 
These properties of uncertainty on their relationship result in many questions: 
How do the distinct designs of the European Council and the Commission affect 
their relationship in agenda setting? To begin with, do the institutions interact 
through time? If so, how does their interplay happen? Who follows whom? Or do 
the institutions influence each other?
Ultimately, the questions on their individual and interactive dynamics lead us back 
to the original inquiry that ‘opened the appetite’ for conducting this research on 
the peculiarities of the EU. Although it is clear that the EU system entails distinctive 
features, it is not assumed that this system completely works in a unique way. This 
work conceives the EU ‘uniqueness’ as a continuous concept rather than a binary 
one. The question is thus about to what extent —instead of whether— the EU acts 
uniquely. As a result, the study profits from earlier theories and insights on processes 
observed in national political systems. This situation makes possible to compose 
a  theorical approach for the study of agenda dynamics in the EU and facilitates 




1.1. The Agenda Dynamics Approach: addressing a big 
puzzle in EU agenda setting
Motivated by this combined puzzle in EU agenda setting, the project analyzes how 
the attention of the European Council and the Commission to policy problems 
develops over time and compares their behaviors. Moreover, it investigates how 
the institutions relate to each other in the long run. It is a study on the effect of their 
institutional designs on the way they set the agenda. 
The main goal is to reveal their underlying dynamics and explain the processes. 
Two types of EU agenda dynamics are considered and studied in this project: 
the intra-agenda dynamics, or the logics occurring in the agenda of each institution; 
and the inter-agenda dynamics, or the logics between the agendas. 
The central research question is: How can the agenda dynamics in and between 
the European Council and the Commission be explained? Three sub-questions help 
address this main inquiry. The first one is: What are the intra-agenda dynamics of 
the  European Council? The second sub-question is: What are the intra-agenda 
dynamics of the Commission? And the final is: What are the inter-agenda dynamics 
of the European Council and the Commission? 
The theoretical lens to address these questions and explain the behaviors is the Agenda 
Dynamics Approach (ADA).9 This study proposes and applies this framework for 
the analysis of the intra- and inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council and 
the  Commission. ADA is a conceptual model constructed in this project for such 
purpose. It revolves around the credence that the designs of the institutions impact 
their individual and interactive dynamics in agenda setting. The theoretical framework 
will be described in detail in Chapter 3. For now, let us address in a general way 
important features of this research and central components of ADA. 
1.1.1. Placing the research in context
The notion of dynamics is central in this project. This is a widespread term in the study 
of policymaking. Although commonly used, its meaning is practically assumed in 
academia, as there is no established definition. It has been often used as a sort of 
label to refer to changes, whether more incremental or more abrupt, in the policy 
process in a period of time. For instance, the term ‘policy dynamics’ is present in 
9 The term ‘Agenda Dynamics Approach’ has been previously referred to in the agenda-setting literature 
(Chaqués-Bonafont et al., 2015:137). However, it has not been used to denote a theoretical framework. It 




the  titles of classic books on public policy (e.g. Rose, 1976; Hogwood and Peters, 
1983). Similarly, the term ‘agenda dynamics’ has been assigned to books on policy 
agendas that explain the evolutionary processes experienced by more particular 
countries, such as Spain and Canada (S. N. Soroka, 2002; Chaqués-Bonafont et al., 
2015). Thus, even when dynamics is an abstract concept, we intuitively understand 
what it means. However, it is important to have a working definition in this study. 
The definition draws from its use in the literature and scholarly work that has claimed 
that a dynamic perspective in the study of public policy involves “temporality and 
change at different scales” with the aim to understand and explain policy evolution 
(Kay, 2006:3). On this basis, dynamics is the way policy processes develop over time.
The study analyzes the agenda of policymakers in the European Union, also known as 
the EU political agenda.10 There is, however, no such thing as a single EU agenda. This 
is an abstract concept that refers generically to all the agendas of the EU institutions, 
but in reality each political body has its own. It is enough to acknowledge this condition 
when we talk about EU agenda setting. But this situation becomes inadequate 
when we want to analyze the policy process because not all political agendas are 
the same. Generally speaking, two types can be distinguished in domestic systems: 
the “governmental” agenda and the “decision” agenda (Kingdon, 2011:1–4).11 In 
the European Union, the European Council and the Commission are govermental 
agendas, while the Council and the Parliament are decision agendas. It is fundamental 
to make a distinction between the types of agendas, as the actual arrangements 
pushing issues on the govermental agenda may differ from the mechanisms regarding 
the decision agenda (Princen, 2009:22). It thus would be misleading to conceive 
the existence of one global agenda dynamic happening EU-wide. The truth is that 
“governmental and decision agendas are affected by somewhat different processes”, 
as argued by Kingdon (Kingdon, 2011:4). Therefore, it is important to notice that this 
research is about the dynamics of the EU governmental agendas. 
A broad conceptualization of agenda setting is conceived in this study. It entails 
a formal and informal connotation (cf. Pollack, 1997:121). Setting the EU agenda is 
about the mandate given to a political institution to do so and about the actual ability 
to commonly place an issue on the agenda. While the Commission is “Europe’s main 
agenda-setter” (Hartlapp et al., 2014:14), a wide definition is considered because, 
as Princen has claimed, “[i]t would be a misconception (…) solely to equate agenda-
10 Herein referred to as ‘political agenda’ and ‘policy agenda’ interchangeably, unless otherwise specified.
11 The former agenda includes the issues that get attention from policymakers and outsiders closely 
related to those policymakers (Kingdon, 2011: 3). The latter agenda consists of the narrower group of 




setting in the EU with the activities of the Commission” (Princen, 2007:23).12 And, 
at the same time, Werts has argued that “the European Council has developed itself 
as the agenda-setter of the Union, taking the major political initiatives” (Werts, 
2008:191). In effect, as claimed by Alexandrova and colleagues, this institution is 
“the top informal agenda setter in the EU” (Alexandrova et al., 2016:611).13 
The project thus conceives both political institutions the key actors in the process. 
As Alexandrova has claimed, among EU institutions, “the two bodies are particularly 
relevant because of their position and powers” (Alexandrova, 2017:756). 
An important reason is that agenda setting in the European Union happens in two 
manners, according to the Agenda-Setting Routes Framework (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006). One is by following a route in which issues ‘crash from above’ on the agenda, 
initiated by the heads of state or government in the European Council. The other 
way is the route where policy problems ‘creep from below’ on the agenda, placed 
by expert groups in the Commission or working parties in the Council. Further, 
while this Framework conceives that the Council may be involved in the latter route, 
the  prerogative of this institution is primarily in the decision-making process. By 
contrast, the Commission “has an outstanding role in setting the agenda” (Hartlapp 
et al., 2014:2). This research thus considers the Commission the central political 
body in the route from below. Other EU institutions may play a part in the agenda-
setting process, as will be described in Chapter 2, but they are neither intrinsically 
necessary nor obliged to perform in this stage in the policy process. In addition, as 
also explained in the next Chapter, the participation of citizens and the media is 
considerably less relevant than how it happens in national political systems. In the EU 
system, issues are commonly “raised and developed within the EU’s policy-making 
institutions, without a direct link with the public agenda(s) in the EU” (Lelieveldt 
and Princen, 2011:211). This inside-initiative model characterizes EU agenda-setting 
dynamics (Ibid: 209–211). EU policymaking is thus essentially a political process.  
12 This research acknowledges that the Commission does not have monopoly of power in policy initiation 
in all policy domains. However, it is not in the scope of this study to go into a debate on this matter. For 
a discussion on this, see for instance Ponzano et al., 2012.  
13 While the European Council is an EU institution since relatively recently and its development over 
time within the EU framework has been gradual, as will be described in Chapter 2, these conditions have 
not hindered its “great power” (cf. De Schoutheete, 2012:46). Moreover, although it commonly cannot 
take binding decisions in the legal sense, “[t]his has not prevented the European Council from carving 
out a niche for itself at the very heart of the EU” (Hayes-Renshaw, 1999:25). This body has practically 
acted as a fully-fledged institution over the years even in times without a Treaty-basis for its authority. 
In this sense, as argued by De Schoutheete, “[t]he European Council needs to be considered not only as 
an institution, in legal terms, but also as an essential locus of power” (2012:53). For these reasons, in this 
study the European Council is seen as an entity on its own, instead of part of the “Council hierarchy” as, 
for instance, Hayes-Renshaw has done (1999:23–26).  
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While the study sees the European Council and the Commission as the core agenda 
setters in the EU, it does not conceive that they take control of this policy stage. It 
recognizes that policymaking does not exist in a vacuum and that agenda setting 
involves many (f)actors in and around the process. Aware of this, this research 
examines the effect of other elements that may trigger the institutions to initiate 
issues on their agendas, such as focusing events, policy inheritances, and political 
signals, as will be explained in Chapter 5. 
The two institutions are the main focus of the study. However, the project is not based 
on the classic institutional perspective where norms, interests or ideas are the typical 
drivers of how institutions shape and change preferences and interact (cf. Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000; Pollack, 2009). Instead, acknowledging that rules in the policy process 
exist (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005:19, 151) as well as different levels of institutional 
power among policymakers (Ibid: 17), the designs of the  institutions are primarily 
studied as a crucial source of agenda dynamics. Accordingly, the organizations as 
a whole are studied, rather than the individuals within them.
1.1.2. Solving the puzzle: an overview of the theoretical framework 
and methods of analysis
The Agenda Dynamics Approach centers on the different political attributes and 
information-processing capacities of the European Council and the Commission. 
The  two features comprise their institutional designs, as conceived in this project. 
More specifically, the European Council is composed of the political leaders of the EU 
member states. They handle the ‘hot’ issues in the EU and do it without the support 
of an organizational structure. The carrying capacity of its agenda is significantly 
limited against its wide political authority. By contrast, the Commission is formed 
by experts and administrators grouped in specialized departments, which deal with 
more particular problems. This arrangement allows this institution to have a broader 
agenda and thus deal with many issues at the same time. Its political profile in agenda 
setting, however, is lower than that of the European Council. It is argued that these 
features impact how the institutions act and react in setting the agenda.
Following the two types of EU agenda dynamics distinguished in this project, 
the Agenda Dynamics Approach consists of two parts: 1) the intra-agenda dynamics 
and 2) the inter-agenda dynamics. The theoretical framework argues that knowing 
the former dynamics of the European Council and the Commission promotes 
a better understanding of their latter dynamics. The first part of ADA is constructed 




First, the intra-agenda dynamics part is mainly developed on central propositions of two 
agenda-setting theories: the Disproportionate Information-Processing Model14 (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005), and the Agenda-Setting Routes Framework15 (Princen and 
Rhinard, 2006). The former theory looks at the information-processing characteristics 
of institutions and the latter at their political features. Both frameworks originated in 
the mid–2000s. The Processing Model was conceived in its origins to study the policy 
process in the United States. Shortly afterwards, it started to be used to analyze 
European countries. By contrast, the Routes Framework was created for the purpose 
of studying agenda setting in the European Union and its political institutions. 
ADA integrates both theories, which so far have been considered separately in 
the agenda-setting literature. The two lenses speak to each other when providing 
a theoretical explanation for agenda dynamics. The theories encompass common 
assumptions as well as complementary premises. Both share a feature that is 
fundamental in this study: the differences in the internal characteristics of institutions 
have implications for agenda setting. According to the Processing Model, the variation 
in the information-processing capacities of organizations affects the way institutions 
attend issues on their agendas (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Similarly, based on 
the Routes Framework, it is argued in this project that the difference in the political 
attributes of institutions impacts the manner policy problems are initiated on their 
agendas (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). 
The overarching expectation of ADA is that the intra-agenda dynamics of the European 
Council and the Commission are mostly different in the long run because the designs 
of the institutions are different. This means that, in a comparative perspective, their 
agendas evolve in a different way over time. It is thus argued that their distinct designs 
make the institutions act differently on the whole, even when their roles are similar. 
Second, the part on the inter-agenda dynamics is developed from a theory-building 
perspective. No specific expectation is formulated a priori on how the institutions 
relate to each other. The reasons for doing this have to do with the research problem. 
As previously mentioned, part of the puzzle on the interaction between the institutions 
is that different ideas have been put forward by scholars, but there is barely empirical 
evidence available and no regulation on how their relationship shall work. This means 
that there is no straightforward indication on the direction of causality16 between 
14 Herein referred to as ‘the Processing Model’. 
15 Herein referred to as ‘the Routes Framework’.
16 The notion of causality in this study follows the same approach as previous work on agenda dynamics 
in Canada, as carried out by Soroka (S.N. Soroka, 2002). Such approach is “based on the assumption that 
causality and predictability are interchangeable, at least empirically speaking” (S. N. Soroka, 2002:131). 
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the institutions. Thus, all the ideas are basically empirical questions. This circumstance 
becomes even more challenging when we add to the puzzle the condition that 
the roles of the institutions overlap, but not their designs. As a result, four different 
lines of thinking on causality patterns are distinguished in this project, which will be 
described in Chapter 3. For now, it suffices to know that all four research lines are 
considered, in order to validate the idea with the strongest empirical evidence and 
arrive at conclusions on the governing directionality in their interaction. It is done in 
this manner because testing instead one particular hypothesis, albeit relevant, may 
give us a partial view and keep limiting our knowledge. Therefore, an exploratory 
study of the inter-agenda dynamics will be conducted. 
For the empirical analysis, the agendas of the European Council and the Commission 
are studied, represented by key policy documents issued by the institutions over 
decades. The European Council Conclusions17 and the COM docs of the Commission 
are analyzed for the period between 1975 and 2013, as will be described in Chapter 5. 
Their agendas are studied on a long-term basis because “if we look at policy dynamics 
in the short term (…), we can be misled” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993:39). This 
may hinder us from appreciating substantial arrangements and identifying regular 
schemes. As has been acknowledged by agenda-setting scholars, “the problem 
with a cross-sectional design is that it is, by definition, static, while the agenda-
setting process is, by definition, dynamic” (S. N. Soroka, 2002:12). Put differently, 
a longitudinal study allows us to capture underlying dynamics of the institutions in 
policymaking.   
The dynamics of the institutions are studied observing the development of their 
agendas in the domain of organized crime (OC). This policy field is the vehicle to 
identify their processes. First of all, choosing a single domain is done for methodological 
and analytical reasons. According to Princen, it is necessary to limit the scope 
of policy areas when making an in-depth empirical analysis of agenda dynamics 
(Princen, 2009:44). An important reason is that such study requires a well-founded 
understanding of central policy debates in the policy field, which demands “quite 
an intimate knowledge of the issue area, prior developments in it, and the context 
within which the debate is waged” (Ibid). Studying a single domain thus facilitates 
a comprehensive study of dynamics in policymaking, allowing us to become immerse 
in their complexities. It also facilitates an analysis of these conditions in the long 
run. The motivation for studying the OC domain will be explained in Chapter 4. 
To put it short now, organized crime allows us to study the agenda dynamics of 




the European Council and the Commission under relatively equal and balanced 
conditions in the complex EU policy-making process. The two political bodies deal 
with this policy field similarly, in contrast to the distinct way each of them handles 
other policy areas. For instance, while the European Council is inclined to deal with 
particular policy topics such as macroeconomics and the Commission specially 
with others such as common market issues, it appears that neither institution is 
the ‘owner’ of the organized crime domain. OC is thus a ‘comparable’ policy field 
for both institutions. Furthermore, the development of organized crime in the EU 
framework has happened in such a way that it is neither a purely intergovernmental 
nor entirely supranational policy field, in contrast to other EU domains that are 
clearly intergovernmental, such as defense, or supranational, such as agriculture. 
In this sense, OC is a ‘mid-range’ policy domain. This is an important consideration 
to avoid bias, given that the European Council is an intergovernmental organization 
and the Commission a supranational one. These conditions suggest that none of 
the institutions clearly dominates in this field. In addition, another reason for studying 
the area of organized crime is that the topic has been subject of significantly limited 
research from an agenda-setting perspective. 
Further, the project focuses on the attention given by the institutions to the policy 
problem of organized crime over time. In policymaking, attention is fundamental. 
Attention is a condition to turn on the machinery of the policy process. This is because 
“[c]hoice presupposes attention” (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005:33) and “agendas 
are about the attention given to issues” (Princen, 2009:19). Only the issues selected 
by policymakers reach the agenda and are in position to be decided. In this way, 
policies can be made or changed. Agenda setting thus determines what problems in 
a political system are attended by the government. This is an important reason why 
this stage in the policy process is crucial.  
The methodological strategy of this study is broadly divided in two parts, as will be 
described in Chapter 5. First, the analysis of the intra-agenda dynamics is largely 
conducted in a quantitative fashion, by means of content analysis and the use of 
statistical tools. Also part of the study is developed qualitatively, adding value and 
meaning to the numerical findings. The results on the dynamics in the European 
Council agenda and the Commission agenda will be presented in Chapters 6 
and 7, respectively. Second, the analysis of the inter-agenda dynamics is based 
on econometrics.  Here vector autoregression (VAR) techniques are used. This 
is an  innovative method to the study the relationship between institutions in 
the European Union. The findings will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
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In short, based on the lens of the Agenda Dynamics Approach, this project studies in 
a systematic and in-depth way how the European Council and the Commission have 
set their agendas over time, comparing their patterns and showing their governing 
relationship in the long run. By doing so, the project attempts to explain the dynamics 
in and between the agendas of the institutions. 
1.2. Towards a better understanding of agenda setting 
in the EU
This study and its central research question are relevant for many reasons. First of 
all, we will identify the processes experienced by the institutions in agenda setting 
and explain such dynamics. In theorizing the intra-agenda dynamics, core premises 
of the Processing Model and the Routes Framework will be examined. This will 
help in consolidating and modifying theoretical knowledge. The Processing Model, 
which was originally develop to study domestic political systems, will be tested on 
the European Union. This will add value to our limited knowledge on the effect of 
information-processing capacities of institutions on agenda setting in this political 
system. In addition, the Routes Framework will be challenged because no systematic 
analysis has been done to estimate the validity of its postulates. 
The project will empirically observe the institutions separately and will go one step 
further by also making a comparative analysis of their dynamics on a long-term 
basis. Conducting an empirical study that compares the European Council and 
the Commission will represent a fascinating challenge, given that they encompass 
political agendas that diverge in shape and scope. Such study will be especially 
relevant because, as Princen has claimed, “a more fine-grained analysis that 
compares different EU agendas is necessary to obtain a clearer understanding of 
‘the’ EU agenda and the roles played in it by the different EU institutions” (Princen, 
2013:864). 
The study will also contribute to our understanding on their relationship, by empirically 
exploring the interaction of their agendas over decades and providing an explanation 
of the dynamics observed. This will push our knowledge an additional step forward 
because, after knowing how each institution works individually and comparing their 
ways, we will identify the trend in their interplay. Moreover, an innovative method 
for the analysis of the relationship between political institutions in the European 
Union will be introduced. The outcome from this systematic and longitudinal study 
will add important value to inform scholars, given the ample academic discussion and 




In addition, the project will fill a gap in the organized crime literature. It will provide 
a less conventional perspective to look at OC, studying this phenomenon from 
a political science view with focus on agenda setting. This will be done by analyzing 
the ‘coming’ and ‘going’ of this policy problem in and between the agendas of two 
policy-making institutions in the European Union. This is also relevant because we 
have barely knowledge on the way EU institutions have dealt with organized crime 
as a policy theme. This will be the first in-depth and long-term study conducted 
systematically on the evolution of the EU political agenda on organized crime. 
All in all, the project will allow us to theoretically and empirically address one part 
of the big puzzle of how agenda setting in the European Union occurs. Ultimately, 
understanding how the European Council and the Commission set their agendas 
individually and in interaction is key to better comprehend policymaking and policy 
change in this political system.
1.3. Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters and develops in the following way. 
After this introductory chapter, the second chapter deals with relevant features of 
the agenda-setting process in the European Union. It describes the roles and designs 
of the European Council and the Commission, and compares them. The third 
chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the project: the Agenda Dynamics 
Approach. It shows the theoretical notions on which ADA is supported and presents 
its components and propositions. Along the lines of this chapter, the literature on 
the institutions is reviewed. The fourth chapter touches upon the policy domain of 
organized crime as a means to identify the dynamics of the institutions. It describes 
its characteristics as a policy domain in the EU institutional framework and shows its 
analytical relevance in this study. In doing so, it reviews the literature on OC. The fifth 
chapter describes the Methods. It also presents the data of the study. The sixth 
chapter introduces the first of three analytical chapters. It identifies the dynamics 
of the European Council. It shows the way the attention of the institution evolved 
over the years and the factors that stimulate this body to set issues on its agenda. 
The seventh chapter presents the analysis on the dynamics of the Commission and 
compares the findings to the results of the European Council. Next, chapter eight 
introduces the last analytical chapter. It examines the inter-agenda dynamics. It 
studies four research ideas to arrive at conclusions of how the relationship works. 
The final chapter concludes. It describes the lessons learned from this project, its 
limitations and avenues for further work.
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C h a p t e r  2
As mentioned in the Introductory chapter, the main goal of the research project is 
to reveal and explain the dynamics of the European Council and the Commission in 
agenda setting, studying the impact of their distinct institutional designs. The current 
chapter identifies the roles of the institutions in this policy stage and their designs. 
It is divided into 4 parts. The first section shows aspects of agenda setting in general 
and highlights relevant features of this process in the European Union. The second 
part touches upon the roles of the European Council and the Commission, and 
the third section deals with their designs. The final part summarizes. 
2.1. Features of agenda setting in the European Union
In any political system, the point of departure in the policy-making process is agenda 
setting. This stage is the front door for public policies to be realized. Agenda setting 
is “the politics of selecting issues for active consideration” (Cobb and Ross, 1997:3). 
This process generates the ‘agenda’: the outline of issues that receive attention. 
Different conceptualizations on typologies of agendas can be found in the literature.18 
The distinction among them is defined by what actor in the political system, whether 
public opinion, media or government, is paying attention to a given issue. Agenda 
setting is thus about the issues that receive attention from a certain actor and may be 
18 For instance, public and formal agenda (Cobb and Ross, 1976); public, media and political agenda 
(Princen, 2009); governmental and decision agenda (Kingdon, 1984); and systemic and institutional 
agenda (Cobb and Elder, 1983). 
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later decided by policymakers. The agenda of policy-making institutions is especially 
relevant, as issues are in the right place to be likely adopted. However, not all existing 
issues in a given system can reach the agenda. The agenda is restricted. It is not 
possible for institutions to attend each single problem. The reason is that organizations 
have cognitive limitations. This circumstance is known as “bounded rationality” 
(Simon, 1983, 1985). This means that the attention of institutions is restricted. 
As a result, they need to discriminate some issues from all the bunch of negative 
conditions in a political system. Only the issues that are filtered enter the agenda. 
Therefore, the political discussion of policy issues is intrinsically incomplete because 
the institutional abstraction of information is constrained (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005). Attention is thus fundamental in the agenda-setting process.
This policy stage has a powerful effect on the policy process because “how policies 
are initially formulated and packed has a strong bearing on eventual outcomes” 
(Princen and Rhinard, 2006:1119). Even when a political organization is not formally 
empowered to take decisions, if it achieves to place an issue on the agenda and 
maintain prolonged support for it, this policy body is able to influence the creation 
of policies (Ibid). This phase is crucial in the policy process because, as Princen has 
argued, “agenda-setting is a necessary condition for decision-making” (Princen, 
2009:1). The reason is simple. A problem cannot be policy-wise tackled, if no political 
talk is initially scheduled. For a policy to be decided, policymakers must have it first 
in the spotlight via their agenda. 
Policy-making institutions do not act alone and are not in total control in setting 
the agenda. Diverse circumstances may influence the process. In fact, an important 
feature in any political system is “the way that different groups participate in 
the process of policy formation” (Cobb et al., 1976:126). Some examples of influential 
means are: campaigns from interest groups, pressing newspaper articles, speeches by 
prominent leaders, and persuasive calls from international organizations. Also other 
elements, such as focusing events, may have an impact (Kingdon, 1984:94–100). 
Many actors and factors may foster attention to an issue, thus promoting or even 
obstructing the initiation of policies. However, although possibly stimulating, none 
of these (f)actors is necessarily relevant by its own. While they can influence agenda 
setting, their meaning needs to be interpreted (Ibid). And after their interpretation, 
they need to be taken up by political institutions. Only in this way, an undesirable 
social condition can be translated into a policy problem and thus be in position to be 
decided (Cobb and Elder, 1983:161; Kingdon, 1984:4). The reason is that eventually 
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Setting the agenda can happen in different ways, based on the manner the different 
types of agendas interact in a given political system. According to Cobb et al., 
the “career” of an issue can follow three ways, based on three different models of 
agenda setting: “outside initiative”, “mobilization” and “inside initiative” (Cobb et 
al., 1976). This circumstance ultimately delineates the path an issue follows through 
the policy-making process. In the first model, issues are initiated by the public and 
taken up later by policymakers. This means that an issue passes from the public to 
the political agenda. In the second model, issues are raised by policymakers who later 
attempt to gain support of the public. Thus an issue arises on the political agenda and 
is further supported by the public agenda. Finally, in the inside-initiative model, issues 
are initiated by policymakers and stay within the government for further decision; no 
effort is done to further expand the issues to the public. So in this model issues are 
born on the political agenda and develop there.
In the context of the European Union, the predominant way in which the different 
types of agendas interact is based on an “inside access” model (Lelieveldt and 
Princen, 2011:211). Issues in the EU are regularly “raised and developed within 
the EU’s policy-making institutions, without a direct link with the public agenda(s) in 
the EU” (Ibid). This inside-initiative model characterizes EU agenda-setting dynamics 
(Ibid: 209–211). The reason is that the existence of a European public is disputed, 
which makes the interaction between the public and the political agendas in the EU 
not so significant as in other political systems (Princen and Rhinard, 2006:1121). EU 
policymakers are “less directly accountable” to a public that is strongly national rather 
than European in its political beliefs (Princen, 2007:31). Consequently, in the EU 
the distinction between the public agenda and the political agenda is “less likely to be 
relevant” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006:1121). In other words, given the questionable 
presence of a European public (agenda), other policy actors beyond the political 
sphere are unlikely to have a major and direct role in agenda setting, in contrast to 
what happens in countries. Thus, agenda setting in the EU is mainly political in that 
the central actors in the process are policymakers. They decide the  fate of policy 
issues.
As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, policy issues in the EU reach the agenda in 
two ways: placed by the European Council and the Commission (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006). The process is neither sequential nor straightforward; it is rather complex. For 
the purposes of exemplification, some steps can be distinguished, as followed by 
the Commission with a view to produce a policy proposal (Lelieveldt and Princen, 
2011:214–217). Accordingly, the flow of an idea may start with informal discussions 
among EU policymakers and experts. Depending on the policy area, an issue may 
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be published later in the so-called multi-annual work plans of the  institution and 
then included in its annual work programme. Afterwards, a proposal may be issued, 
supported by a committee of internal and external experts convened by the institution. 
In some cases, green and white papers may be also produced for consultation and 
discussion with interested stakeholders before an initiative is issued. In the meanwhile, 
in order to produce political guidelines, the European Council follows a more internal-
oriented path. Its President in collaboration with the Commission President prepares 
some ideas to be considered by the Heads of State or Government (TEU: art. 15–16). 
Prior to a summit, the ideas are also discussed by the General Affairs Council, which 
works as well to promote the continuity of the meetings (Ibid).  
2.2. The role of the European Council and the Commission 
There is no institution that exerts “monopoly” on agenda setting in the European 
Union (Peters, 1994; Pollack, 2007), due to the complex, open and fragmented 
nature of this political system and its political bodies (Peters, 1994). 
In this context, the European Council and the Commission are at the heart of 
the  agenda-setting process. The two political institutions are primarily responsible 
for initiating the path for the formation of policies. This is a general classification, as 
in reality all EU institutions play more than one specific role in EU policymaking (see 
Treaty of Lisbon: Title III). To mention some of the tasks, the European Council provides 
political guidance, has a say in decision making, and may amend the European 
treaties. The Commission has such responsibilities as initiating policies, guarding 
the treaties, mediating, and representing the EU abroad. Thus the institutions can be 
analyzed from different angles, according to their diverse functions (Nugent, 2010a; 
Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011; Hooghe and Kassim, 2012). 
The European Council and the Commission are the core agenda-setters in the  EU 
because they represent the two main ways in which issues are placed on the EU 
agenda: ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, as Princen and Rhinard have argued (Princen 
and Rhinard, 2006). Some academics, such as Marks and colleagues, have considered 
that EU agenda setting is a collective and disputed task that includes also other bodies 
such as the Council and the Parliament (Marks et al., 1996). This idea is related to 
the credence that the EU is unique, in the sense that it has a system of ‘multilevel 
governance’.19 While it is true that officially these institutions can become involved in 
19 Under a multilevel-governance view, authority in policymaking goes across diverse levels of government, 
from subnational to supranational, rather than only national —as assumed by a ‘state-centric governance’ 
model (Marks et al., 1996).
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the process, their role is limited. They can request the Commission to come up with 
a proposal, but the latter instituiton is not obliged to act in consequence (TFEU: art. 
225, 241). Other scholars have argued that the Council influences the agenda through 
its Presidency.20 Although work based on case studies, such as individual presidencies 
and single policy fields, has shown that the Presidency has pushed certain issues 
to the  front (e.g. Tallberg, 2003; Warntjen, 2007; Ferreira-Pereira, 2008), research 
covering a broader scope has found a different outcome. For instance, a study 
including more than 20 presidency terms and 20 policy domains has demonstrated 
that on the whole the Presidency does not effectively advance its national agenda 
to the EU level (Alexandrova and Timmermans, 2013). Accordingly, what member 
state presides the Council does not make much difference. As claimed by different 
scholars (e.g. Elgström, 2003; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Thomson, 2008), 
the opportunities for the Presidency to set the agenda are in general limited because 
of events that demand prioritization, issues predetermined in previous agendas and 
norms that promote a neutral behavior of member states, among other reasons. 
Further, it has been argued in the literature that the Parliament can be a “conditional 
agenda setter” (Tsebelis, 1994). This circumstance, however, can only occur if its 
proposal is adopted first by the Commission (Ibid). As a result, the Council is inclined 
to decide on such initiative. This scenario was conceived under the framework 
of the  Single European Act (SEA) and since then the powers of the Parliament in 
the  policy process have gradually increased with treaty revisions. Nevertheless, 
its actual influence in agenda setting is open to study. Ultimately, the  key role of 
the Council and the Parliament is not in setting the agenda. Formally the Council 
has a “legislative” function “jointly with the European Parliament” (TEU: art. 
14), which means that they are primarily involved in adopting policy proposals. In 
this regard, the former institution seems to be particularly relevant. As argued by 
Wartnjen, the Council is “the crucial linchpin” where policies need to go through to 
be “enacted” (Warntjen, 2013:1239).
All in all, different EU institutions are allowed to participate, but agenda setting is 
led fundamentally by the European Council and the Commission. Both are necessary 
in this stage in the policy process and expected to act, in compliance with its role. 
While the two institutions are central, it does not mean that they hold command of 
the process. In reality neither these nor other policy-making institutions have control 
of it. As previously noted, agenda setting is complex and diverse circumstances can 
influence it. Therefore, it would be a mistake to claim that the European Council and 
20 The Presidency of the Council rotates every six months among member states and is led by the respective 
Head of State or Government. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the member state in charge of this position also 
presided the European Council.  
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the Commission are the only actors setting the EU agenda. Rather, the argument in 
this study is that these two institutions are key in the process. The following sections 
describe the role of each of them.
2.2.1. The European Council: providing political guidance 
The European Council has the mandate to “provide the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and (…) define the general political directions and priorities 
thereof” (TEU: art. 15).21 This role is not limited to a given policy area. The institution 
shall perform in all domains. It is thus the mentor body of the EU. However, the European 
Council can neither submit initiatives nor exercise legislative functions (Ibid). This means 
that, although it is able to set politically the policy parameters of the EU, this institution 
does not have the faculty to issue proposals —task of the European Commission— or 
to adopt laws —role carried out by the Council and the Parliament.  
Although in theory any EU institution may attempt to exercise an influential part in 
agenda-setting, in reality the European Council’s mandate openly empowers and 
even ‘obliges’ it to set the priorities of the EU. Determining the direction of this 
political system, as the European Council is required to do, essentially means that 
the institution sets the agenda of the EU, informally though. As Werts has argued, 
“[t]he European Council is considered the informal agenda setter of the EU” (as cited 
in Alexandrova and Timmermans, 2013:319).
This happens through the adoption of its so-called Conclusions. These policy 
documents encompass the closing political statements and agreements reached by 
the European Council at the end of its meetings. Such policy documents “identify 
specific issues of concern for the EU and outline particular actions to take or 
goals to reach. European Council conclusions can also set a deadline for reaching 
agreement on particular item or for the presentation of legislative proposal. In this 
way, the European Council is able to influence and guide the EU’s policy agenda” 
(European Council, website). The Conclusions may also include assignments of 
tasks to other EU institutions and bodies, such as invitations to “the European 
Commission to come forward with proposals addressing a particular challenge or 
opportunity facing the Union” (Commission, 2014b:12). They may touch as well on 
decisions on policy, institutional, and administrative matters requiring the (in)formal 
endorsement of the European Council. Examples of these matters are the decisions 
on the Tampere programme on the future of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area, 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) to discuss Treaty changes, and Multiannual 
21 Its function was formalized by the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Financial Frameworks (MFF) to plan EU spending. Furthermore, the Conclusions may 
include, among other topics, progress assessments of implemented policies. 
Given that the European Council deals with all sort of issues during the meetings, 
the conclusions entail a generalized nature, as the summits do not focus on particular 
domains.22 As Ludlow has argued, the Conclusions “acquired a quasi-legal status in 
the European Community politics” in the second half of the 1980s estimulated by 
the incorporation of the European Council in the EU institutional framework by the SEA 
(Ludlow, 1992:62), development that is mentioned below in the section on its design. 
2.2.2. The Commission: generating policy proposals
The Commission is responsible for generating “appropriate initiatives” in order to 
“promote the general interest of the Union” (TEU: art. 17). It thus shall elaborate 
policy proposals.23 In the performance of its duties, it is expected to “neither seek 
nor take instruction from any government or other institution, body, office or 
entity” (TEU: art. 17). It shall carry out its work in an independent way. Therefore, 
in principle its power of policy initiation is not shared with any other political body. 
In fact, the Commission is the only EU institution entitled to initiate proposals. This 
monopoly however can be shared with member states, depending on the policy field. 
The Commission has jurisdiction in all areas related to the Community, most fields 
of Justice and Home Affairs and some areas regarding the Common and Foreign 
Security Policy.24 In the areas of quasi-monopoly, member states have also the power, 
but it is not mandatory for them to come up regularly with an initiative.25
While the right of policy initiation is mainly bound to the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament are formally allowed to have a say but need to do it via 
the Commission (TFEU: art. 225, 241). The Council and the Parliament have the right 
to request the  Commission to submit a proposal, but cannot initiate a  proposal 
themselves. They can take part in the agenda-setting process, but only when they 
estimate necessary to attract the attention of the Commission in order to deal with 
a certain issue in a particular way. This may happen when they consider convenient 
to promote the implementation of the Treaties or to accomplish common objectives 
(Ibid). The Council and the Commission can ask the institution to elaborate initiatives, 
22 Few exceptions have occurred. Some examples are the meetings on November 1997 and October 1999. 
The European Council focused its discussions on particular topics: employment and JHA, respectively 
(European Council, 1997, 1999).   
23 Its role as “the principal policy initiator” was established by the Treaty of Rome, based on the Treaty of 
Paris and the earlier function of the High Authority (Nugent, 2010b:46). 
24 For concrete exceptions, see Ponzano et al., 2012:8.
25 For more information on this, see Secretariat of the European Convention, 2002.  
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“but the Commission can, and sometimes does, refuse to do so” (Hooghe and 
Kassim, 2012: 178).26 The reason is that the Commission, autonomous by mandate, 
has the prerogative of rejection. This condition is possible, as long as the Commission 
explains the reasons to the petitioner (TFEU: art. 225, 241). Further, the European 
Council may ‘invite’ the Commission to deliver proposals on specific topics 
(Commission, 2014b:12). This situation is however not established in the Treaty. As 
noted in the Introduction chapter, their relationship in agenda setting has not been 
formalized. Ultimately, the Commission is the sole EU institution attributed with 
the mandate to issue policy initiatives, regardless of the ‘suggestions’ from others 
(Hooghe and Kassim, 2012:179). Other external policy actors, such as interest groups 
and citizens, can make a request to the Commission but these demands are not 
binding either (Hooghe and Kassim, 2012:179). 
The Commission produces official communications done in the context of policy 
initiation, called “COM docs”. They comprise policy proposals, reports and consultation 
papers (such as green and white papers) for the attention of EU institutions and 
civil society. These documents are issued in relation to a legislative procedure. 
Once the  communication is ready, it is sent to the appropriate policy actors for 
their consideration. For instance, a policy proposal is submitted to the Council and 
the Parliament, which decide on it; or a green paper can be published to become 
informed about the opinion of the public.  
2.2.3. The roles in a comparative perspective 
Both institutions play a fundamental part in the agenda-setting process mainly for 
two reasons. First, the European Council provides political guidelines to the EU and 
the  Commission generates policy proposals. They are thus informal and formal 
agenda setters, respectively. Second, issues on the EU agenda arrive eventually by 
the initiative of any of the two institutions. In this sense, they are the core agenda-
setters in the  European Union, standing out from the rest of EU institutions. 
An overview of their roles is presented in table 2.1.
26 See also Nugent (2010). 
Table 2.1. A comparative perspective on the role of the institutions in agenda setting
European Council Commission
Role In agenda-setting To provide political guidelines
√ (Informal) agenda-setter
To generate policy proposals
√  (Formal) agenda-setter
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2.3. Institutional designs 
2.3.1. The European Council: a high political arena with small 
processing capacities
The European Council is a venue where all heads of state or government of 
the member states get together to promote discussion and reach agreement on ‘hot’ 
EU matters in all policy fields, as well as to guide the political route of this political 
system. It represents the interests of member states, so it is an intergovernmental 
body. 
The European Council was not conceived in the origins of the EU back in the 1950s. 
Its political encouragement and orientation were required decades later in view of 
“the growing feeling that the Community was failing to respond adequately or 
quickly enough to new and increasingly difficult challenges” (Nugent, 2010b:161). 
As a result, the European Council was established in the mid-1970s.27 Its creation 
happened more especifically in 1974 during a summit in Paris (European Communities, 
1974).28  
The reasons for its establishment were intrinsically political, as can be appreciated 
from the communiqué of its meeting: 
“Recognizing the need for an overall approach to the internal problems involved in achieving 
European unity and the external problems facing Europe, the Heads of Government consider it 
essential to ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in 
the work on political cooperation” (European Communities, 1974:7).
The political leaders “therefore decided to meet (…) three times a year” (Ibid). In this 
way, having no treaty-basis, but the agreement of the heads of the member states, 
the European Council was born. In order to stimulate European unity, they confirmed 
their resolution “to adopt common positions and coordinate their diplomatic 
action in all areas of international affairs which affect the interests of the European 
Community” (Ibid).
The European Council started to operate a year later when the leaders met under this 
configuration for the first time in Dublin (European Council, 1975). It was considered, 
however, neither an EU institution nor part of the Community institutional framework. 
Actually, its development happened in a gradual way. This ‘arrangement’ was 
27 However, irregular meetings among the political leaders happened before the establishment of this 
body (Werts, 2008:1–20; De Schoutheete, 2012:45–46).    
28 Note that since 2013 the heads of state or government of the member states whose currency is 
the euro hold formally also another meeting —the euro summit. They meet after the European Council 
summits to discuss issues of common interest regarding the Euro area (Council of Ministers, 2013). This is 
the so-called Eurogroup, which shall not be confused with the European Council. 
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introduced in the framework only in 1987 with the SEA (art. 2). But the SEA did not 
define any formal function. This Treaty only established rules about the membership 
and the periodicity of its meetings. Later, in 1993, its mandate was established with 
the Maastricht Treaty. The new Treaty “created a revised institutional architecture” 
of the political body (Wessels, 2012:761). Its function was set as we know it today: 
the  European Council shall determine the political path of the EU (TEU: art. D). 
Regarding its legal status, “the European Council was positioned at the  ‘roof’” 
of the structure of the EU system, which allowed it to deal with all policy areas 
(Wessels, 2012:761). Yet it was not designated an EU institution. The appointment 
of the European Council as an EU institution occurred much later —only in 2009 with 
the Lisbon Treaty (TEU: art. 13).
In spite of the incremental evolution of this political body, since the beginning “and 
increasingly as time has gone by, European Council meetings have come to mark 
the rhythm of EU activities” (De Schoutheete, 2012:46). In fact, as De Schoutheete 
reminds us, in the pre-Lisbon era there was an important debate around “the legal 
nature” of this body, in part because for more than a decade after its creation 
the European Council had no Treaty-basis, yet it had important power (Ibid: 53). Its 
legal status was clarified with the Lisbon Treaty, by making it formally an EU institution. 
However, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, the European Council shall not 
be seen only as a legal institution, but also as “an essential locus of power” (Ibid).   
Since its origins, the institution gathers always behind closed doors. The heads of 
state or government meet under the chair of a President, who is elected for a two-
and-a-half-year term since the Lisbon Treaty (TEU: art 15).29 The President chairs 
the  meetings and looks after the preparation and continuity of the sessions. He 
however does not have a vote. In addition, two high ranking EU authorities attend 
the summits: the President of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy.30 Some ministers and other members of the Commission 
may be invited, if strictly necessary when the agenda requieres so. 
29 As mentioned above, before this Treaty, the Presidency of the Council presided also the European 
Council. This means that the European Council had a rotating Presidency every six months, which was 
headed by the political leader of the incumbent member state. With the Lisbon Treaty the position of 
the  President of the European Council was created. Thus the European Council changed from having 
a rotating to a standing Presidency. The change was in part a consequence of the formalization of 
the  European Council as an EU institution. For an ‘assessment’ on the evolution of the position of 
the Presidency of the European Council after the Lisbon Treaty, see Dinan, 2013. For further work that 
analyzes changes in different areas regarding decision making in the pre- and post-Lisbon eras, see Hosli 
et al., 2013. 
30 The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy started to attend the European Council 
only in 2009 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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In this sense, the European Council is an exclusive political venue of a secretive 
nature, as argued by De Schoutheete: “This is the essence of the European Council: 
a limited number of political figures, including the chief executives of all member 
states, meeting in a closed room with no assistants” (De Schoutheete, 2012:44). 
Its discussions and decisions are made public at the end of each meeting, through 
the release of their Conclusions. The institution decides mostly by consensus. Only 
the political leaders of the member states are entitled to vote. Neither the European 
Council President nor the Commission President has this right (De Schoutheete, 
2012:49, TFEU: 235). 
Their gatherings take place usually four times a year. This happens twice per Council 
Presidency, more or less one every three months. More summits may be held 
extraordinarily if needed, after a crisis or a shocking event that requires a position 
or prompt action of the EU.31 A reason for the sporadic frequency of the meetings is 
that the European Council works “at the very heart of EU decision making –not on 
a day-to-day basis in the manner of the other four main EU institutions, but rather 
from a  more distance position where it is centrally involved in setting the  overall 
parameters on the EU system” (Nugent, 2010b:162–163). Each meeting lasts 
between one or two days. Brussels is the location of the meetings.32  
In spite of its important political significance and demanding tasks, the institution has 
neither experts to support its deliberations nor specialized bodies to deal with matters 
on particular policy fields. It is however administratively assisted by the General 
Secretariat of the Council (TEU, art: 235).33 The President of the European Council 
drafts the general line of the Conclusions prior to the meetings. This is later discussed 
by the ministers of foreign affairs (General Affairs Council). The draft version needs 
to be adopted by all the heads of state or government at the end of each meeting 
of the European Council. Only afterwards, the Conclusions are released. This high 
political arena contrasts with the rest of the EU institutions: lacking an organizational 
structure of its own, the European Council must deal nearly by its own with all its 
tasks, which include handling all sort of major issues in the EU. 
31 Special meetings are convened ad hoc under exceptional circumstances. An example is the extraordinary 
summit held on 21 September 2001, as consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (European Council, 2001).
32 This situation was different in the past. Until 2001 the venue moved each semester, following always 
the member state that holds the Council Presidency. This situation changed in preparation for the enlargement. 
The Treaty of Nice established that, once the EU reached 18 Member States, all meetings must take place in 
Brussels (Declaration 22). And in the meantime, this city should be the location only one time per Presidency. 
As a result, from 2002 until the beginning of 2004 the European Council occurred several times in Brussels 
but also in the country of the Presidency. Since May 2004 it meets solely in the Belgian capital. 
33 Before the Lisbon Treaty, this function was done by the group of ministers of foreign affairs and 
members of the Commission (European Communities, 1974;, SEA, art. 2; Treaty of Maastricht, art. 4).
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2.3.2. The Commission: a low political arena with large processing 
capacities
The Commission works to develop policy initiatives and conduct operational activities, 
among other tasks. It is composed by a mixed organizational arrangement of 
politicians, experts and administrators. The institution looks after the overall interest 
of the EU. It is thus a supranational body.    
The establishment of the European Commission was conceived around the origins of 
the EU. The idea started when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
founded in 1952 by the Treaty of Paris. The ECSC was established after the Second 
World war to prevent another war between Germany and France by merging 
the production of coal and steel of these countries under the establishment of a High 
Authority, the predecessor of the Commission. The High Authority was established 
on the idea of Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the EU, of setting “a new 
form of supranational, sector-driven interstate cooperation” (Wille, 2013:26).
The reasons for conceiving this political body were essentially technical, as can be 
observed in the declaration made by Schuman, proposer of the ECSC and another 
founding father of the EU: 
“The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in 
the shorted possible time the modernisation of production and the improvement of its quality; 
the  supply of coal and steel on identical terms to the French and German markets, as well as 
to the  markets of other member countries; the development in common of exports to other 
countries; the equalisation and improvement of the living conditions of workers in these 
industries” (Schuman, 2011:2).
Later on, acknowledging “the fragile edifice of European integration”, the member 
states of the ECSC decided to renew efforts to achieve a more linked, open and 
democratic Europe (Commission, 2014a:5). They thus decided to expand their 
cooperation to new areas, establishing in 1958 the European Economic Community 
(EEC) –and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)- with the Treaty of 
Rome. The ECC was created with the idea that the member states would “work 
towards integration and economic growth, through trade” (Eur-lex website). In this 
way, the Treaty of Rome established the Commission (art. 4), which was called, more 
precisely, the Commission of the EEC. In 1967 the three existing Communities were 
merged. As a consequence, the Commission absorbed the High Authority of the ECSC 
and the Commission of the Euratom, becoming what is “nowdays commonly known 
as the European Commission” (Commission, 2014a:5). 
Since the Commission was established, it has been an EU institution. Although it 
is identified as a single unit by the Treaty, the institution is actually a hybrid entity 
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(Peterson, 2012:97). This is because its work “rests on two pillars: politics and 
bureaucracy” (Wille, 2013:4).
On the one hand, the political arm is the College of Commissioners, which is 
composed by one Commissioner per member state. It also includes a President, 
Vice-presidents, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy.34 The President of the Commission is nominated by the European Council; 
the Vice-presidents are elected by the President; and each member state appoints 
a Commissioner. The College is the political head of the institution and its appointed 
for a 5-year term.35 Each Commissioner is responsible for particular portfolios, for 
instance, Health and Food Safety, or Digital Economy and Society. The Commissioners 
adopt policy proposals and policy reports and take decisions within the organization 
(Commission, 2007). The College meets once per week usually in Brussels or in 
Strasbourg when the Parliament has plenary sessions. 
On the other hand, the Commission has a chart structure of permanent staff 
performing daily tasks. This technical arm includes experts, specialists, bureaucrats 
and administrators grouped primarily in two entities, namely, Services and 
Directorate Generals (DG). In general, both are in charge of the operational 
implementation and providing information to the members of the College to carry 
out their tasks (Commission, 2007). More specifically, the Services (around a dozen) 
deal with general administrative tasks for the common functioning of the EU, such 
as ensuring a convenient workplace for the institution’s employees, task carried 
out by the Office for Infrastructure and Logistics Brussels. The Services may also 
be in charge of more specific policy-related tasks, such as supporting EU’s fight 
against fraud via its European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). In addition, the function 
of the DGs is the  realization of specialized groundwork for the development of 
policy initiatives. The existence of DGs stems largely from the Commission’s need 
“to posess technical expertise in almost every area of government activity as well 
as an astute awareness of the politics of these issues, if it wants to see its policy 
proposals and other initatives succeed” (Christiansen, 2006:100). The DGs (more 
than 30) are divided around specific policy areas, such as energy or home affairs. 
However, a DG of a different sphere of activity may have a political say and may 
even take the lead, if its field is involved in the development of an initiative; and 
in case of a disagreement on the  leadership, the Secretariat General arbitrates 
(Nugent, 2001:242). 
34 The EU High Representative was included only with the Treaty of Lisbon.
35 Since 1999 its term in office is alligned with that of the Parliament for better coordination. 
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In the process of developing a policy proposal, the Directorate Generals may ask 
and since recently even require the support of external stakeholders to estimate 
the  need of issuing certain proposals. In 2005 the Commission introduced its 
“Impact Assessment Guidelines”, which established the types of proposals that 
require prior external assessment, the relevance of conducting an evaluation in 
the preparatory phase, and the procedural rules for doing this (Commission, 2005). 
The rules included the need “to ensure input from interested parties and experts” 
by the establishment of a consultation plan (Ibid: 9). The Commission is obliged 
by the Treaty to “consult widely” before proposing an initiative (TEU: Protocol on 
the Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Art. 2). In fact, 
external experts openly support the work of the institution. These can be members 
of public or private sectors clustered in expert groups established by the institution 
to provide it with specialist advise, scientific knowledge, and expertise (European 
Commission website).36
Once the permanent staff comes up with a draft proposal or a draft report, 
the College of Commissioners examines it during its weekly meetings. At least half 
of the group needs to agree on the draft, in order adopt it. Only then, the draft 
can be conceived formally a COM doc. This means that, in contrast to the case of 
the European Council that mostly acts alone, the group of Commissioners does not 
develop policy proposals and communications by its own. This group is supported by 
a technical apparatus of especialized departments (Commission, 2007). 
2.3.3. The institutional designs in a comparative perspective 
A comparative overview of the designs of the institutions is presented in table 2.2. 
We can identify two main features that differ between the policy-making bodies. 
First, their political attributes are different. While both are political institutions, one 
is considerably more political than the other. The European Council is composed of 
the top political leaders in the EU. By contrast, the Commission is constituted by 
politicians of a lower rank together with experts and administrators. In this way, 
the  European Council has much higher political authority than the Commission. 
The latter institution is in turn more technical. Second, their information-processing 
capacities are different. The European Council can deal only with few issues at a time, 
in comparison with the Commission. An important reason is that the European Council 
has basically no apparatus devoted to assist it and the institution meets only seldom. 
This contrasts to the case of the Commission that has a broad organizational structure 
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and a more permanent political and technical staff. Thus, the former institution has 
shorter processing capacities against the latter institution that has larger capacities. In 
other words, the European Council practically lacks a machinery that supports its task 
of indicating the political path of the EU. By contrast, the Commission has a group 
of specialists organized in different topical departments to be able to generate 
policy proposals. This group drafts communications to be adopted by the group of 
policymakers in the College of Commissioners.
2.4. Summary
This chapter introduced the roles of the European Council and the Commission in 
agenda setting and their institutional designs, and compared their features. It started 
by dealing with the characteristics of this policy stage in general and more specifically 
in the European Union, showing relevant differences. For instance, in the EU, policy-
making institutions are central actors in the process, as the direct participation of 
the public is considerably less relevant than in national systems. Besides, policy issues 
enter the EU agenda in any of two ways: placed by either the European Council or 
the Commission. In describing the roles of these political institutions, we identified that 
the former institution is the informal agenda setter and the latter is the formal agenda 
setter. On their institutional designs, we observed that the European Council has a higher 
political profile than the Commission, whose features are more technical. At the same 
time, the  European Council has shorter processing capacities than the Commission, 
which has considerably more resources. The next chapter introduces the theoretical 
framework proposed in this research for the study of processes of the European Council 
and the Commission in agenda setting: the Agenda Dynamics Approach. 
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We saw in the previous chapter that the institutions have a similar role in agenda 
setting, but different designs. This brings us back to the research puzzle and central 
question of the study, as initially posed: How can the agenda dynamics in and 
between the European Council and the Commission be explained? This chapter 
describes the Agenda Dynamics Approach —the theoretical framework that enables 
us to answer this question. ADA is a conceptual model developed in this research. 
The chapter is divided into 3 parts. The first section describes central theoretical 
elements used to build the framework. The second part introduces the characteristics 
and postulates of ADA. Along the lines of these two parts, a review of the literature is 
done. The final section gives a summary of the chapter and describes briefly the next 
steps to be followed in this study. 
3.1. Preparing the ground: theoretical foundations
Three important features in the agenda setting literature serve as a basis to construct 
the  Agenda Dynamics Approach: the notion of attention, the Processing Model 
(Jones and Baumgartner, 2005), and the Routes framework (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006). These are the foundations initially used, as described in the next section. 
Other theoretical notions, as they emerge during the empirical analysis, are described 
in the analytical chapters, accordingly.  
3.1.1. Attention: Issues evolving on the political agenda 
In the literature on agenda setting, attention is a central concept (cf. Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1993; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). In the Agenda Dynamics 
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Approach this notion is also key. Attention is defined as the occurrence of an issue 
on the agenda of a political institution. A political system without problems is not 
conceivable. The world where we live is actually characterized by excess of data, but 
the cognitive capacities of institutions are limited to a lesser or greater extent (Simon, 
1988, 1997; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). So paradoxically governments operate 
in an information-rich environment with relatively capacity-poor organizations. Thus, 
while political systems are bombarded with information about all kind of situations 
suffered by their societies, they have finite resources to handle the problems. How 
are governments able to cope with this? The answer rests primarily on selectivity. 
Political institutions need to discern what issues to pick. Attention thus indicates 
their priorities. This means that not all undesirable conditions for a society are per 
se problems for a government (Stone, 1989; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009:27–28; 
Kingdon, 2011:109–110). Policy problems are not a given (Cobb and Elder, 1983: 
172). The transformation of a social condition into a policy issue needs to happen, so 
that a political conversation can start. Here attention is fundamental. It is the engine 
of agenda setting. It symbolizes the preferences of political actors, as it follows 
from their policy priorities. Policymakers must first filter the enormous amount of 
information to be able to process it (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). In this way, 
attention is a powerful strainer for policymakers to deal with problems (Ibid). 
Public issues are “malleable” (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993: 59). They are opened 
to “competing interpretations”, as they entail different dimensions from which 
they can be estimated (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993: 59). Policy problems thus are 
not dictated by facts (Schön and Rein, 1994:3–5). They are formed. The same 
proposal can simultaneously have different issue definitions. Actors pay their 
attention to different features of a policy in an attempt to generate support for 
their preferences (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008:486). The selection process may 
get into “agenda conflicts” of what problems policymakers focus on and battles 
of opposing conceptualizations (Cobb, 1997:3–4). In effect, “topics become only 
issues when political actors have different ideas about what should be done about 
them”(Princen, 2009: 22). Therefore, a policy issue is a clash of interests (Cobb and 
Elder, 1972: 82; Princen, 2009: 23). The reason is that the agenda has space for only 
one definition. Therefore, agenda setting is not only about a government choosing to 
attend an alarming social situation, but also about what it exactly finds problematic 
from all the dimensions of that issue. This means that “information is never neutral 
in the policy process, and that is why it is fundamental” (Jones, 1994:23). Ultimately 
the most dominant frame in the debate receives political attention. This is the issue 
that policy-making institutions finally handle. 
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Attention is not static. It changes over time (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 2009; 
Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Issues can be ‘on’ and ‘off’ the agenda or ‘high’ 
and ‘low’. A problem can change its position on the agenda and be suddenly out. 
Similarly, an issue can receive different levels of attention at different moments in its 
policy evolution. In this dynamic process, it is likely that issues discarded earlier may 
be attended later under the same previous definition. But it may also be that an issue 
attracts attention portrayed in a completely different way than before.
Attention has important repercussions on the policy process  (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993, 2009; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). It is a precondition for an issue 
to enter the agenda and thus be decided. It also plays a discriminatory role that 
facilitates the selection of issues among those competing for agenda access because 
the agenda entails a constrained scope. Moreover, attention stimulates the evolution 
of a policy domain and frequently changes in it, as “[m]ost issue change occurs 
during periods of heightened general attention to the policy” (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009:20). Attention has a fundamental part in policy dynamics as, depending 
whether a problem is considered by policymakers and how they portray it on 
the agenda, the status quo may be altered.
3.1.2. The Processing Model and the Routes Framework: explaining 
agenda setting
Research on agenda setting in the European Union has been slowly growing in the past 
decades (Peters, 1994, 2001; Tsebelis, 1994; Pollack, 1997, 2003; Tsebelis and Kreppel, 
1998; Tallberg, 2003; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Princen, 2009, 2011).37 However, 
our knowledge on this stage in the policy process is still limited. To explain the logics 
of the European Council and the Commission, the Agenda Dynamics Approach draws 
from two theories: the Routes Framework (Princen and Rhinard, 2006) —used for 
the  study of the EU system— and the Processing Model (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005) —used for the examination of domestic systems. These theories largely support 
the postulates of ADA.  Both were formulated in the mid-2000s. The Routes Framework 
was created in 2006 to observe the European Union, specifically the EU institutions, 
and the way agenda setting happens. The Processing Model originated in 2005 to 
analyze the United States’ political system and its agenda-setting process. This theory 
later started to expand and be applied in Europe to study mostly countries.38 
37 For the state of the art on EU agenda setting at least until 2007, see Princen, 2007.
38 American and European scholars following this approach have established the Comparative Agendas 




The theories have common assumptions and complementary conceptualizations. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the features. Both theories explain agenda-setting 
dynamics and their effects in the policy process. The theories distinguish between 
two types of organizations. The Processing Model analyses macropolitical institutions 
—or serial processors— and policy subsystems —or parallel processors. The Routes 
Framework studies high politics venues and low politics venues. This two-fold 
distinction of institutions is analogous. A macropolitical institution resembles a high 
politics venue and a policy subsystem mirrors a low politics venue. The theories 
study the characteristics of policy institutions and how they impact agenda setting. 
The  theories focus on different institutional features. These are considered in this 
project the designs of the institutions. The Processing Model looks at the information-
processing characteristics of institutions and the Routes Framework at their political 
attributes. Each type of organization has different features. Macropolitical institutions 
have more cognitive constraints for processing issues than policy subsystems, which 
have broader capacities. High politics venues have a higher political authority than 
low politics venues which are more technical.
Both theoretical frameworks conceive that the different characteristics of institutions 
affect agenda setting. The difference in their information-processing capacities 
impacts how institutions prioritize issues on their agendas. By the same token, 
the variation in the political attributes of EU institutions affects the way issues are 
initiated on their agendas. Each type of institution promotes a different dynamic. 
For instance, a policy subsystem or a low politics venue promotes stability in 
a political system. Moreover, the theories consider that the interplay between 
institutions entails conflict that, once overcome, likely leads to major policy 
changes. Further, according to the Processing Model, four core features of agenda-
setting are: attention, problem definition, friction and image-venue link. Similarly, 
according to the Routes Framework, the agenda-setting process happens in four 
phases: initiation, specification, expansion and entrance. Both frameworks consider 
attention and problem definition fundamental in agenda setting. They also conceive 
that a venue usually frames an issue according to the nature of that organization. 
For the  Processing Model, information is an  element that provokes the  entrance 
of an  issue on the  agenda and, for the Routes Framework, symbolic events and 
professional concerns are key influential factors in policy initiation. 
Most work conducted on the Processing Model in Europe has analyzed national 
agendas of member states (e.g. Vliegenthart et al., 2013). Studies on single policy 
domains at the national level have been also carried out, such as the case of 
immigration in the United Kingdom (Boswell, 2012). Other research has compared 
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policy processes in European countries with those happening in the United States 
(e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2011). Little work has been done on 
EU institutions. In general we have scarce knowledge on the way political institutions 
process information in the EU system. Research has mostly studied the agenda of 
the  European Council (Alexandrova et al., 2012; Elias and Timmermans, 2014; 
Carammia et al., 2016).39 No research has analyzed the Commission in this stage in 
the policy process.40 There is no study that observes in the long run the differences 
and similarities of the way the two institutions process information in agenda setting. 
Further, overall little research has been carried out using the Routes Framework (e.g. 
Princen and Rhinard, 2006; García, 2007). No study has systematically observed 
the way issues are initiated on the agenda by the two institutions over time. 
39 For an information-processing perspective applied to EU decision-making, see Daviter, 2014. For 
a  broader notion on information processing in the EU, called ‘politics of information’ that centers on 
the EU institutions and their bureaucratic bodies, see Blom and Vanhoonacker, 2014.  
40 For work on the Commission in other policy stages, see for instance Baumgartner et al. (2012) for 
an  empirical analysis of the institution’s role in the budgetary phase and Daviter (2014) for descriptive 
notions on its role in decision making. 
Table 3.1. The Processing Model and the Routes Framework: general characteristics
Processing Model Routes Framework
 Focus on the information-processing  
characteristics of institutions
 Focus on the political attributes of 
institutions
 Types of organizations: 
Macropolitical institutions/Serial processors 
Policy subsystems/Parallel processors
 Types of organizations: 
High politics venues 
Low politics venues
4 core features of agenda- setting:
Attention, problem definition, friction and  
image-venue link
4 phases of agenda-setting:
Initiation, specification, expansion and 
entrance
Information promotes agenda access Symbolic events and professional concerns 
promote issue initiation
Policymaking is explained from an agenda-setting perspective
The characteristics of institutions affect agenda-setting 
Attention is central in agenda-setting
Problem definition is central in agenda-setting
Policy actors define issues according to their institutional nature
Policy stability is promoted by  policy subsystems / low politics venues
Institutional interaction entails conflict
* In italics the most important features used for the development of the Agenda Dynamics Approach
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This section described general characteristics of these theories. The specific propositions 
used in the construction of the conceptual model are explained in the following part. 
3.2. Building the theoretical framework
The Agenda Dynamics Approach studies the processes occurring in and between 
the European Council and the Commission agendas. ADA rests on the notion that 
the  designs of organizations affect their behavior in policy making. Accordingly, 
the  theoretical framework posits that the institutional designs of the European 
Council and the Commission have an impact on how each sets its own agenda 
and how they relate to each other in the agenda-setting process. ADA focuses on 
the  information-processing capacities and political attributes of the institutions. 
These two features comprise their institutional designs, as conceived in this study.
3.2.1. Types of EU agenda dynamics 
ADA distinguishes two types of dynamics (see table 3.2). First, the intra-agenda 
dynamics —or the processes occurring in the agendas— refers to the way each 
institution sets its own agenda. Second, the inter-agenda dynamics —or the processes 
happening between the agendas— deals with the manner the two institutions 
interplay in agenda setting.
Two types of agenda dynamics are conceived, rather than only one type where 
the two institutions set the agenda at once because of two main reasons. On the one 
hand, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, each EU institution has its own 
agenda. On the other hand, as described in Chapter 2, the institutions do not share 
the same design. This condition that can be noticed at least in two areas. First, 
the institutions have distinct information-processing capacities. This means that they 
deal with issues in a different way. Second, the institutions have different political 
attributes. That is, the level of political authority to handle policy problems differs. 
Here a snapshot of their institutional designs: the European Council is considerably 
more limited to process issues than the Commission, but its political authority is much 
higher; conversely, the Commission is by far less constrained to process problems 
than the European Council, but its political profile in agenda setting is much lower 
and in turn more technical. 
It is argued that, as a consequence of their distinct designs, the institutions set their 
agendas differently. The reason is that each political body intrinsically entails unlike 
resources and preferences. As a result, another logic follows in interaction. In this 
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way, the  Agenda Dynamics Approach is a framework to study and compare how 
each institution attends issues, and analyze how they handle issues together.
According to the two types of EU agenda dynamics, ADA is composed of two main 
parts. One deals with the intra-agenda dynamics and the other with the inter-
agenda dynamics. It is argued that knowing the former helps understand the latter. 
The  theoretical approach will allow us to answer the central research question of 
this study: How can the agenda dynamics in and between the European Council and 
the Commission be explained?
An outline of the theoretical framework is presented in Figure 3.1. From left to right, 
it illustrates central concepts and ideas. Accordingly, the designs of the institutions, in 
terms of their information-processing capacities and political attributes, affect their 
patterns of attention to policy issues over time. This constitutes the intra-agenda 
dynamics. Ultimately, the intra-agenda dynamics affect the inter-agenda dynamics. In 
other words, the individual processes of the institutions affect the way they interact 
in the long run. These dynamics are described in the remainder of the chapter.
Table 3.2. Types of EU agenda dynamics
Intra-agenda dynamics Inter-agenda dynamics
Processes occurring in the agendas Processes occurring between the agendas
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INTRA-AGENDA DYNAMICS INTER-AGENDA DYNAMICS 
Figure 3.1. Outline of th  Agenda Dynamics Approach
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3.2.2. Intra-agenda dynamics 
The first part of ADA deals with the processes of each institution in agenda setting. 
This will allow us to address two research sub-questions of this project: What are 
the intra-agenda dynamics of the European Council? and What are the intra-agenda 
dynamics of the Commission? 
This part is deductively developed. It is done on the basis of central postulates of 
the Processing Model and the Routes Framework, theories whose general features 
were previously mentioned. Therefore, there are clear expectations on the behavior 
of the institutions. 
The specific propositions used for developing the model are explained in detail below. 
In a nutshell, ADA posits that the institutional designs of the European Council and 
the Commission have implications for agenda setting fundamentally in two areas. 
First, the  different information-processing characteristics of the institutions affect 
the  way they attend issues, stimulating that their attention trends differ. Second, 
their different political attributes promote that the institutions set issues on their 
agendas triggered by distinct factors. As a result, the intra-agenda dynamics are on 
the whole different. Put differently,  each institution set its agenda in its own way. 
Information-processing capacities
According to the Processing Model, institutions deal with problems in a disproportionate 
way in relation to the huge amount of information ‘out there’ because institutions 
have cognitive limitations to process issues (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). 
There are two types of processing capacities by which the excessive number of 
problems are handled in any political system: serial and parallel (Simon, 1983; Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005). The way of processing issues goes according to the type 
of organization dealing with problems, whether it is a macropolitical institution or 
a  policy subsystem (Redford, 1969:83; True et al., 2007:158–159). the effects of 
the information-processing characteristics vary according to each type of organization. 
On the one hand, macropolitical institutions deal with issues in a general way and 
attend problems one by one or only few at a time. They are thus serial processors. 
They are at the top of the political system and are responsible for deciding on the big 
problems. However, these institutions move fast from one issue to the next, in order to 
manage their considerable agenda limitations, as they are not equipped institutionally 
to deal with all the influx of information at once. This type of processing assumes 
a short-term time horizon. There is a great competition among issues and a constant 
battle for attention on the agendas of these institutions. As a result, numerous 
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attention swings are invariably occurring on their agendas over time. Due to their 
overdisproportionate attention changes, the policy-making nature of macropolitical 
institutions entails a punctuated behavior (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 44). 
The features of this type of organization go in line with the configuration of 
the  European Council. This institution is the uppermost political authority in 
the EU and in charge of deciding on the major problems in this political system. 
Nevertheless, it is significantly constrained in its organizational structure and gathers 
only sporadically, situation that makes it difficult for the institution to handle a large 
number of issues at the same time and keep them under its radar for a long while. 
The institution thus needs to be highly selective on what problems to consider on its 
agenda, in order to be able to guide the political direction of the EU.
On the other hand, policy subsystems can handle specialized problems and do it 
simultaneously, given that this type of organization is composed by groups of experts 
and bureaucrats that deal with more specific issues and work separately in departments. 
In this way, policy subsystems are parallel processors. The carrying capacity of their 
agendas is much broader than that of macropolitical organizations. This allows 
a much less voracious issue rivalry for attention. Consequently, the attention they give 
to problems is more static, but it may be shared with several issues at the same time. 
The parallel fashion of policy subsystems presupposes a longer attention span. They 
tend to be more open to information from abroad and thus process issues in a more 
balanced way. As a result, less changes in attention to issues occur on their agenda. 
The dynamic of policy subsystems is more incremental but never completely stable 
over time. Thus the development of their behavior shows a punctuated pattern, but 
much less marked than in the case of macropolitical organizations. Policy subsystems 
may be conceived as a way to institutionally induce or enforce (partial) equilibrium 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 18-21). In this way, this type of organization promotes 
stability in the political system. In the long run, both macro-political institutions and 
policy subsystems involve policy change, but at a significantly different rhythm.  
The characteristics of a policy-subsystem organization mirror the features of 
the  Commission. This institution deals with specialized issues. It has a mixed 
configuration of policymakers, administrators and specialists. It has a wide and 
permanent structure constituted by numerous directorate generals and services 
supporting its administrative and political activities. Consequently, it can deal 
with multiple issues simultaneously and for a longer time. In fact, policy proposals 
are the result of the Commission’s broad organizational machinery, which allows 
the  institution to produce numerous reports and communications on specific 
problems in diverse areas.  
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In short, according to their information-processing characteristics, the European 
Council is a macropolitical organization that thus deals with problems serially, while 
the Commission is a policy subsystem-type of organization that thus handles issues 
in parallel.41 The capacities of the European Council to process issues are significantly 
more limited than those of the Commission. Based on this, the expectation is that 
their patterns of attention differ significantly:
H1.  Given that limitations to process information of the European Council agenda 
are larger than those of the Commission, the European Council agenda displays 
over time more drastic shifts in attention than the Commission agenda whose 
attention changes are more moderate.
Table 3.3. summarizes the information-processing capacities of the institutions and 
the expectations. 
Political attributes
According to the Routes Framework, there are two ways of setting the agenda 
in the  European Union: via a high politics route, where the political leaders in 
the European Council take the initiative to place an issue on the agenda; and a low 
politics one, where expert groups in the Commission do so. 
In this way, two types of organizations can be distinguished in the formation of 
policies in the EU: high politics venues and low politics venues (Princen and 
41 For research that considers both the European Council and the Commission macropolitical systems, see 
Alexandrova, 2017.




Handles major issues 
No support apparatus  
Periodic meetings 
More limited capacities to 
process issues
Handles specialized issues 
Broad organizational structure 
Permanent staff 
Less limited capacities to 
process issues
Type of organization  
(based on the Processing 
Model)
Serial processor /  
Macro-political institution 
Parallel processor / 
Policy subsystem 
Expectations More drastic changes in 
attention over time 
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Rhinard, 2006). More specifically, the European Council is a high politics venue and 
the Commission a  low politics one. Thus, while the two bodies are policy-making 
institutions, the former has more political attributes, or more political authority, than 
the latter. The Commission has less political attributes and in turn is more technical. 
This feature in their designs is relevant in the formation of policies, as it has an impact 
on the way the institutions initiate issues on their agendas. 
Accordingly, an issue “crashes” on the agenda “from above” by the European 
Council, following a high politics route in the policy-making process. This institution 
sets an issue on the agenda usually stimulated by symbolic events —or focusing 
events as referred to in this project. These events are politically salient and highlight 
a political problem shared by the heads of state or government. In addition, an issue 
can “creep” into the EU agenda “from below” sponsored by the Commission via 
a low politics route, after professional concerns from a group of experts is raised. 
In this way, the high politics route entails primarily a “political” nature and the low 
politics route predominantly a “technocratic” one (Princen and Rhinard, 2006:1121).
In short, looking at the European Council and the Commission in their quality as 
a high and low politics venue, respectively, the former has more political attributes 
than the latter to set an issue on the agenda. Based on this, the expectation is that 
the factors driving the institutions to set issues on their agendas differ: 
H2.  Since the European Council has higher political attributes than the Commission that 
in turn has more technical features, attention of the European Council over time to 
set an issue on its agenda is mostly triggered by focusing events, while attention 
of the Commission is generated mostly by professional concerns of expert groups.
Table 3.4. summarizes the political attributes of the institutions and the expectations. 
Table 3.4.  The institutions, according to their political attributes
European Council Commission
Political attributes Heads of state or government 
More political
College of Commissioners + 
experts and bureaucrats  
Less political, more technical
Type of organization  
(based on the Routes 
Framework)
High politics venue Low politics venue
Expectations Attention triggered mostly by 
focusing events




3.2.3. Inter-agenda dynamics 
The second part of ADA deals with the processes between the institutions. This 
will answer the last research sub-question of this study: what are the inter-agenda 
dynamics of the European Council and the Commission? 
ADA follows a theory-building perspective for looking at their dynamics in interaction. 
This part is constructed inductively. It is supported on the different streams in 
the literature on the relationship between the institutions, rather than testing a specific 
theory. It is done in this way for various reasons. First, the literature points to different 
directions. Theories seem to be underdeveloped. Furthermore, their relationship has 
no Treaty basis. Moreover, little empirical research has been done on the topic. In 
addition, there is no research that examines the phenomenon that their roles overlap 
but not their designs, and how these conditions altogether impact their interaction. 
So far their relationship has been “rarely the focus of theoretical driven analysis” 
(Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:24). Only few scholars have studied the interplay 
between the two institutions as such (Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Höing and Wessels, 
2013; Alexandrova, 2014; Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). Most academic research 
has looked at one of the two institutions as the primary object of study. From this 
‘solo’ perspective, a cursory analysis of the relationship of one institution with 
the other —and often with the rest of the EU institutions— has been conducted. 
While the studies with focus on single institutions are relevant, they are inadequate 
to understand how the interplay occurs. However, important insights can be found 
in such analyses. Altogether, two main lines of argumentation can be distinguished. 
On the one hand, scholars have pondered the power of the institutions. Within this 
stream, two ways of thinking can be noticed: one in which the European Council 
impacts the Commission, and another where the influence happens in reverse order. 
So the interplay seems to be unidirectional.42 On the other hand, scholars have looked 
at the institutions as partners. They influence each other. In this case, the interaction 
appears to be bidirectional. 
These circumstances of ambiguity generate diverse paths of reasoning. On this 
basis, this project conceives four main possible patterns, as explained below. All are 
42 This conceptualization draws on the notion often conceived in international relations. This discipline 
has studied the interaction between international institutions and international regimes (e.g. Gehring 
and Oberthür, 2008; Young, 2008). Accordingly, a unidirectional relation is when one institution 
influences the other, but not the other way around, as Gehring and Oberthür have argued: “Our concept 
of institutional interaction does not imply that influence runs back and forth between the institutions 
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in principle equally likely to happen and, consequently, all explored. The data are 
analyzed first and then the idea with the strongest empirical evidence is taken up to 
substantiate the directionality of the interaction between the institutions in the long 
run, in search for the governing pattern. Each pattern is described in the following 
subsections. 
Possible pattern 1: no interaction 
The relationship between the European Council and the Commission in agenda 
setting is not established in the treaty. There is no official provision on whether or 
how the  institutions are expected to work together.43 Therefore, we do not with 
certainty if they regularly interact in the process. 
This suggests that the institutions are independent entities in agenda setting and 
thus not necessarily accountable to each other. Therefore, in principle, they do not 
need to be responsive to each other. Also, in a broader context, there is no actual 
need for the European Council and the Commission to respond in one voice to 
the  demands of the European citizens. The reason is that direct accountablity of 
EU policymakers to its citizens “cannot be taken for granted” (Princen, 2007:31), 
in contrast to what is assumed in domestic political systems. In fact, much research 
in countries has analyzed the extent governments are responsive to its citizens (e.g. 
Jones and Baumgartner, 2004; Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). In the European 
Union, however, accountability of the EU institutions directly to its public is neither 
a given nor a must. One motive is that political interests of EU citizens are strongly 
national, so domestic issues tend to dominate; as a  result, the  Commission “is 
not accountable to any public” (Princen, 2007:31). In addition, neither institution 
is elected by the  European citizens. Therefore, it is not necessary that the two 
institutions are efficient between them in handling policy issues. They do not need 
to fulfill the  preferences of the public. Consequently, the European Council and 
the Commission do not need to coordinate, or even talk to each other commonly, in 
order to look after the topics considered relevant by EU citizens.   
On top of this, the institutions can act on a regular basis in their own way passing 
each other’s choices because they have different designs. That their intra-agenda 
dynamics are overall different, as this research argues, may hinder their interaction.
43 We know, however, that the two institutions are formally involved in each other’s organizational 
formation. On the one hand, the European Council nominates the candidate for the Presidency of 
the  Commission (which needs to be approved by the Parliament), situation that happens every five 
years. On the other hand, the President of the Commission attends the European Council meetings. 
The Commission President, however, has no say on the decisions of the political leaders.  
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Possible pattern 2: unidirectional interaction —the European  Council 
influences the Commission 
Most of the academic discussion on their relationship points to the supremacy of 
the European Council. To begin with, “the European Commission receives demands 
from the European Council to draft legislative proposals, even if the Treaty does 
not formally provide for such a procedure” (Ponzano et al., 2012:8). The power of 
the European Council stems largely from “its political status and the leverage of 
each of its members over the actions of their respective governments” (Lelieveldt 
and Princen, 2011:56). These are major inducements for the Commission to have 
a “subservient position” in its relation with the European Council (Werts, 2008:53). 
In this sense, the Commission is the ‘agent’ that follows the orders of the European 
Council, which is a “powerful principal” in its relationship with the Commission 
(Marks et al., 1996:357). 
This is part of a major traditional debate in EU integration studies between 
intergovernmentalism (e.g. Moravcsik, 1993) and supranationalism (e.g. Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet, 1998) on how the forms of cooperation between member states 
and the  transfer of competences to a higher level of authority have promoted 
integration in the EU. Accordingly, the relationship between the European Council 
and the Commission has been typically studied on the basis of their characteristics 
as intergovernmental and supranational institutions, respectively. In this debate, 
the Commission either applies the will of the member states or circumvents their 
desires. In other words, one institution defines what the other shall do, meaning 
that one institution dominates. As observed, many scholars consider the European 
Council the dominant actor. This institution plays the role of the ‘principal’ in their 
interaction in order to stimulate policymaking and check the application of its policy 
requests (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). 
Their interplay is perceived as a process where the European Council signals the way 
to go and, in consequence, the Commission acts. Since the European Council lacks 
an administrative apparatus and meets only occasionally, it has a more generalized 
approach to address policy problems and often signals and assigns specific tasks to 
the Commission —and other political bodies— (Alexandrova et al., 2012:71). “[T]he 
European Commission follows up on the European Council’s resolutions” because 
the President of the Commission is member of the European Council (Ponzano et al., 
2012:8). The Commission “has increasingly considered itself politically committed” 
to work on the requests made by European Council via the Conclusions (Ponzano et 
al., 2012:42). In this way, the institutions constitute a “tandem” that is “driven and 
governed” by the European Council (Werts, 2008:54). Consequently, the Commission 
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resembles a “secretariat” of the European Council, rather than a “partner” (Höing 
and Wessels, 2013). 
The European Council’s leadership has two contrasting implications. On the one hand, 
the European Council may stimulate the Commission in the policy process. This is to 
a  large extent because the Commission’s proposals suffer from a “lack of political 
weight”, so it requires “a stronger political body” such as the European Council to 
steer the European Union (Bulmer and Wessels, 1989:113). The European Council’s 
indications are highly relevant for the Commission’s own choices, as this gives political 
legitimization to its policy acts. As a result, the initiatives of the Commission based on 
the ideas of the European Council are likely to have an effect further on the policy-
making process. This happens because of the echo of the powerful political voice 
of the European Council (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011:57) and the  circumstance 
that the members of the Council of Ministers “consider themselves bound in their 
decision-making by the position taken earlier by their Heads of Government” (Werts, 
1992:145). As a result, it can be observed “the paradoxical sight of the Commission 
carrying out its initiating role not by means of its formal rights, but via the back 
door of the European Council” (Werts, 2008:53). Therefore, while the  European 
Council has eroded the Commission’s power of initiation, at the same time it has 
“upgraded” the political position of the latter (Werts, 2008:52). The Commission’s 
role may not be as central as initially designed, “but it has broadened its area of 
activity: a development largely due to the European Council” (Bulmer and Wessels, 
1989:113). 
On the other hand, as much as the European Council’s authoritative behavior may 
promote the Commission’s position, it may also constrain it. The former institution 
with its ideas restraints the latter in a political sense (Werts, 2008:25). The European 
Council imposes its agenda on the Commission, challenging the role of the latter in 
policy initiation (Allerkamp, 2010). The European Council represents one of the most 
significant pressures suffered by the Commission, as it is obliged to respond to its 
proposals’ requests (Nugent, 2010a:123). This has consolidated an innovative informal 
way in the policy-making process that has importantly restricted the Commission’s 
authority on policy initiation (Ponzano, et al.: 3). However, this is not entirely new. 
Already since the origins of the  European Council, it was feared the intrusion of 
this institution on the Commission’s independence and right to propose, owing to 
the former’s growing interest to initiate policies and to set specific guidelines (Bulmer 
and Wessels, 1989:109). Over the years, the increasing role of the European Council 
and its presidency have accounted “for the weakening of the Commission’s right of 
initative” (Rasmussen, 2007:250). 
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Possible pattern 3: unidirectional interaction —the Commission 
influences the European Council 
The previous research line contrasts with the idea that the Commission does 
exercise a  powerful role vis-à-vis the European Council. This is largely possible 
as the  Commission “is in possession of a range of appropriate power resources” 
(Nugent, 2001:17). Some of the assets of the institution are its official mandate of 
initiation; its access to privileged technical information; its strategic position that 
gives it the ability to sense the possible responses of member states to its proposals; 
and its key role managing powerful policy networks (Nugent, 2001:17). 
Consequently, according to Marks et al., “[t]he European Commission is a critical 
actor in the policy initiation phase, whether one looks at formal rules or practice. If 
one surveys the evidence one cannot conclude that the Commission serves merely as 
an agent of state executives” (Marks et al., 1996:361). Even when the Commission 
is requested by the European Council to come up with a proposal, “the former still 
has the final say on the content and date of submitting a proposal (or not submit it)” 
(Eggermont, 2012:106). 
In this line, Marks and colleagues have barely conceded power to the European 
Council but to the Commission. They have argued that in spite of the European 
Council’s authority, “its control of the European agenda is limited because it meets 
rarely and has only a skeleton permanent staff” (Marks et al., 1996:357). Therefore, 
the idea that the Commission’s role has been undermined by the European Council 
should not be “exaggerated”, as the institutional design of the latter hinders its 
possibility of initiating and promotes instead a reactive behavior (Nugent, 2010a:123). 
Thus, given that the European Council can act neither innovatively nor autonomously 
due to its vulnerable configuration, it depends strongly on the proposals presented 
to it by other institutions, circumstance that gives “agenda-setting opportunities for 
the Commission” (Nugent, 2001:187). In this sense, many indications of problems 
and solutions seem to originate in the Commission, due to its wide-ranging resources. 
That is, its direct access to experts’ knowledge on all sorts of areas, broad staff 
infrastructure, and formal mandate of policy initiation enable it to have an open radar 
to recognize issues and provide indications to the European Council (cf. Nugent, 
2001: 17), making this institution in need of the Commission. The Commission, 
supported on its machinery, may show problems and propose initiatives on policy 
issues that the European Council with its restricted structure may not be able to 
identify. Another reason of the Commission’s influence seems to be that the much 
narrower agenda capacity of the European Council finds a way to overcome this 
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limitation through the broader information-processing capacity of the Commission. 
Therefore, the European Council depends on the Commission to deal with policy 
problems. 
Possible pattern 4: bidirectional interaction
The last stream, as distinguished in this project, argues that the institutions shape 
the  agenda jointly. Accordingly, the influence between the two political bodies is 
reciprocal, “as the input of one feeds into the work of the other” (Bocquillon and 
Dobbels, 2014:26). They depend on each other to be able to go further with their 
ideas (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:26), as well as to achieve goals (Alexandrova, 
2014:5). 
The Commission with its broader capacity in terms of personnel and expertise in 
specialized areas is useful for the European Council to compensate its constraints 
and narrow down its general approach, in order to transform general guidelines 
into concrete initiatives (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:25). In spite of being EU’s 
authoritative political venue and providing political impetus to the Commission, 
the European Council equally needs the support of the Commission to be able to 
process issues that otherwise cannot do alone. 
Their interrelation is evidenced in the way they contribute to each other in 
the  generation and development of ideas for policy action.44 The Commission, 
autonomous as it is formally supposed to be by mandate, has the power to produce 
initiatives by its own, which the European Council may agree with and consider as 
guidelines for the EU. This is likely to happen because the Commission is particularly 
involved in an active way in the preparation of the agenda of the  summits of 
the European Council providing it with reports on compelling issues (Nugent 2001: 
187). Since a  small percentage of policy proposals is spontaneoulsy produced 
independently by the  Commission (Fitzmaurice, 1994; Nugent, 2001:236–237), it 
can lean on the European Council and other EU institutions to formulate an idea 
of legislation (Nugent, 2001: 238–241). The European Council distinguishes from 
the Council and the Parliament in that it officially does not have the mandate to 
demand from the Commission to submit a proposal, but it may ‘invite’ the Commission 
to do it via the conclusive statements of its summits (Werts, 1992:143; Höing 
and Wessels, 2013:134–135). Such invitations entail a heavy political weight. At 
44 In strict sense, it is practically impossible to identify the prime source of an idea (Kingdon, 2011: 
71–73). However, according to Princen, it is possible to make an estimation of the origins of an idea when 




the same time, much of the discussions during the European Council meetings occur 
“on the basis of papers that have been drawn up by the Commission” (Nugent, 
2001:214). In fact, the Commission’s informational contribution to the European 
Council was made official when the latter institution adopted its Rules of Procedure 
in 2009. Accordingly, the Commission —in the shape of its President— is involved 
in the  preparation of the agenda of the European Council and the follow-up of 
their conclusions (European  Council, 2009, Annex: Art. 2–3). In this way, “whilst 
the European Council sets the terms of reference for such reports, the Commission 
has an additional political legitimation so that government heads might be induced 
to take the reports seriously” (Bulmer and Wessels, 1989:113). 
The institutions need each other to get an issue higher on the agenda, as 
the  intersection of their different agenda-setting processes offers complementing 
opportunities in policymaking to achieve major outcomes (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006:1122, 1129–1130). According to the Routes Framework, the two distinct 
processes of setting the agenda in the EU involve the interaction of high and low 
political levels at different moments and stages in the process.45 The high politics 
route includes the participation of low politics institutions and vice versa. Agenda 
interaction occurs mostly due to the opportunities the institutions provide each 
other for an issue to eventually achieve high agenda status, considering their distinct 
political resources. While the European Council is able to provide a important political 
boost for the EU to handle and decide on an issue, the Commission can progressively 
create broader and steady support to deal with an issue in the EU and adopt it. 
The former chance is taken by the Commission, and the latter advantage is used by 
the European Council.46 
The institutions are interdependent also because the European Council is “a power 
station not connected to the grid” that thus needs the Commission to crystallize its 
45 Accordingly, an issue follows four phases in EU agenda setting: initiation, specification, expansion and 
entrance (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). The characteristics of each stage vary depending on the type of 
route, whether from above or below. In the route from above, the European Council takes up an issue after 
the occurrence of a symbolic event; then the institution defines the problem in general terms on the basis 
of a common approach for the EU; it later expands the issue to the low politics institutions that have a say 
in policymaking; finally the issue enters the agenda for decision making after a strong political stimulus. In 
the route from below, the Commission initially attends an issue based on concerns from its community of 
experts; later, the institution frames the issue in a specific and technical way according to the specialized 
background of the experts group; then it moves the issue to high level institutions with decision power; and 
finally, after doing this in a gradual and sustainable way, the issue is practically to be decided. 
46 The joint work of the distinct political levels and its usefulness has also been recognized by Mazey and 
Richardson, who have argued that the high and low politics are significantly interrelated, as the latter 
helps the former to construct the context where the former operates (Mazey and Richardson, 1995:354). 
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choices, which requires the two institutions “to work together to make the system 
work”  (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:24). Ultimately a “circular pattern of 
interactions” is perceived (Alexandrova, 2014:5). In this sense, “the tandem European 
Council-Commission can be conceptualized as a joint agenda setter” (Bocquillon and 
Dobbels, 2014:27).
Their interdependance is caused to a large extent by a parallel growth of supranational 
and intergovermental policymaking elements that “turns the Commission into 
a partner to the European Council —due to shared responsibilities and a joint problem-
solving” (Höing and Wessels, 2013:138–139). They are “partners” working jointly 
handling problems and responsabilities equally and complementing their tasks (Höing 
and Wessels, 2013:126, 138–139). Also “a form of institutional interdependency” 
happens because of the participation of the Commission President in the European 
Council and the engagement of the latter insitution in the selection of the former 
position (Alexandrova, 2014:5). Thus the institutions are associates in policymaking, 
experiencing a “horizontal fusion” (Höing and Wessels, 2013:126).
3.3. Summary and the way forward for the analysis
This chapter introduced the Agenda Dynamics Approach, the theoretical framework 
developed in this project to study the processes of the institutions in agenda setting. 
It described the way this conceptual model was constructed and its propositions. 
It started by presenting the main theoretical foundations, namely, the notion of 
attention, the Processing Model and the Routes Framework. It later showed 
the more specific components of ADA. We saw that this theoretical perspective 
distinguishes two types of EU agenda dynamics: the intra- and inter-agenda 
dynamics. Accordingly, ADA entails two main parts, each built on a different basis. 
First, the  part on the  intra-agenda dynamics was deductively shaped, supported 
by existing theory and thus concrete hypotheses were generated. The overall 
expectation is that the  intra-agenda dynamics of the institutions are mostly 
different over time. Second, the inter-agenda dynamics part followed an inductive 
view. It was developed in this way, as there are different ideas in academia on 
how the interaction occurs and there is hardly empirical evidence on one particular 
pattern happening in the long run. Consequently, no specific expectation on their 
inter-agenda dynamics was formulated. Rather, four possible patterns are equally 
considered and explored: no interaction between the  institutions; the European 
Council influences the  Commission; the Commission influences the European 
Council; and the institutions influence each other.     
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The next steps in the dissertation are related to the analysis. They are about how ADA 
is applied. The subsequent chapter presents important characteristics and analytical 
relevance of the policy problem of organized crime, as the field studied in this project 
to identify the agenda dynamics. Afterwards, the next chapter introduces the data 
and methods. This is followed by three analytical chapters. The first two chapters are 
on the intra-dynamics of the European Council and the Commission, respectively. 
The last analytical chapter is on their inter-agenda dynamics. In the final chapter, 
conclusions of this research are drawn, based on the empirical findings.
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C h a p t e r  4
After showing the theoretical lens used in this study, this chapter introduces 
the policy domain of organized crime. The aim is to show the relevance of this topic 
for this study from an analytical point of view, while becoming acquainted with it. 
The chapter has four parts. The first section gives a brief overview of the justification 
for studying the domain. The second part explains more in detail the methodological 
reasons for using OC as a policy theme in this research. In doing so, the origin 
and development of the organized crime domain in the EU framework, as defined 
by the  Treaties, are presented. The third section deals with the debates revolving 
around the conceptualization of OC and explains further the implications for how 
to measure the policy issue. At the same time, the literature on organized crime is 
reviewed. In the final section, a summary is provided.  
4.1. The subject of study
As argued by Thurber, “[l]ocating the real policy agenda of the government requires 
an in-depth and prolonged analysis” (Thurber, 2011:vii). Such a comprehensive 
study is less facilitated when many policy areas, not to say the whole agenda, are 
observed in the long run, as this presupposes a more generic type of study. As Princen 
has claimed, limiting the range of policy domains is necessary when conducting 
a profound empirical study on agenda dynamics because the researcher shall have 
a clear understanding of the policy area and debates around it (Princen, 2009:44). 
Studying a single policy field enables us to conduct a thorough and longitudinal 
study and obtain detailed insights on the processes. 
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The policy domain of organized crime is analyzed to illustrate the dynamics of 
the European Council agenda and the Commission agenda in the period 1975–2013. 
It is a vehicle for this purpose. This is a methodological and empirical choice for 
the reasons explained in the remaining of this chapter. 
In short, as will be shown below, organized crime is important for this study because, 
in contrast to other policy fields, this domain allows us to observe the behaviors 
of the institutions under similar and balanced conditions. In addition, focusing on 
OC allows us to become substantially familiar with the topic and the discussion 
in and outside academia on its definition. These circumstances promote not only 
to make better sense of the processes experienced by the institutions, but also to 
better measure the phenomenon. Last but not least, organized crime has been barely 
studied from a political science approach, in particular using an agenda setting lens. 
Altogether these elements facilitate obtaining a firm grasp on EU agenda dynamics, 
while also contributing to fill a gap in the literature on OC.  
4.2. Organized crime as an EU policy theme 
As claimed in the literature, not all issues are the same and not all institutions 
respond similarly to them. On the one hand, there are diverse attributes, such as 
solubility and complexity, that may vary between issues (Peters, 2005). It would be 
thus misleading to assume that all issues reach the agenda equally. In reality, issues 
do not have the same opportunity to enter it (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Actually, 
a key question in agenda-setting studies is why some issues make it onto the agenda 
while others not. On the other hand, it would be deceptive to think that all types of 
institutions attend issues alike. Some issues may promote more (stable patterns of) 
political conflict than others (Lowi, 1964, 1972). In addition, “[t]he institutional and 
political framework within which polities operate favours consideration for some 
issues while discouraging consideration for others” (Princen, 2007:22). In other 
words, institutions are biased (Schattschneider, 1960).
In the context of the European Union, these conditions are problematic when 
conducting empirical research, given also the complex features of EU policymaking. 
For instance, in this political system policy-making organizations have overlapping 
competences and in some cases even distinct institutional designs —as the European 
Council and the Commission have. In addition, while —contrary to countries— 
the EU does not have faculties to deal with all policy areas (TEU:art.5),47 over time its 
47 The EU has limits on what policy issues can address given the subsidiarity principle, by which “the Union 
shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States… [and instead]  be better achieved at the Union level” (TEU:art.5).
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competences have expanded and it has become involved in an important number of 
fields.48 Actually, as claimed by Lelieveldt and Princen, “it is increasingly difficult to 
name a policy area in which the EU plays no role at all. Nevertheless there are vast 
differences in the degree of EU involvement in various areas” (2015: 181). On top of 
these circumstances, EU policymaking entails a sui generis arrangement that requires 
an active participation of supranational and/or intergovernmental organizations, 
depending on the policy filed.
In this sea of policy domains possible to study and variations in the performance 
of EU institutions, organized crime stands out because the European Council and 
the  Commission deal with this domain more or less similarly. In this sense, OC is 
referred to in this study as a ‘comparable’ policy domain for these institutions. 
Moreover, OC is not an extreme area in that, on the one hand, EU competences over 
the years have developed in the middle between supranational and intergovernmental 
spheres. And, on the other hand, the evolution of OC in the EU framework also 
stands in between traditional and new policy domains. OC is thus called here a ‘mid-
range’ field. For these reasons, on the whole organized crime represents a baseline 
to study the dynamics, as it provides a reference point to look at the behaviors of 
the  institutions in an impartial and moderate setting, in relation to the bunch of 
complex possibilities in the EU system. 
4.2.1. A comparable policy domain
The agendas of both institutions attend organized crime relatively in equal terms, in 
contrast to the way it happens with other policy domains. Each institution is inclined 
to handle particular issues. For instance, the European Council gives attention 
specially to macroeconomics and the Commission to health. In general there are 
issues regularly more important for each of them, just as there are issues commonly 
less salient. An example of the latter situation is science and technology particularly 
for the case of the European Council. However, organized crime is under the political 
radar of both institutions alike somewhere in the middle of saliency. Put differently, 
these actors react almost equally to OC. It seems that neither institution is the ‘owner’ 
of organized crime. It is thus a comparable domain for them. 
This situation is appropriate for the comparison of the trends in the attention of each 
institution and the analysis of their interaction, given that neither political body clearly 
dominates in this domain. This is relevant in analytical terms, especially considering 
48 For an overview of general areas, as officially established by the EU with the Lisbon Treaty (the last 
treaty revision so far), see TEU:art.3. For more specific areas, as analytically conceived by scholars, see for 
instance Lelieveldt and Princen (2015: 180–182) and Nugent (2010: 303–306). 
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central propositions of the Agenda Dynamics Approach by which, on the one hand, 
it is expected that the intra-dynamics are different due to the distinct institutional 
designs and, on the other hand, it is argued that the intra-dynamics affect the inter-
dynamics. Given the features of organized crime as a comparable policy domain, 
a bias stemming from the domain itself can be discarded, enabling us to conduct 
a study of both institutions based on conditions of similarity. Otherwise, it would 
be practically prearranged to obtain from the analysis the result that the  agenda 
dynamics of the European Council and the Commission differ. 
The conclusions exposed here were drawn after conducting an examination of 
the literature, as described in the following part. 
In search of the policy field
Given the existence of numerous policy areas and in order to get an impression of 
a potential one, I started by looking at problems that have a generalized opinion 
and agreement in society, that is, valence issues —as opposed to position issues.49 
According to the literature on valence politics, crime is an “excellent contemporary 
example” of a valence issue because “almost everyone wants protection from 
the security threats posed by criminals” (Clarke et al., 2011:238). 
A central reason why basically all people share this view is that organized crime aims 
at generating profits out of illegal methods and networks, provoking a widespread 
damage. Criminal organizations “represent a multibillion dollar set of networks that 
prey on every aspect of global society, distorting markets, corrupting governments, 
and draining huge resources from both” (World Economic Forum, 2010). Criminal 
networks put in risk not only fragile states, but also developed countries. The impact 
in different parts of the world can vary, “but the common feature is that organized 
crime negatively affects the life chances of ordinary people: it undercuts key 
institutions, damages the environment, distorts or impedes economic growth and it 
fuels conflict” (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime website). In 
this regard, two worldwide developments have played a significant role in the active 
evolution of organized crime as a global problem: the ending of the Cold War and 
the ongoing globalization. It is true that these events have stimulated the liberalization 
of the economy and trade, as well as facilitated migration flows and expansion of 
49 Valence and position issues are distinguished in the literature on valence politics, a notion in electoral 
studies that explains electoral behavior and preference of voters, based on valence issues (Clarke et al., 
2011). Valence issues are contrary to position issues, on which conflicting views may emerge (Butler and 
Stokers, 1969: 189). An example of a position issue is death penalty in the United States, where the social 
debate has mainly centered on pro- and anti-moral arguments (Baumgartner et al., 2008:6). 
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communications, but they have brought ‘opportunities’ also for criminals activities, 
due to a deficiency in global governance. As a consequence, over the years “[o]
rganized crime has diversified, gone global and reached macro-economic proportions 
(…) fueling corruption, infiltrating business and politics, and hindering development” 
(United Nations, 2010:ii). Particularly in Europe, “[s]erious and organized crime is 
an increasingly dynamic and complex phenomenon, and remains a significant threat 
to the safety and prosperity of the EU” (Europol and British Chamber of Commerce, 
2013:foreword).
In effect, in the European Union, “[o]rganized crime is a threat to European citizens, 
businesses, state institutions as well as the economy as a whole”, according to 
the Commission (DG Migration and Home Affairs website). In the view of the Council, 
OC is mostly a menace “to society as we know it and want to preserve it”, given that 
criminal organizations “pervade the various structures of civil society, and indeed society 
as a whole” (Council of Ministers, 1997:Chapter I). Following a  threat assessment 
made by the European Police Office (Europol), OC represents a “significant threat to 
the internal security of the EU and its citizens”, who are directly and indirectly harmed 
by it (Europol, 2011:47). For instance, it is estimated that drug trafficking affects 
the life of millions of persons who consume drugs; VAT fraud activities have a serious 
impact on taxpayers’ interests and governments’ supply of public services, due to 
the loss of billions of euros from public revenue; trafficking of humans employed as 
irregular workforce generates unfair competition in the job market; and counterfeiting 
of medicinal products puts in risk the health and safety of citizens (Ibid). Altogether, 
OC causes severe damage not only to the  “financial integrity” of the European 
Union, but also to its “foundations” (PWC Belgium and PWC Netherlands, 2011:17). 
According to Eurobarometer, organized crime in the EU worries its citizens. European 
citizens considered this problem a main concern uninterruptedly for 8 consecutive 
years, in the period between 2003 and 2010, even above any other domain within 
the JHA area (Standard Eurobarometers 59–73). 
In this way, taking into account the academic claim and the concerns from policymakers, 
practitioners and society, a hint of where potentially to look at to conduct this study 
was obtained. Accordingly, OC seemed like a policy domain that the European Council 
and the Commission may prefer to address likewise. 
Therefore, once identifying some features of the problem globally and in the EU, 
I observed the few existing studies on the attention of the European Council and 
the Commission to policy issues in general. This provided evidence that confirmed 
the initial hint. 
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On the one hand, previous work on the European Council has demonstrated that this 
institution devotes considerably more attention to three “core” themes, namely, foreign 
affairs, governance, and macroeconomics —from a pool of more than 20 policy domains 
analyzed (Alexandrova et al., 2012). The field of crime is relatively at the intermediate 
level. Issues that regularly receive less consideration are, for example, science and 
technology and social policy. In addition, research on the institution’s attention to 
the problem of organized crime has argued that “OC is not systematically traded off 
when other matters push the Heads of State or Government to addressed them” (Elias 
and Timmermans, 2014:172). Also according to the study, a less crowded European 
Council agenda is not necessary for OC to get access. This is a  remarkable feature 
of this domain because issues in general compete for attention against other issues, 
promoting considerable variations in the way they are taken up (or not) by policy-making 
institutions. On the other hand, previous research has shown that the  Commission 
gives particular attention to agriculture, external trade, health and transport —more 
than to the remaining fifteen policy issues examined (Alexandrova, 2014). Further, as 
demonstrated by earlier work, the broader domain of Justice and Home Affairs “is 
almost equally addressed by the two institutional venues” (Alexandrova, 2017:764). 
Within JHA, the attention of the European Council and the  Commission to crime 
fluctuates on average similarly on their agendas over time, while other issues, such 
as education and culture, are practically neglected by both institutions (Alexandrova, 
2014).50 All in all, this domain appears to be positioned intermediately in a sort of 
spectrum of ‘core-noncore’ policy topics for both political bodies. 
4.2.2. A mid-range policy domain
While being a comparable policy issue suits organized crime well in this study, 
this situation is not necessarily sufficient, considering EU’s complex policymaking. 
Accounting for the formal policy process in this field becomes a sort of requirement 
to be indeed able to capture a baseline of how the institutions behave under similar 
and balanced conditions. This is important to do, even when it has been argued in 
the literature that the arrival of issues on the agenda “does not depend on a legal 
competence in the EU treaties” (Princen, 2012:43). It is relevant because it is reasonable 
to think that it can be a factor that may provide an advantage, if the faculties of one 
institution prevail in the process over time, in comparison with the competences 
of the other institution. Thus, if we are to conduct a longitudinal study of agenda 
dynamics of political institutions entailing a different nature —the European Council 
50 For research on their interaction regarding specific events (e.g. Climate and Energy package of 2008) 
that are “characterized by a high degree of involvement of the two institutions” in the years right before 
and after the Lisbon Treaty, see Bocquillon and Dobbels (2014:29).  
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being an intergovermental body and the Commission a supranational one—, it 
seems wise in this study to analyse a domain that does not face completely one side 
of the coin, but that it is rather a mid-range field. 
Organized crime in this regard is appropriate for this research because neither 
institution notably leads in policymaking. This contrasts to, for example, foreign 
affairs and common market issues, where the involvement of the European Council 
and the Commission —respectively— is and has been specially high. The organized 
crime domain has rather changed over time in such a way that it is an area neither 
purely intergovernmental nor purely supranational. Organized crime policies have 
been developed over time between the EU as a whole and the member states. This 
domain is not extreme as other fields, such as culture —where the EU has almost no 
competence— and monetary policy —where EU’s authority is practically absolute. 
Moreover, OC has an intermediate level of evolution, in relation to other areas 
that were created when the EU originated, like agriculture, or relatively recently, 
such as bioterrorism. This characteristic conveniently fits the research. To conduct 
a longitudinal study, a domain established already in the origins of the EU may not be 
entirely appropriate because the European Council was not formally functioning yet, 
which may give a (dis)advantage to one of the two institutions. Moreover, a domain 
embedded in the EU institutional framework only in recent years may not provide 
enough time frame to identify underlying dynamics.
These conclusions are based on an analysis on the institutionalization of organized 
crime as an EU domain and the policymaking role of EU institutions, according to 
the Treaties. The conclusions are also supported on the literature. The examination 
is described below. 
The institutionalization of organized crime in the EU framework
The history of OC as an EU policy domain started officially in 1993 with the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty incorporated for the first time organized 
crime and many other policy domains. It formalized diverse policy fields based on 
a classification scheme of three areas known as ‘pillars’: first pillar (or Community 
pillar); second pillar (or Common Foreign and Security Policy); and third pillar (or Justice 
and Home Affairs area). OC was included in the third pillar. This pillar established that 
police cooperation shall be promoted “for the purposes of preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, 
including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation” (TEU: art. K.1). This 
was done with a view to achieve the free movement of persons in the EU. In this way, 
OC acquired a political housing in the EU framework under the JHA area. 
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With revisions to the Treaty, the jurisdictional framework of OC evolved. The treaty 
has been amended so far in three occasions, in 1999, 2003 and 2009. These 
amendments are known as Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty, and Lisbon Treaty, 
respectively. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the third pillar changed its name from JHA 
to Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Some organized crime issues related 
to the free movement of persons, such as human trafficking, were transferred to 
the  first pillar. From all three amendments, the Amsterdam Treaty brought most 
of the changes for the AFSJ area, but specially for the organized crime domain. 
The Treaty established that “crime, organized or otherwise, in particular terrorism, 
trafficking in persons and offenses against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit 
arms trafficking, corruption and fraud” should be prevented and combated (TEU: art. 
29). The aim was to provide safety to EU citizens in the AFSJ. With the Nice Treaty, 
the OC domain did not suffer significant changes. Finally, with the Lisbon Treaty, 
the  ‘pillar’ structure was abolished. Both the third and first pillars were subsumed 
and organized crime remained under the jurisdiction of AFSJ.
As a consequence of the amendments to the Maastricht Treaty, the policy-making 
process in the domain of organized crime has also suffered changes. Initially, 
the  Maastricht Treaty established the so-called ‘intergovernmental method’ for 
the  third pillar. Also known as ‘consultation procedure’, this method empowered 
the member states, rather than the Commission, to propose initiatives in the areas 
of terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime, as well as in any 
other matter in the JHA area (TEU, art.: K.1, K.3). The Commission was entitled to 
combat only fraud (Ibid).51 The Council was responsible for deciding on initiatives by 
unanimity (TEU, art.: K.3), previous consultation with the Parliament (TEU, art.: K.6). 
With the Amsterdam Treaty, the same method was maintained for most OC issues. 
However, there was a major modification for the Commission: the scope of its power 
of initiation broadened. It was entitled to propose proposals to combat organized 
crime, terrorism, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, corruption 
and fraud (TEU, art.: K.1, K.6). The conditions for the Council and the Parliament 
remained the same (TEU, art: K.6, K.11). For those OC issues that moved from 
the  third to the first pillar, a different process applied: the ‘community method’. 
Under this method, also known as ‘codecision procedure’, only the Commission was 
able to issue proposals. The Council decided by qualified majority voting together 
with the Parliament. Thus, with the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission was enabled 
to deal with all sorts of organized crime problems. However, a transitional period 
51 The Commission was, however, entitled to initiate legislative acts regarding other JHA matters, such as 
migration policies (TEU, Art. K1, K3).   
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of five years was established for those OC issues related to the free movement of 
people, such as human trafficking. This means the Commission enjoyed the exclusive 
power of initiative on these issues and other JHA matters in the end of 2004. 
During this transition the Council continued deciding by unanimity, after consulting 
the Parliament. As from the Lisbon Treaty, mostly the community method, now called 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’, applies for all types of OC issues (TFEU:art. 74).52 
In addition, since the end–1990s, the so-called ‘multi-annual programs’ have 
given shape to organized crime policy. This has been promoted to a large extent 
by the Amsterdam Treaty and its goal of achieving freedom, security and justice in 
the EU. These programs are strategic action plans of 5 years adopted every cycle 
by the European Council, in order to define the key priorities to be achieved in all 
domains in the area of justice and home affairs. During the research period, three 
were established, namely, the Tampere Programme (1999–2004), Hague Programme 
(2005–2009), and Stockholm Programme (2010–2014).
After recognizing these developments, the involvement of the institutions was 
identified by observing the three ‘pillars’.53 This gave us an indication of whether 
the  conditions between the institutions are more or less similar. As mentioned, 
organized crime belongs to the JHA area. Before commenting on this pillar, let us first 
examine the other two. On the one hand, the Community pillar is basically the territory 
of the Commission, especially because the institution has the monopoly in policy 
initiation. On the other hand, the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar is more 
the dominion of the European Council because most decisions are intergovermental. 
In this sense, the JHA pillar stands between the other two pillars. Issues in this area 
involve the participation of supranational and intergovernmental levels. In effect, 
as Trauber and Ripoll have argued: “[w]ith the changing involvement and decision-
making powers of the EU’s supranational institutions, the AFSJ provides a quite unique 
setting” for the discussion on the role of EU institutions and policy dynamics (Trauner 
and Ripoll Servent, 2016:1418). Looking at the development of the policy process in 
the organized crime domain, we can identify that the rules have been modified over 
time (cf. Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016), passing through different positions in 
the policy-making spectrum. In the beginning, when OC was established as a policy 
field by the Maastricht Treaty, intergovernmental institutions were primarily leading 
the policy process. Some years later, this situation changed with the Amsterdam Treaty 
when many OC issues were decided for the first time by supranational institutions 
52 In some cases, however, member states can also initiate proposals (TFEU: art. 76).
53 Although the conceptualization of the EU setup in three ‘pillars’ ended with the Lisbon Treaty, it is used 
here as a reference to distinguish the type of policymaking across EU policy domains.
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and many other matters remained under the intergovernmental say. In the previous 
decade, the Lisbon Treaty moved the process towards the supranational side. This 
situation is what currently applies. 
In the same line, as part of the JHA area, organized crime is a policy field whose 
level of authority in decision-making has changed over the years between “shared 
competences light” and “medium”, according to Börzel (Börzel, 2005). These 
concepts refer to the arena where the competences on policy issues are located. 
In the  former level, the competences reside mostly at the national level; while, in 
the  latter level, the  competences are divided between the national and EU level 
(Börzel, 2005:221–222). Thus, following Börzel’s distinction of the level of authority 
vis-à-vis- issue areas, organized crime is a mild policy field rather than extreme as 
other topics in which the EU is either completely involved or (almost) not involved, 
such as monetary policy and culture, respectively.   
Finally, during the examination of the development of the organized crime domain, 
it became evident that this field has also a middle level of evolution, in comparison 
with other areas. As observed, the embedment of OC in the EU framework happened 
in the beginning of the 1990s. In this way, OC stands in an intermediate position, in 
relation to other EU policy domains. It is not a traditional domain, such as agriculture, 
institutionalized since the origins of the EU (Commission, 2012:3). Also it is not so 
novel as the field of bioterrorism, which started to be tackled under the EU remit in 
the beginning of the new century (Princen and Rhinard, 2006:1126). 
4.3. Debates on the definition of organized crime 
There is no consensus in the European Union on the meaning of organized crime. 
Each member state has its own conceptualization, as extensively argued by OC 
scholars (Den Boer, 2001; Von Lampe, 2008; Allum et al., 2010; Vander Beken, 
2012; Allum and Boer, 2013). However, “most European countries agree that each 
has an organized crime problem” (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004: 2) and share that they 
“have to some extent drawn attention to organized crime” (Den Boer, 2001: 265). 
Notwithstanding this, no European Union-wide approach exists.54
54 The EU is however not an exemption. OC is a topic that has no shared definition in the world. Attempts 
to achieve global uniformity have been done, though. The United Nations started negotiations in December 
1998 to convene an instrument to support the fight against organized crime (2004:1). This international 
organization was triggered by “the rapid growth in the scale and scope of the problem in the post-Cold 
War” (United Nations, 2010: 25). Two years later, a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
also called Palermo Convention, was adopted (United Nations, 2004). This instrument finally entered into 
force in September 2003 once ratified by 147 countries, out of 185 (UN Treaty Collection website). It is 
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This is the current situation, also in spite of two major EU policy instruments adopted 
to define organized crime and contribute to fight the problem. The EU approved 
a Joint Action in 1998 (Council of Ministers, 1998) and a Framework Decision in 
2008 (Council of Ministers, 2008). The latter instrument amended the former. In 
the two cases, the EU centered its efforts to define mainly the actors —or criminal 
organizations—, albeit broadly. When we compare the definitions between the two 
instruments, they differ in the ultimate aim of a criminal group. The Joint Action 
established three possible objectives: to achieve the perpetration of a crime, to 
get resources, and to disturb governmental activities.55 The Framework Decision 
focuses on the idea that any criminal organization pursues only an economic goal.56 
Regarding the offences, or the types of crimes, no specific definition was included 
in any of the  two instruments. However, the Joint Action in article 1 established 
that, in order to identify the criminal activities, it was necessary to refer to the list 
of crimes contained in another document: the Europol Convention. When we look 
at this Convention, some illegal activities included are drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, trafficking in works or arts and terrorism (Council of Ministers, 1995:art. 
2 and its annex).57 The Framework Decision discarded such list. This policy instrument 
attempted to establish the meaning of an offense, but in reality it did not make 
significant changes. One of the most notable modifications was done to article 2, 
the instrument with major relevance at the international level to tackle OC. It conceptualizes the notions of 
organized criminal group and serious crime (United Nations, 2000: Art. 2). Nevertheless, as acknowledged 
by United Nations itself, the Convention includes neither a precise definition nor a list of the types 
of crimes that should be considered part of (transnational) organized crime (2010: 25). According to 
the international organization, it was conceived in this way for two important reasons. First, there is no 
consensus on its meaning and, second, OC is a constantly-transforming matter. Therefore, “[i]n order to 
accommodate this complexity, a precise definition was omitted” (Ibid).
55 “A criminal organization shall mean a structured association, established over a period of time, of 
more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, 
whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, where 
appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities” (Council of Ministers, 1998: 
art. 1).
56 “(A) criminal organisation means a structured association, established over a period of time, of more 
than two persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation 
of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (Council of Ministers, 2008: art. 1).
57 The complete list of crimes includes: terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and 
radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings, motor vehicle crime, illegal 
money-laundering activities, as well as other international criminal acts against “life, limb or personal 
freedom”-such as illicit trade in human organs and tissue, kidnapping, racism and xenophobia-, and 
against “property or public goods including fraud –like trafficking in cultural goods and works of art, 
counterfeiting and piracy, forgery of administrative documents, computer crime and corruption-, as well 
as “illegal trading and harm to the environment” –e.g. trafficking in arms, smuggling of animal species 
and environmental crime- (Council of Ministers, 1995: art. 2 and its annex).
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which refers in a generic way to the types of criminal “conduct” (Council of Ministers, 
1998, 2008: art. 2). The Framework Decision added the title “Offences relating to 
participation in a criminal organization” to this article, heading that the Joint Action 
did not have (Ibid). The content remained practically the same.58  
4.3.1. Implications for a better measurement 
While the concept of organized crime is in general heterogeneous, its case is not 
peculiar from a political science perspective. All issues are intrinsically multidimensional 
and have a “malleable” nature (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993: 59). As Rochefort and 
Cobb have argued: “The first thing to note about the malleability of public issues 
—their openness to competing interpretations as well as factual distortion— is that 
they are not unique in this way” (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993: 59). In the context of 
the European Union, it seems that there is actually no problem that is easily definable 
and solvable, given the cross-linkages between issues that, before the opening of 
the EU borders, were practically only national. Nowadays, problems in one member 
state cannot exist outside of the scope of the other members. Issues are thus 
intertwined in the EU, which seems to hinder a homogenous way to define them. 
Organized crime is thus in principle similar to other public issues.
The point here is that the property of malleability shall be taken into account because 
it has methodological implications on how to measure the policy problem, especially 
because we want to make a comprehensive research of agenda dynamics by means 
of the analysis of OC in particular. After all, “[l]imiting the scope of empirical study 
is necessary because examining agenda processes in-depth requires a firm grasp of 
the substantive policy issues and debates in the areas under study” (Princen, 2009: 
44). In addition, OC scholars have acknowledged that organized crime is “very 
much constructed by those who study it, fight it and encounter it” (Allum and Boer, 
2013:138). Thus, to avoid conducting a partial study and imposing the researcher’s 
own view on the policy problem, it is fundamental to know the discussion revolving 
around organized crime and become acquainted with the different ways this problem 
is considered. Let us find this out. 
58 Accordingly, two types of conduct from criminal organizations can be considered offenses: “(a) conduct 
by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of either the aim and general activity of the criminal 
organisation or its intention to commit the offences in question, actively takes part in the organisation’s 
criminal activities, including the provision of information or material means, the  recruitment of new 
members and all forms of financing of its activities, knowing that such participation will contribute 
to the  achievement of the organisation’s criminal activities; (b) conduct by any person consisting in 
an agreement with one or more persons that an activity should be pursued, which if carried out, would 
amount to the commission of offences referred to in Article 1, even if that person does not take part in 
the actual execution of the activity” (Council of Ministers, 2008: art. 2).
63
4
The policy problem of organized crime
To begin with, the lack of conceptual homogeneity in the EU lies on different factors. 
One reason seems to be that, as has been claimed by scholars, the problem of 
organized crime varies importantly across countries in the European Union (Fijnaut, 
1998:277–278). In addition, the “complex” nature of organized crime as a problem 
that has negative effects in a number of spheres —from social and economic to 
political and cultural— provokes highly controversial discussions, discouraging to 
reach a shared approach (Longo, 2010:15). Another motive is that “[a]ll definitions 
mirror a certain way of looking at this phenomenon”, thus some stress certain aspects 
of organised crime while others remark different features (Van Duyne, 1996:343). 
Also a reason is that in practice organized crime usually involves several problems 
simultaneously, such as trafficking in drugs, smuggling of people and illegal trade 
in arms (Europol and British Chamber of Commerce, 2013:2). Related to this is that 
organized crime is in constant change. It tries to adapt and cope with the existing and 
varying conditions, as well as with the legal setting where it is immersed, as argued 
by the Council of Europe: “Organized crime does not take place in a vacuum but in 
an ever changing environment. It is a dynamic process adapting to new opportunities 
for crime, to resources and skills available to potential criminal as well as to law 
enforcement and other control efforts. It may take different forms in different 
societies” (Council of Europe, 2005:19). Take the case of cigarette smuggling in 
the EU. This form of crime has been an option for criminal groups to circumvent 
the high penalties imposed to drug trafficking. And the reason is that the cigarette 
smuggling is a crime with lower fines and extensive profits (Europol, 2006, 2011). 
Further, organized crime groups have moved from a hierarchical structure with 
a well-established configuration to a rather loose network with a mutable operations’ 
scheme (Council of Europe, 2005:20; United Nations, 2010:27). As a result, “[t]oday, 
organized crime seems to be less a matter of a group of individuals who are involved 
in a range of illicit activities, and more a matter of a group of illicit activities in which 
some individuals and groups are presently involved” (United Nations, 2010:29).59 
59 Organized crime is however not a recent phenomenon. Its emergence dates back to long time ago 
in Europe and in other places around the world. As a term, its first appearance happened in the United 
States somewhere between the late 19th century (Woodiwiss, 2003:4; Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004:24) and 
the beginning of the 20th century (Von Lampe, 2001:104). However, far before its coinage, organized 
crime manifestations were present (United Nations, 2010:25). When the term originated, it had no specific 
meaning but it often alluded to professionals, such as politicians or lawyers, who conducted crimes in 
an ostensible organized context (Woodiwiss, 2003:4). Over the years, the term turned into an “organized 
crime control framework” with focus on drug regulation (Ibid: 25). In this way, it reached the international 
agenda in the early 1960s with the establishment of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, as a result of the US strong pressure and influence (Ibid). The spread of the American minting to 
the other side of the Atlantic seems to happen somewhere in the mid-1970s (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004:31). 
The concept was imported in Europe with the idea of an “illegal enterprise”, where a criminal organization 
64
Chapter 4
A final explanation is that OC has an intractable character because, not only criminal 
organizations “frequently operate a range of activities simultaneously: trading in 
tobacco, drugs, people, armaments, pornography and many others” (Europol, 2013:2). 
But also, with a view of reaching their financial goal, crime organizations operate mostly 
hidden and undercover. However, OC sometimes commutes from the underworld to 
the upperworld. Here a link between the illegal and legal spheres may happen when 
actors from both areas either ‘compete’ for a market (turning part of it black) or take 
advantage of each other’s characteristics to promote their activities and profits. This is 
what Passas has called “antithetical and symbiotic relationships” (Passas, 2002). 
As a consequence, organized crime entails a wide pallette of conceptualizations. This 
can be identified when looking at scholarly research and the work of practicioners. For 
instance, among EU countries this problem may vary from mafia-related in Italy with 
the Cosa Nostra and the ’Ndrangheta (Paoli, 2004) to terrorism-associated in Spain with 
the Basque separatist organization ETA (De la Cuesta, 2004), to mention only a few.60 
In general OC may be considered an umbrella concept that embraces all sorts of criminal 
activities under it, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and fraud (Council of 
Ministers, 1995). It may be also linked specifically to terrorism (Makarenko, 2004). 
Sometimes it may instead include terrorism within its scope (European Council, 1996). 
All these ways to look at the problem contrast with a conceptualization that entails 
a more individualistic character. In this sense, organized crime is defined as a separate 
phenomenon, different from specific crimes such as money laundering or corruption 
(Beare, 2003:xv). OC may be also studied in relation to white-collar crime, by 
which legitimate businessmen are conceived to serve also as criminal entrepreneurs 
(Ruggiero, 1996). 
In contrast to its activity-based definition, organized crime may be seen instead as 
an actor-based problem, highlighting “the criminal not the crime” (Harfield, 2010). 
Here the focus is on “the concept of criminal organization” (Cohen, 1977). As 
a consequence, a pronounced distinction between activities and groups of organized 
crime is present (Hagan, 2006). 
Additionally, OC may be more in general defined stressing its qualities as, for instance, 
‘organised’ crime (Finckenauer, 2005), ‘transnational’ crime (Edwards and Gill, 2002; 
Allum and Gilmour, 2012) or ‘serious’ crime (Dorn, 2009). 
—similar to a legal corporation in its structure and way of operation— is active in market areas outside 
the law, but whose commodities are demanded by consumers (Ibid: 28–31). 
60 For approximately 180 definitions of organized crime by scholars from all around the world and diverse 
international organizations, see Von Lampe (2015). 
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The policy problem of organized crime
Taking into consideration all these ideas in the discussion, a broad catalogue on 
organized crime issues was developed (see Appendix 1) for data collect purposes. 
This analytical tool was also used to support the development of a codebook on 
OC issues (see Appendix 2), which is a more refined analytical construct created 
a priori to conduct most part of the empirical analysis. Both instruments considered 
the different perspectives on how OC has been considered by academics and 
policymakers, based on the analysis on the debate, as just described. These tools 
avoided a limited view in the analysis of the policy problem. They also helped define 
what to measure exactly, circumstance that is relevant given the ‘malleability’ of 
policy issues. A detailed description on the way the catalogue and the codebook 
were elaborated is given in the chapter that follows, which deals with the Methods. 
Last but not least, after reviewing the literature with a view to become aware of 
central debates, we realized that there is another significant reason for selecting OC 
to study EU agenda dynamics: filling a gap in the literature. It became evident that 
thus far the policy field of organized crime has been subject of limited work from 
a political science perspective, particularly in the area of agenda setting. There is no 
systematic study on they way political actors in the European Union have dealt with 
the problem of organized crime as a policy theme in the long run. In addition, no 
study has analyzed the policy processes involved in the development of this domain 
stemming from the role of EU institutions. 
4.4. Summary
This chapter presented diverse features that make this domain analytically appropriate 
in this research. This was done to justify its analysis as a means to identify the dynamics 
of the European Council and the Commission in the long run. We observed that it is 
a comparable and mid-range policy field in the complex EU political system. That is, 
in contrast to how it happens with other policy domains, over time the attention of 
the European Council and the Commission to the OC topic has fluctuated likewise 
and OC policies have been produced between intergovernmental and supranational 
levels. This enables a study of the institutions based on conditions that discourage 
analytical advantages. In addition, we realized that OC is a malleable policy problem 
and that this has implications for how to collect data and measure the phenomenon. 
Finally, we also identified that there is little research on organized crime that follows 




C h a p t e r  5
Methodological strategy
The current chapter deals with the means used to address the research (sub)questions 
of this study. The aim is to show the data and methods. The chapter has four parts. 
First, it presents the sources and the way the data were collected. The second section 
introduces the methods to analyze intra-agenda dynamics. The third part deals with 
the techniques used for the study of inter-agenda dynamics. In the fourth section 
a summary is given.
5.1. The data: European Council and Commission agendas 
on organized crime 
The agendas of the European Council and the Commission between 1975 and 2013 
are studied. Observing the institutions on a long-term basis allow us to identify 
the underlying dynamics of their agendas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The research 
period starts in the year when the European Council started to function.61 The time 
frame ends four years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which is the last 
change made to the EU framework so far, and in the year of the last enlargement 
experienced by the EU at the time of writing. The empirical material of the project 
is constituted by key policy documents issued by the institutions. More specifically, 
the Conclusions of the European Council, and the COM docs of the Commission are 
used to reconstruct the political agendas.
61 The Commission’s origin —the 1950s— was not selected as the point of departure because we would 
lack information on the European Council of the years prior to its establishment.
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The Conclusions of the European Council
The Conclusions62 comprise the final statements on the discussions and decisions 
occurring during each summit of the European Council. This means that these policy 
documents are issued approximately four times per year, as a result of the gatherings 
that are usually held twice per semester. In each occasion, the Conclusions are adopted 
by consensus between all the heads of state or government. These policy documents 
have a generic nature, as they include all sorts of issues discussed during the meetings. 
These sources are appropriate to study the agenda of the European Council because, 
by this means, the institution communicates its wishes, concerns and opinions on EU 
issues. Through its Conclusions, the institution also expresses its ideas to an open 
public, addresses EU political bodies in general and targets particular political bodies. 
The texts often contain ideas for action, stemming explicitly from suggestions done 
by other institutions. 
The sources of this study include the Conclusions of regular summits, as well as informal 
and extraordinary meetings. The Conclusions of the so-called Eurosummits were not 
considered. The reason is that they do not entail the opinion of the European Council 
as a whole, but of the political leaders of the member states of the Eurozone. Other 
communications produced in the framework of the European Council meetings were 
not included because they do not represent the political agenda of the institution 
itself. For instance, press releases are not considered, given that they comprise only 
a summary on the topics discussed in the gatherings and the issues included are 
selected by the press center (of the General Secretariat) of the Council. A similar case 
happens with the statements published in the social media. Some of the platforms 
are twitter, facebook, and youtube.63 To begin with, given that information started 
to be posted via these channels somewhere around 2010,64 the platforms do not fit 
the research period of this study. Although the social media channels are meant to 
be official, they do not represent the view of the European Council, as a different 
office than the institution itself (so, regularly the General Secretariat of the Council) 
decides the information to be published. In addition, many of the platforms are not 
about the institution, but representatives of it. As an example, in facebook we can 
keep track of the activities of “Donald Tusk” in his role of President of the European 
62 Until the Lisbon Treaty, they were officially known as Presidency Conclusions. Afterwards, the official 
name changed. They are currently called European Council Conclusions.      
63 For an overview of the platforms in social media, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/contact/
social-media/, retrieved in April 2018.
64 The year is estimated considering the registration of the twitter accounts of the so-called “EU Council”, 
where information on both the European Council and Council are posted together. The “EU Council TV 




Council, whose “page is managed by the President’s media team”.65 Even when press 
releases and social media statements provide an overall impression of the ‘secret’ 
activities of the institution, they are not appropriate to reconstruct the actual political 
agenda, as set by the European Council. Ultimately, the Conclusions are the only 
valid source, as they constitute “the only written evidence of matters discussed and 
agreed by the heads of state or government, since meetings are held behind closed 
doors” (Alexandrova et al., 2012:71–72).
To collect the data, first all Conclusions issued during the research period were gathered. 
For this, the so-called “European Council Conclusions dataset”66 (Alexandrova et al., 
2014) was used as a compilator, as it includes the texts of all Conclusions since they 
were published for the first time until 2014 (at least at the  time of writing). This 
facilitated the process of data collection because it gave me access to all documents 
in one single volume. During the research period, 136 conclusions were issued 
(between formal, informal and extraordinary meetings). Next, all documents where 
organized crime was discussed were selected. In total 76 documents were collected 
(see Appendix 3). 
Data collection was done on the basis of the issues established in the catalogue 
on organized crime issues (see Appendix 1). This instrument was created and used 
mostly to collect data, but also to conform a detailed outline of practically all 
possible organized crime issues that would be later observed in the analysis. In this 
way, based on the analysis on the academic debate on OC and the ideas regarding 
the malleability of the topic, as described in the preceding chapter, the catalogue 
considered the views of academics and policymakers. 
On the one hand, the discussion among OC scholars was addressed.67 Here three 
streams can be distinguished. The first line includes those that consider fundamental 
to study the phenomenon in terms of its qualities, whether, for instance, international, 
organized or serious (Finckenauer, 2005; Dorn, 2009; Allum and Gilmour, 2012). 
The  second line is on work that conceives relevant to look at its activities (Beare, 
2003; Makarenko, 2004). And the third stream argues that it is important to observe 
the criminal groups, including criminal entrepreneurs (Cohen, 1977; Harfield, 2010). 
On the other hand, the political side was included by observing the policy instruments 
adopted so far by EU policymakers on the definition of OC. They conceptualize this 
65 This can be observed in Tusk’s facebook account 
(https://www.facebook.com/pg/europeancouncilpresident/about/?ref=page_internal), when reading 
the “Moderation policy“ within the tag “Info”. Retrieved in April 2018.
66 For information on the dataset, see www.policyagendas.eu.
67 For a literature review on different ways to study organized crime, see Von Lampe et al. (2006).
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problem generally in terms of the criminal networks (Council of Ministers, 1998, 
2008) and to some extent of the offenses (Council of Ministers, 1995). 
From all these ideas, altogether three approaches on how to look at organized crime 
were distinguished in the catalogue: denomination, activities and actors. The first 
one is about the different ways to see the phenomenon of OC in general (e.g. 
transnational organized crime). In the second, the focus is on more specific criminal 
offenses (e.g. drug trafficking). And the last approach centers on the individuals 
involved (e.g. criminal groups). 
In determining the more specific issues to be included in the catalogue, reference 
was made to notions claimed by organized crime scholars (Ruggiero, 1996; 
Mitsilegas, 2001, 2003; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004; Irrera, 2010; Longo, 2010), as well 
as to the offences included in the Europol Convention (Council of Ministers, 1995), 
diverse publications of Europol (e.g. Europol, 2011) and information contained in 
the two EU policy instruments adopted so far to define organized crime (Council 
of Ministers, 1998, 2008). As a result, the catalogue included 25 organized crime 
issues divided into three clusters, according to the three approaches just mentioned. 
The “denomination” cluster includes the different terms to refer to the general 
phenomenon of organized crime. The group “activities” covers the types of crimes. 
The category “actors” is about the offenders and victims. 
The COM docs of the Commission 
The so-called COM docs68 are the official documents produced by the Commission, 
with a view to formally initiate a procedure of legislation and assess the status of 
implemented policies. These policy documents are aperiodic and have a specialized 
nature. In other words, they are issued whenever is required, according to the needs 
of the European Union, in order to address specific policy issues.
COM docs include proposals, white papers, green papers, work programs, 
communications and reports. Proposals are policy initiatives addressing specific 
issues. The initiatives are later decided by the Council and the Parliament. White 
papers present specific proposals for possible action in a given area. They are 
meant to generate discussion among EU institutions, in particular the Council and 
the Parliament, but they are also open to the public and stakeholders. The aim is to 
facilitate consensual agreements that may eventually lead to the development of 
68 The prefix “COM” refers to the Commission. It is part of the label assigned to the documents for 
classification purposes. Each document is identified by adding the year when it was issued, followed by 




a proposal for EU legislation. Green papers include general ideas on certain topics. 
They are used mainly for consultation purposes beyond the European institutions, 
so interest groups and citizens are invited to participate and express their point of 
view by proposing initiatives. These documents may generate specific legislative 
points about the discussed topic and promote the formulation of white papers. 
Work programs contain the priorities of the Commission in a specific policy field in 
a year. Communications and reports contain diverse information, such as opinions 
on a certain topic and descriptions of the progress on policy implementation. They 
sometimes describe the plan of action towards the development of policy goals. 
These documents represent the political agenda of the Commission, as they are 
issued in the context of the policy process and adopted by consensual agreement by 
the political arm, that is, the College of Commissioners. They thus express the political 
voice of the institution as a whole. COM docs are appropriate for the analysis because 
they show the actual issues the Commission officially works on in order to produce 
and update legislation. They thus demonstrate the policy priorities of the institution. 
In addition, by this means, the Commission indicates the reasons for its choices 
and often the source, whether EU institutions, experts, etc., from which the idea of 
handling a given problem originated. 
Other types of documents issued by the Commission are not considered in this 
project. For instance, the so-called “SEC docs” and “SWD docs” are not included, 
as they are not official policy documents, but staff working texts for internal 
communication. The  so-called “Strategic plans” are not included because they 
are issued per Directorate General, which means that they represent the vision of 
a specific department. Statements produced in the social media and press releases 
are not considered, as the source of authorship is not the Commission as a whole 
institution, similarly to the case of the European Council as mentioned above. 
Diverse steps were followed to collect the data. First, COM docs on all policy 
areas published during the research period were identified. This was done using 
the  Application Programming Interface for European Union Legislation, so-called 
API (Buhl & Rasmussen, website). This application extracts and organizes data from 
Prelex, an online public database run by the EU’s Publications Office containing 
all documents issued by the Commission to be transmitted for decision and/or 
observation of other EU institutions and actors.69 API’s interface quality allowed me 
69 In December 2014 Prelex was closed. However, the data of this project was collected while Prelex 
was still functioning. Since 2015 the information of this database is available on Eurlex, an EU database 
the contains all kinds of policy documents from preparatory acts to laws and international agreements. It 
can be accessed via the following link http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/legislative-procedures.html.
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to get different type of information on all COM docs, such as titles and type of 
legislation. Next, the information was organized and a large dataset of approximately 
25,000 COM docs was created. Later, the dataset was checked for errors and 
later cleaned discriminating irrelevant information for the project (e.g. name of 
the commissioner responsible for the document). Afterwards, the data was collected, 
selecting the documents whose titles included any of the issues in the catalogue of 
OC issues (see Appendix 1), which was built to collect data, as mentioned above in 
the subsection of the European Council. With the documents collected, a dataset 
on COM docs on OC was created. Finally, the electronic versions of the data were 
obtained and cleaned. This included a detailed process. For the cases where the data 
was not available electronically –as many sources were produced long time ago-, 
a hard copy was requested to the Commission’s General Secretariat. The information 
obtained was transformed into a digital format. Once all electronic versions were 
gathered, they were revised to assure that they were computer-readable to facilitate 
the analysis. Also they were checked to confirm that each title in the dataset 
contained indeed only one document. When more than one document was included 
in the same file (as it was often the case when COM docs were about a proposal that 
derived from a communication issued simultaneously), the different documents were 
split. A total of 263 COM docs in the domain of organized crime were collected (see 
Appendix 4). This represents 1% of the overall agenda of the Commission, which 
is similar to the amount of data analyzed in previous research using COM docs on 
single policy domains studying a similar time frame  (e.g. Princen, 2009:60).
5.2. Methods to study Intra-agenda dynamics
The analysis focused on the attention patterns. Attention is the occurrence of an issue 
on the agenda of a political institution. Pattern refers to the way an institution gives 
attention to issues over time. Seven features were measured: development of attention, 
level and distribution of attention changes, factors of attention, agenda content, 
allocation of attention, agenda scope, and agenda diversity. The first three aspects 
were studied for the domain of OC as a whole. The last four features were analyzed 
by observing more specific issues within the policy field. In this way, a thorough study 
on the policy problem was achieved. All features are connected to each other, which 
means that all results must go in a similar direction in order to validate the findings.   
Development of attention 
The development of attention over time was studied, conducting a mapping of 




crime issues occurring on the agendas between 1975 and 2013 was identified, 
using a codebook on OC issues (see Appendix 2). This analytical instrument was 
developed on the basis of the catalogue (see Appendix 1), but it is a more refined 
instrument. The codebook is the actual tool used for measuring and conducting 
the empirical analysis. It has 14 issues. The number of issues included originally in 
the catalogue was reduced, after the experience obtained from collecting the data. 
The reason is that not all issues in the catalogue were ‘fished’ (e.g. gambling) and 
some issues sometimes belong to two different clusters (e.g. criminal groups that 
commit money laundering activities). As a consequence, some issues were discarded 
and others merged. The separation of issues in three distinct clusters, as established 
in the catalogue, was eliminated. The reason is that, while such grouping was initially 
relevant to obtain a thorough impression of all possible lines in the discussion around 
OC and collect data, it was relevant neither to conduct the analysis nor to achieve 
the research goal. In addition, the issue terrorism was assigned specific coding rules 
to assure precision on the measurement and replicability of the analysis. It was done 
in this way because, as identified in the previous chapter on the policy domain, 
terrorism can be included in the conceptualization of OC, but can be also considered 
a problem in its own right. The unit of analysis was words. 
The study was done on a year-to-year basis. Other options were to consider semesters 
or quarters. However, the former interval has been barely chosen to study agenda 
evolution in the long run (Carammia et al., 2016) and the latter has not been used. 
Years are a valid interval for diverse reasons. First, most research on the politics of 
attention on agendas in Europe —including the European Council— and in other 
political systems, like the United States, has used this time interval (e.g. Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005; Jennings et al., 2011; Alexandrova et al., 2012). This makes 
the results comparable with findings in previous work. Second, an analysis on the basis 
of years enables us to conduct a critical test to find attention changes. An examination 
of the data per semester, not to say quarters, facilitates the  identification of 
punctuations as they occur. Thus, if changes can be perceived even year by year, 
a critical threshold can be surpassed by observing changes at an aggregate level. 
Additionally, a yearly interval was selected for two pragmatic reasons. On the one 
hand, the findings of the intra-dynamics of the European Council will be later 
compared with the results of the Commission. This has implications for the analysis 
because there is a considerable difference between the periodicity of the data of 
each institution (i.e. while Conclusions are issued more or less quarterly, COM docs 
are published as often as the Commission deems it necessary). On the other hand, 
the research period is long, covering almost 40 years. 
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The analysis was done on the texts of the Conclusions. Other studies on the politics 
of attention have analyzed the titles. However, this is not an option in this research, 
given the characteristics of the Conclusions. These policy documents do not have 
a  title as such, but a name that refers to the city and date when the meeting 
of the  European Council takes place. In addition, only a very limited number of 
Conclusions are published per year. The reason is that, regardless of how concerned 
the European Council may be about any problem, the institution holds only around 
four summits in a year or two gatherings per semester approximately, issuing one 
set of Conclusions each time. Thus, an analysis of the number of Conclusions leads 
to an  underestimation of the European Council’s attention to policy problems. In 
the case of the COM docs, a content analysis on the text and titles was conducted. 
The  texts in the introductory part were analyzed. One reason is that this section 
provides an overview of the content of the document and presents the most relevant 
elements of it, as considered by the institution. The whole communication, by contrast, 
entails a more technical and legal nature, which may lead to a misrepresentation of 
the political attention. Another reason is that practically all COM docs include this 
part, which allows for consistency of the analysis. The titles were also analyzed for 
a more precise estimation. 
Level and distribution of attention changes 
The actual level of variation of the development of attention was studied, looking at 
the distribution of changes. For this, a kurtosis analysis was done. The measurement 
of kurtosis indicates how “wild” the distribution of attention changes is (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005: 183). This was done to have a more accurate evidence of 
how the changing trend was, based on the previous results on the development of 
attention. The aim was to identify whether the changes in attention over time were 
only incremental or sometimes more drastic. 
The statistical analysis was conducted in two steps. First, the annual change scores 
in attention to the domain were calculated. In general there are two options for 
doing this: a percentage-count method or a percentage-percentage method (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005). The former method enables us to measure the “growth in 
the total size of the policy agenda (…) by basing change on what has occurred before 
within the policy arena” (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 202). It is based on counts. 
The latter method considers the space of the agenda constant over time in a given 
policy field, taking into account the past situation in the field and the present situation 
in other policy areas. It is based on proportions. In this project, the first approach was 




method. One explanation is that it goes in line with the research goal, as the method 
allows us to know the effect of the design of the institution and its overall carrying 
capacity (Ibid: 180). By contrast, the other method is especially useful for exploring 
its changing priorities across policy fields (Ibid). Another reason is that the method 
fits the project, as a single policy domain is analyzed. As a consequence, a relative 
measure of change that involves other policy fields is not applicable. 
Accordingly, the following formula was used: 
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Where t1 is the value of the agenda in the present and t0 is the agenda in the past. 
T   change in the development of the agenda was identified by taking into 
consideration the situation in the previous year. For instance, if there were 28 number 
of observations in 2007 and 14 in 2006, then the change score for 2007 is one. In 
this way, the distribution of attention shifts from one year to the next was measured. 
The point of departure to do this calculation was the year 1983 for the Conclusions 
and 1984 for the COM docs. The reason was that the results of the previous analysis 
on the development of attention showed that OC entered the agenda of the European 
Council and the Commission for the first time in those years, respectively. These 
findings had an important analytical implication for this research: the time frame 
originally established for the empirical study needed to be modified, accordingly. 
Thus, considering the year when the problem debuted on the  European Council 
agenda, the new period of investigation to analyze the  institution’s attention was 
between 1983 and 2013. Similarly, the new time frame to analyze the Commission 
agenda was between 1984 and 2013.
Second, based on the distribution of yearly change scores, the level of kurtosis was 
measured. This type of measurement shows the degree of change or ‘peakedness’ of 
a frequency distribution. Statistically, kurtosis is considered the fourth moment around 
the mean. More precisely, the level of kurtosis is the relation between the  fourth 
moment of a distribution and the square of its variance, which is the second moment. 
A kurtosis analysis is appropriate for diverse reasons. It enables a precise calculation 
of the distribution of annual changes, in order to statistically confirm the variation 
of the attention pattern. In addition, it allows for theory testing. According to 
the Processing Model, a clear indication of the effect of the information-processing 
characteristics of institutions dealing with complex problems is that the distribution 
of their policy outputs invariably displays a positive kurtosis value (Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005:173). Such value means that the development is non-incremental. 
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In an incremental model of policy change, the theoretical kurtosis score of a normal 
distribution is 3.0. Above this statistical value, the development is considered to 
be positive or ‘leptokurtic’, which signifies that the distribution is non-normal. This 
indicates that, contrary to an incremental archetype, there is a degree of punctuation 
in the policy process. In other words, a kurtosis value above 3.0 signifies that policy 
development over time is not always incremental, but includes important shifts 
every now and then. Based on the Processing Model, political institutions tend to 
delay action to process issues and overrespond when they finally react. This behavior 
stimulates a pattern of both moderate and sudden abrupt shifts in policy. Such 
punctuated-equilibrium development of policy change, as argued by the theory, is 
expected to be observed. Put differently, the expectation is to find a leptokurtic score 
for the level and distribution of attention changes in both agendas. Furthermore, 
this theory also posits that the distinct constraints of institutions make them prone 
to variations of attention. The less constrained, the less oscillations. Statistically, this 
means that the less punctuated the change, the lower the kurtosis value. Based on 
this, a second expectation is that the value of the Commission agenda is lower than 
the score of the European Council agenda. 
The standard measure, also called Pearson’s kurtosis, was calculated. The following 
formula was used: 
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analysis was facilitated by the findings on the development of attention. It was carried out in 
                                                          
70 Note that a score for the initial year cannot be calculated, given that the calculation of the change scores 
considers the previous year.    
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Where X is the variable (change score, in this case), µ is the mean (of the change 
scores, in this case) and  is th number of dat  points (years, in this cas 70). 
Factors of attention
A study on the factors that generated the attention of each institution was conducted. 
This was done to identify what stimulated the institutions to take up the problem of OC 
on their ag ndas. The analysis was facilit ted by the findings on the development of 
attention. It was carried out in different phases. Initially, according to the expectation 
of ADA that the attention of the European Council and the Commission is regularly 
shaped by focusing events and professional concerns, respectively, only one factor 
was analyzed per agenda. The study was done by means of content analysis. The unit 
of analysis was documents. For the Commission data, the introductory part was 
observed. The category was binary coded (1, meaning factor found; and 0, meaning 
70 Note that a score for the initial year cannot be calculated, given that the calculation of the change 




factor not found). Only explicit arguments were considered. The study was thus 
based on references in the data, not on external sources. 
During the development of the analysis, it was identified that the single factor expected 
to drive the attention of each institution was not constantly present. Consequently, 
additional factors were included a posteriori in the study. To begin with, no 
discrimination was done between the two factors mentioned in the hypothesis. This 
means that the impact of focusing events and professional concerns on both agendas 
was explored. Later, based on the literature on agenda-setting and representation in 
domestic political systems, different ideas were developed and finally translated into 
four factors that were incorporated in the study. 
In this way, six factors in total were analyzed: focusing events, professional concerns, 
EU institutional milestones, political signals, policy inheritances and public concerns. 
Focusing events are salient, powerful and sudden socio-political occurrences.71 
Professional concerns are statements from a group of experts that estimate critical 
the status of a given condition.72 EU institutional milestones are key developments in 
the institutional framework of the European Union.73 Political signals are indications 
made by political actors to address a given issue.74 Policy inheritances are previous 
policy decisions and political agreements that influence the consideration of current 
policy commitments.75 Public concerns are problems that citizens consider important 
to be tackled by the EU.76 For analytical purposes, a codebook on factors of attention 
was created (see Appendix 5). On this basis, the six categories were examined for each 
of the two agendas. The categories were binary coded. Next, the analysis zoomed 
71 The notion is based on the Routes Framework that posits that ‘symbolic events’ impact issue initiation 
in EU agenda-setting (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). The term and conceptualization follows from Kingdon’s 
(1984) and Birkland’s (2010) notions of focusing events. Accordingly, these events are “a powerful 
symbol” (Kingdon, 1984:95) and attract attention, due to their “sheer magnitude” (Birkland, 2010:118) 
and sometimes given the “harm they reveal” (Birkland, 2010:118). They are also “sudden” and “relatively 
rare” (Birkland, 2010:118). 
72 The term is borrowed from the Routes Framework (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). Accordingly, 
‘professional concerns’ stem from “people working in the same issue area” or “in epistemic communities” 
and affect issue initiation in EU agenda setting. 
73 The notion is inspired by Breeman and Timmermans’ idea of ‘institutional milestone effect’ (2012), 
which refers to the impact that changes in European legislation, particularly EU treaties, have on national 
legislation. 
74 The term is inspired largely by the Processing Model, where signals from the environment play 
an important role and push for attention to be transformed into policy output. Additionally, the notion takes 
into consideration that agenda setting in the EU is inherently a political process, as mentioned in Chapter 2. 
75 The notion is inspired by Rose and Davies’ idea that newly elected politicians have little choice but to 
work with ‘inheritances’ or ‘legacies’ on programmes initiated by previous governments (1994). 
76 The notion is inspired by Jones and Baumgartner’s idea of ‘policy priorities of the public’ and the extent 
of responsiveness of the government to such priorities (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004).
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in into central moments of attention over time, such as when OC first appeared on 
the agenda and when the domain was high on the agenda. This study was done in 
a qualitative way.
Agenda content and allocation of attention 
The specific content of the agendas was identified, counting all different OC issues 
handled by the institution in the whole research period. The issues analyzed were 
those pre-established in the codebook in Appendix 2. 
An analysis of the allocation of attention across the total number of different OC 
issues was done, calculating on an annual basis the percentage of attention to each 
issue in relation to the overall agenda during the research period. This enabled us to 
recognize the relative variation of attention within the OC agenda over time.
Agenda scope and diversity 
The scope of the agenda was analyzed by identifying the number of issues that 
reached the radar of the institutions during the research period. The number of 
different OC issues attended by each of them was counted on an annual basis. 
This was done to see the how the agenda concentrated in few or many issues over 
the years.  
An analysis of the diversity of its agenda was done, calculating the level of entropy. 
Entropy indicates the variation in the composition of the different groups in a sample. 
More specifically, it measures the diversity of observations across the total number 
of given categories and the probability of observing variation on a specific event. 
Although the analysis of attention allocation and agenda scope provided an overview 
of how disperse the consideration to OC issues was over time, a statistical analysis 
provided a more accurate evidence of the range of diversity. 
This type of measurement has been used in agenda-setting studies to measure 
the  fragmentation of attention across policy issues or, more precisely, agenda 
concentration and agenda diversity (Jennings et al., 2011; Alexandrova et al., 2012; 
Carammia et al., 2016). Accordingly, while a concentrated agenda involves attention 
to one issue, a diverse agenda entails equally shared attention among many issues. 
The degree of entropy depends on the total number of issues on the agenda, given 
that the goal is to identify the portion of attention allocated across all elements in 
the sample. A concentrated agenda has a lower degree of entropy and, conversely, 
a dispersed agenda a higher level. In other words, a lower value signifies that the focus 




is spread more similarly among issues. These patterns speak to the information-
processing behaviors of macropolitical institutions and policy subsystems, respectively. 
Therefore, calculating the degree of entropy is appropriate for two reasons. First, 
I am interested in knowing whether each of the two institutions regularly focused on 
one or many issues, as this provides evidence to further compare the intra-dynamics 
in the way problems enter and fade away from the political radar of each institution. 
Second, I am also interested in knowing whether the variation pattern in expansion 
and concentration occurred in a similar way because this allows for a more detailed 
evidence of the (dis)similarities in their processing dynamics. 




patterns speak to the information-processing behaviors of macropolitical institutions and policy 
subsystems, respectively. Therefore, calculating the degree of entropy is appropriate for two 
reasons. First, I am interested in knowing whether each of the two institutions regularly focused on 
one or many issues, as this provides evidence to further compare the intra-dynamics in the way 
problems enter and fade away from the political radar of each institution. Second, I am also 
interested in knowing whether the variation pattern in expansion and concentration occurred in a 
similar way because this allows for a more detailed evidence of the (dis)similarities in their 
processing dynamics.  
The entropy was calculated using Shannon diversity index (H), based on the following formula:  
H = (−1) ∑ 𝑝𝑝 
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) ln(𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖))                                        (3)  
where H is the entropy value of the negative sum for all categories of the probability p(x) that x (an 
observation) happens within a particular category i, multiplied by the natural log of that probability.  
For categories where no observation happens in a given year, it is assumed that 0 x ln(0) equals zero, 
given that logs of zero cannot be calculated. The minimum score of H is always zero. However, the 
maximum value is not fixed, but dependent on the number of categories. 
The analysis was conducted in three parts. First, the range of measurement was estimated. It was 
necessary to calculate only the maximum value, as the lowest possible entropy score is a given, as 
just mentioned. It is zero, which means that all the attention is concentrated 100% on one issue. 
However, the maximum possible value varies according to the total number of categories. In this 
case, based on the previous results of the analysis on agenda content, the total number of OC issues 
was thirteen for the analysis of the European Council. Based on the formula in equation (3), the 
highest possible entropy score for a sample of thirteen categories is 2.5649. This value signifies that 
all thirteen issues are equally attended, each occupying 7.69% of the total agenda space. To calculate 
the range measurement for the analysis of the Commission, according to the earlier findings on the 
agenda content, the total number of issues attended by the institution during the research period 
was twelve. On this basis, the maximum entropy value was estimated. For a group of twelve 
categories, the maximum possible score is 2.4849. This means that the attention is equally 
distributed among issues, each receiving 8.33% of the total amount.   
Next, the actual score for each year was measured. In the last part, the average entropy level for the 
whole research period was calculated. Years in which OC issues were not on the agenda were not 
included in the calculation of entropy. The reason is that, for determining the level of entropy of the 
        ( )
where H is the entropy value of the negative sum for all categories of the probability 
p(x) that x (an observation) happens within a particular category i, multiplied by 
the natural log of that probability.  For categories where no observation happens in 
a given year, it is assumed that 0 x ln(0) equals zero, given that logs of zero cannot 
be calculated. The minimum score of H is always zero. However, the maximum value 
is not fixed, but dependent on the number of categories.
The analysis was conducted in three parts. First, the range of measurement was 
estimated. It was necessary to calculate only the maximum value, as the lowest 
possible entropy score is a given, as just mentioned. It is zero, which means that all 
the attention is concentrated 100% on one issue. However, the maximum possible 
value varies according to the total nu ber of categories. In this case, based on 
the previous results of the analysis on agenda content, the total number of OC issues 
was thirteen for the analysis of the European Council. Based on the formula in equation 
(3), the highest possible entropy score for a sample of thirteen categories is 2.5649. 
This value signifies that all thirteen issues are equally attended, each occupying 7.69% 
of the total agenda space. To calculate the range measurement for the analysis of 
the Commission, according to the earlier findings on the agenda content, the total 
number of issues attended by the institution during the research period was twelve. 
On t is basis, th  maxi um entropy value was estimated. For a  group of welv  
categories, the maximum possible score is 2.4849. This means that the attention is 
equally distributed among issues, each receiving 8.33% of the total amount.  
Next, the actual score for each year was measured. In the last part, the average 
entropy level for the whole research period was calculated. Years in which OC issues 
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were not on the agenda were not included in the calculation of entropy. The reason 
is that, for determining the level of entropy of the agenda, issues must be present on 
the agenda in the first place. It is thus incorrect to consider that the entropy score in 
years of no attention is zero, as it would mean that the institution focused on one 
issue, when in reality it did not consider the problem at all. As a result, the average 
score excludes years without attention.
According to the Processing Model, the fewer constraints to process issues —as it 
is the case of parallel-processing institutions, such as the Commission—, the more 
diverse the agenda. Therefore, the attention is more equally shared. In terms of 
entropy, the more diverse the agenda, the higher the entropy level. On this basis, 
I  expect to find a higher average value in the Commission agenda in relation to 
the average value in the European Council agenda. 
5.3. Methods to study Inter-agenda dynamics 
The analysis centered on the governing pattern in the relationship between 
the institutions. It explored the directionality between their agendas. Drawing from 
the field of econometrics, Vector Autogression (VAR) techniques were used (Sims, 
1980; Freeman et al., 1989; Stock and Watson, 2001). By means of VAR, the agenda 
interaction was modelled.
VAR is a multiple regression model, in which each variable in the system is “explained 
by its own lagged values, plus current and past values of the remaining (…) variables” 
(Stock and Watson, 2001:101). For instance, in a bivariate model, i.e. consisting of 
two variables, the value of one variable is caused by the lagged values of itself, as 
well as the present and lagged values of the other variable. VAR models do not 
presuppose which variable is exogenous —or independent. All variables are in 
principle assumed to be endogenous —or dependent. After running the model and 
examining the results, exogeneity becomes clear. In this project, these conditions 
of flexibility provide a better alternative for modelling than other methods, such 
as structural equation (SEQ) models, where the parameters need to be rigorously 
predetermined by placing “reliance on a single theory” (Freeman et al., 1989:848). 
Setting strict parameters and doing it a priori becomes a problem in this study because 
there is no clarity in the theory about the institutions’ interplay and our knowledge of 
the reality is substantially limited. Thus, as a result, we are uncertain about the actual 
properties of the system. It, however, shall not be understood as if no specifications 
are considered in the formulation of VAR models. Comparatively speaking, “VAR 




VAR techniques are widely used in Macroeconomics to study the relationship between 
two or more variables in time series data. This method has been used to analyze, 
for instance, the relationship over decades among interest rates, inflation and 
unemployment and the effect of a change in any of them (Stock and Watson, 2001).
The method is also applied to model policy processes. VAR is adequate to study 
the inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council and the Commission for several 
reasons. To begin with, VAR fits this research because it is about the analysis of 
time series data. Thus the relationship between the institutions can be analyzed in 
the long run, revealing its underlying trend.
A central reason for using this method is that, as Edward and Woods have argued, 
“VAR is the most appropriate method for circumstances in which the theory provides 
a weak rationale for imposing restrictions on the parameters of a structural equation 
system” (Edwards and Wood, 1999:334). This feature is particularly relevant in this 
project given the wide academic discussion on the relationship between the institutions 
vis-à-vis the little empirical work, not to mention the lack of regulation on their 
interaction. Consequently, there is neither a firm theoretical basis nor a genuine 
justification for predetermining the direction of influence between the institutions. 
Furthermore, in line with the Agenda Dynamics Approach, VAR allows us to study 
specific processes based on a theory-building perspective. This is possible because, in 
order to run this type of autoregression model, there is no need to establish a priori 
restrictions derived from theoretical assumptions (Sims, 1980). This does not mean 
that we can start running models ‘just like that’ without any theory. Theory is indeed 
used, for instance, to select which variables are to be included in the system, but 
not to assume which of such variables is independent (Freeman et al., 1989: 844). 
In a way, the data can ‘talk’ (cf. Edwards and Wood, 1999:334). But “the data will 
obviously not determine directly the outcome of the debate between various schools 
of thought; it does, however, influence the conflict by defining what battlefield 
positions must be” (Sims, 1980:30). It is the researcher who gives voice to the findings, 
based on theoretical and empirical knowledge on the analyzed phenomenon and 
the variables in the study. In general, for modelling by means of VAR, it is necessary 
to be well informed about possible theoretical causal-relation dynamics in order to 
construct the system, conceive a reliable analysis and draw founded conclusions.
Another reason to use VAR is that with this method the causality between variables 
can be estimated, in clear line with the research goal on the inter-agenda dynamics. 
As Liu et al. have argued, an “advantage of VAR modeling is that it can provide 
empirical evidence for Granger causality of two possibly interactive variables” (Liu 
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et al., 2009:412). According to the notion of Granger causality, one variable causes 
another variable, if the lagged values of the former and the latter variable help better 
predict the present value of the latter variable (Granger, 1969:459). This is tested in 
VAR techniques as a means to interpret the output of the estimated model, as will 
be described below. 
A final motivation to use VAR relates to its methodological novelty. This technique 
has not been applied to study EU policymaking. Until now, research by means of VAR 
has been conducted in national political systems to study the relationship between 
political institutions and between political and public organizations. Most work 
has been done on institutions in the United States (e.g. Rutledge and Larsen Price, 
2014; Peake, 2017; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2004; Edwards and Wood, 1999). 
Some work has been conducted to study organizations in other countries, such as 
Canada (S. N. Soroka, 2002) and the Netherlands (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 
2007). However, VAR has not been used to analyze the interaction between political 
institutions at the EU level. It is thus appropriate to use it because this promotes an 
innovative method for the analysis of the policy-making process in the European 
Union political system.  
VAR is, however, not exempted from criticism and disadvantages. Perhaps one of 
the most criticized features relates to the concept of Granger causality. The reason 
is that this type of causality is not entirely the same as normal causality. Granger 
causality is about “prediction” (Granger, 1969:429). It demonstrates potential 
causality, provided the occurrence of one variable by which the other variable can be 
better determined. Some scholars consider this circumstance a limitation. However, 
in VAR models an additional test on Impulse Response Functions (IRF) complements 
the information obtained by Granger tests (Edwards and Wood, 1999). Also as a way 
to interpret the VAR output, IRF allows us to confirm and observe further the behavior 
between variables by showing the response of one variable to a simulated shock in 
another variable in the system, as will be mentioned in the next section. 
Some disadvantages of the method can be also noticed. VAR does not allow for 
an analysis of short-term deviations from the long-term pattern. Nevertheless, there 
are reasons why this situation is not necessarily a drawback in this study. One is that 
the research goal is to identify the primary trend in their interaction in the long run, 
not to show transitory moments. However, because random patterns may happen in 
time series, one of the conditions to run VAR is to control for stationarity. Stationarity 
refers to the stability of the system. This concept brings us to another reason. If 
the  test to control for stationarity is passed, it means that the same trend occurs 




Another disadvantage discussed in the literature is related to the circumstance that, 
as will be explained, the examination of individual coefficients in the regressions —as 
it is common practice in econometrics— is extremely complex in VAR models and, 
therefore, this is usually not done (Sims, 1980). Instead, tools to interpret the results 
are necessary. In this way, VAR models are not so precise in quantitative terms as, 
for instance, SEQ models. However, this situation is compensated because VAR 
provides better “accuracy of causal inference” than SEQ, as claimed by Freeman 
and colleagues (Freeman et al., 1989:842). In effect, as Soroka has argued, with 
VAR models we are able to “make more convincing claims about causal relationships 
between variables”, in comparison to SEQ models (Soroka, 2000:144). Considering 
the trade-off and in view of the research goal in this study, the argued disadvantage 
does not represent a problem here; the feature of the method, as suggested by 
Freeman et al. and Soroka, rather benefits this research.      
The model
VAR was conducted for a bivariate model, that is, the European Council agenda 
and the Commission agenda. The domain of organized crime as a whole was 
analyzed. Time series data on attention of each institution to this field were used, 
on the basis of the data previously collected for the analysis on the intra-agenda 
dynamics. The model revolves around notions obtained from the earlier results. It 
was built in different steps, which are described in the three following sections. 
The results of the first two parts can be found in Appendix 7. The findings of the last 
part are introduced in the analytical chapter (Chapter 8). The overall procedure was 
conducted using Stata 13. 
Data preparation 
The analysis of the inter-dynamics was done on a quarterly basis. Therefore, before 
constructing the model, the original yearly data used to study the intra-dynamics 
was disaggregated in quarters. At first sight, an obvious choice was to take the same 
annual interval used for the analysis on the intra-agenda dynamics. This interval is, 
however, not appropriate to study the interaction. Years are too long to capture 
the  fine dynamics of the relationship, given the distinct institutional calendars to 
process issues. The European Council has per year a relatively fixed number of 
gatherings, where it deals with policy problems. While the number of summits per 
year has increased in the last two decades (Puetter, 2014:104–106), on a longer 
term the European Council has held two meetings on average per semester or one 
“every three months” (Werts, 2008:189). By contrast, the Commission is significantly 
flexible in this regard. The institution has no schedule as such, in the sense that 
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it does not need to reach a predetermined number of policy documents per year 
or semester. Instead, the Commission can issue communications on policy issues 
whenever necessary. Therefore, a lot can happen in a semester, not to mention 
a  year. As a result, a study on a quarterly interval seems appropriate. It enables 
a refined view on the interactive processes. 
The research frame was between 1993 and 2013. The time before this period was 
not considered, given that the findings on the intra agenda-dynamics show that 
the institutions —especially the Commission— discarded the problem from their 
agendas in many years, which would provide several time points with missing data 
(see Chapters 6 and 7). These results demonstrate that the situation changed in 1993, 
when the attention of both political bodies took off and afterwards the problem was 
constantly present every year on their agendas. The study included in total 83 quarters, 
from the second quarter of 1993 —when the domain appeared on the agendas for 
the first time— to the fourth quarter of 2013 —the last period the domain was on 
the agenda, according to the research period. The domain analyzed included eleven 
OC issues, in contrast to the study of the intra-agenda dynamics that considered 
fourteen. Three issues were discarded (i.e. cigarette smuggling, trafficking in works 
of art, trafficking in vehicles) because the findings on the intra-agenda dynamics 
showed that on the whole both institutions paid less than 1% of attention to such 
issues and, in some cases, no attention (see Appendix 6). 
Then, the variables were standardized. Next, the stationarity of the time series was 
checked, a key condition to be able to run VAR.77 Statistically this can be observed by 
the presence of unit root, which means that the time series has a random pattern. 
An  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was conducted. The Akaike Information 
Criterion was used to determine the lag length to do the test. The results indicate 
that the variables are stationary (see Appendix 7, Table A). This enabled us to conduct 
the model.
Vector autoregressions and post-estimation tests
As we know by now, VAR involves the examination of lagged values. Thus, prior 
to running the model, the lag length to conduct the analysis was calculated. This 
was done by a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (see Appendix 7, Table B). Then the vector 
autoregressions were run. The results of the estimated VAR are regularly not reported 
in academic research. Instead, further tests need to be conducted to interpret 
the output. The reason of this convention is that it is complex to directly analyze and 
digest the large number of coefficients obtained by VAR models, as Sims has argued: 




“Autoregressive systems like these are difficult to describe succinctly. It is especially 
difficult to make sense of them by examining the coefficients in the regression equations 
themselves (…) The common econometric practice of summarizing distributed lag 
relations in terms of their implied long run equilibrium behavior is quite misleading in 
these systems” (1980: 20–21). As a consequence, additional tests are required to read 
the VAR output. The interpretative tools commonly used are Granger causality and 
Impulse Response Function. They are described in the next section.   
To validate the estimated model, two conditions were controlled: stability and 
autocorrelation. The eigenvalue stability condition was checked and a Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test was conducted to control for autocorrelation in the residuals.78 
The  results indicated that the model was adequately specified (see Appendix 7, 
Figure A and Table C). This gave solid ground to the interpretative tools. 
Interpretative tools
As just mentioned, there are two ways to make sense of the results of VAR. First, 
Granger causality allows us to test causal relations, or direction, between variables. 
According to this notion, variable A Granger-causes B, if B can be better predicted 
from the history of A and B together than only of A. This is based on the idea 
that the cause happens before the effect. The null hypothesis is that the lagged 
values of variable A do not Granger-cause the current values of variable B. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis is accepted. In theory, four different 
results are possible to obtain from the model: no Granger-cause relationship 
between the  institutions; the  European Council Granger-causes the Commission; 
the Commission Granger-causes the European Council; and the institutions Granger-
cause each other. To identify this, Wald tests were conducted. The results are 
discussed and reported in Chapter 8. 
Second, Impulse Response Functions show the reaction of each of the variables in 
the system to a simulated unexpected exogenous shock to one variable and then 
to another variable, and so on, over a horizon of time. In other words, “[s]hocking 
a variable means increasing the independent series by one standard deviation and 
estimating the impact the increase has on the other series in the system” (Peake, 
2001:73–74). This provides further information on the effect between variables, 
such as the magnitude. The reactions of the institutions were tested by IRFs, or 
more precisely, orthogonalized IRFs. The shocks were orthogonalized by Cholesky 
descomposition (Sims, 1980). This transformation makes the error terms orthogonal 
78 Finding evidence of autocorrelation means that some parameters of the model need to be further 
analysed and better specified.
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or contemporaneously uncorrelated, which allows for the simulation of the system’s 
response to unexpected disturbances to the system. The results on the IRFs are 
discussed and reported in Chapter 8. 
Granger and IRF analyses are useful for various reasons. They do not only make 
possible to interpret the results of the estimated VAR. They are also important to 
validate the findings. The results of the predictive causality of Granger causality 
tests confirm and complement the evidence of IRFs on the response of one variable 
in relation to the impact on the other. Moreover, IRF facilitates the interpretation 
of the findings, as it allows for a visual representation of the model. It also gives 
additional information on the impact. In this way, the combination of both tests in 
this study provided strong evidence of the causal relations between the variables and 
made possible to characterize their interaction. 
Additionally, to make the results more solid, a change in the ordering of the variables 
was done to check that the pattern in the relationship holds. According to 
the  literature, IRFs are sensitive to variation in the ordering —situation that does 
not occur for Granger causality— (Peake, 2001:74). The convention is to decide 
the original ordering of IRF on the basis of the Granger causality test, by which 
the variable that proves to be independent in the latter test is placed first in former 
analysis. In order to challenge this convention, additional IRFs were conducted, 
setting the variable ordering the other way around. This means that the variable 
that was found to be dependent, according to the results of Granger causality, was 
located first. The results obtained (see Appendix 7, Figure B and Table D) were similar 
to the original model (see Chapter 8, Figure 8.1 and Table 8.2).  
5.4. Summary
This chapter described the methodological strategy of the project. It first dealt with 
the sources and the data collection process. It showed the reasons the Conclusions of 
the European Council and the COM docs of the Commission are used to reconstruct 
their agendas for the analysis. It also described how the policy documents, as they 
relate to the OC domain, were collected. Later, the chapter addressed the methods. 
It showed the way seven features, such as agenda diversity and factors of attention, 
were measured to study the intra-agenda dynamics. It also explained why vector 
autoregression techniques were used to analyze the inter-agenda dynamics. The steps 
followed to build and run the VAR model were described. The next chapter presents 
the first empirical study applying ADA. It analyzes the intra-dynamics of the European 
Council. 
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Intra-agenda dynamics of the European Council 
C h a p t e r  6
The preceding chapters introduced the preparatory theoretical and methodological 
components to conduct the empirical research. It is time now to do the analysis. This 
chapter introduces the first of three analytical chapters. It deals with the dynamics 
in the European Council agenda. It addresses the following research sub-question: 
what are the intra-agenda dynamics of the European Council? The answer gives 
empirical evidence of the evolution of attention of this institution to the problem 
of organized crime over time. The goal of the chapter is to identify and explain 
the processes happening on the agenda. The chapter is divided into five sections. In 
the first part, the expectations are introduced. The second part reveals the attention 
trend over the  years. It also explains the processes observed. The third section 
presents an analysis of the factors that drive the institution to initiate issues on its 
agenda, explaining the behaviors. In the fourth part, the previous two sections on 
the empirical research are placed together and additional findings are introduced. 
In doing so, a comprehensive explanation of the dynamics is provided. Finally, 
the conclusions of the chapter are presented.
6.1. Expectations 
According to the Agenda Dynamics Approach, which was presented in Chapter 3, 
the institutional design of the European Council affects how this political body sets 
its agenda. First, its information-processing capacities impact the way it deals with 
policy issues. Given that this institution has significantly limited capacities to process 
policy problems, I expect to observe that its agenda displays over time a pattern 
of drastic rise and fall of attention to issues. Second, its political attributes have 
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implications for the way its attention is formed. Given the top political profile of 
the European Council, I expect to find that the institution regularly attends issues 
triggered by focusing events. The methods used to conduct the analysis were 
described in the previous chapter.
6.2. How does the attention of the European Council move 
in time?
Let us start by identifying the content of the agenda of the European Council 
during the research period. Table 6.1 presents the findings. It shows the issues 
that entered the agenda, as well as those that never reached it during the research 
period.79 
The analysis demonstrates that the institution attended thirteen different OC 
issues, out of a total of fourteen distinguished in the codebook on OC issues (see 
79 The issues are presented in the order they appear in the codebook (see Appendix 2), not ranked. 
Table 6.1. Content of the European Council agenda on organized crime (1983–2013)











11 Trafficking in vehicles
12 Cybercrime
13 Money laundering
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Appendix 2).80 The way the institution allocated its attention across issues is reported 
in Table 6.2. The table centers on the five more salient issues on the European Council 
agenda over time: drugs trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, human trafficking 
and fraud. Altogether, they represent 85% of the total agenda.81 The first two issues 
were particularly prominent, occupying altogether more than half of its attention 
over the whole period (55%). 







Remaining 8 issues 14.70%
Total 100%
A visualization of the results per year is presented in Figure 6.1. It displays 
the proportion of attention to the five issues in relation to all OC issues over time.82 
The figure is useful for two reasons. First of all, it can be observed that the OC topic 
did not reach the agenda of the European Council in 1975, as the original research 
period suggested. In reality, the problem attracted the attention of the  institution 
for the first time in 1983. During the 1980s, the institution neglected all issues 
in 1984 and 1987, but afterwards its attention was present every year. Second, 
the figure helps distinguish the variation. It becomes evident that the consideration of 
the European Council to the five issues went often considerably up and considerably 
down, even during the period after its last drop of attention (1988–2013). This trend 
holds also true in the case of the two most predominant issues. The attention of 
the European Council to drug trafficking and organized crime entailed a very flexible 
scope, often leaving them out from its agenda in several occasions. This finding is 
relevant because it indicates that no matter how prominent an issue is in relation to 
80 For an explanation on the codebook, see Chapter 4 (for a background on debates on the conceptualization 
of OC that served as a basis to elaborate the codebook) and Chapter 5 (for a description on the way 
the codebook was constructed). 
81 For a complete overview on the allocation of attention across all issues, see Appendix 6, Table A.
82 For a visualization on the allocation of attention to all issues, see Appendix 6, Figure A.
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others, its saliency will eventually decline substantially and later raise again, and so 
on. This variation is an indication of the effect of its processing capacities. It suggests 
that, given its short resources, the institution needed to select tightly the issues to 
handle, in order to be able to move into other policy problems that are also waiting 
to receive its attention. 
Further, the analysis on the agenda scope reveals important features of the institution’s 
behavior. Figure 6.2. shows the results. Based on the previous findings of the agenda 
content, the maximum possible range of the agenda scope was thirteen. The study 
here reveals that the institution did not constantly handle all thirteen issues. Actually, 
the limit of the scope was never reached in any year. The institution dealt at the most 
with eleven issues in a year. This was the broadest the European Council opened its 
attention, which occurred in two years in the second half of the 1990s. By contrast, 
its consideration (nearly) faded out in diverse occasions during the research period. 
To begin with, when the problem entered the agenda in 1983, the institution 
focused on only one issue. In addition, as the previous findings on the allocation of 
attention also showed, during the 1980s OC issues left completely the political radar 
in two years. In the following decades, the attention of the institution decreased 
importantly from time to time until the point that the institution handled only few 
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The analysis also shows that its attention was first concentrated in the 1980s and 
then spread specially around the mid-1990s, but the scope shrank significantly in 
the following decade. In other words, its range of attention stopped expanding 
in the 2000s. This means that the expanding pattern changed over the years into 
a  concentrated one again. In the evolution, the stretched attention contracted 
to the  tightest range, similar to how it was in the beginning of the 1980s. These 
findings are comparable to work that has found “[f]rom the mid-1990s (…) 
oscillations in agenda scope, pointing to an alternation between narrower and 
broader policy agendas of the European Council. In the most recent years, the trend 
is toward a narrowing scope, down to the level of the early 1990s” (Carammia et al., 
2016:817). This fluctuating pattern may be related to the evolving agenda-setting 
role of the European Council, as the EU remit has grown. As it has been argued in 
the literature, the institution is not anymore involved only in “selective targeting” 
of issues, but also in “routine monitoring” of them (Carammia et al., 2016). This 
means that, besides processing urgent issues that demand its prompt and selective 
response, the institution has needed to include more issues on its agenda over time 
and deal with them in a more ordinary way (Ibid: 812). The first mode of issue 
processing obtained in this study can thus explain the concentrated pattern, while 
the latter mode can be related to the expanding trend. 
The analysis on agenda diversity allows us to observe further the oscillating pattern 
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measured in terms of the levels of entropy for each year, except for the years of no 
attention by the institution, as described in Chapter 5. The average entropy value 
was 1.25 for the whole period. During the time that OC issues were constantly on 
the agenda (1988—2013), the attention oscillated between a minimum value of 0.50 
and a maximum of 1.94. These scores were reached in 1992 and 1994, respectively. 
These extreme values happened around the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty. In 
this sense, a pre– and post–Maastricht behavior on agenda diversity can be observed. 
Before the Treaty, the agenda was focused on few issues. After it, the agenda got 
importantly expanded. This finding suggests that this event gave a considerable boost 
to the attention of the institution, diversifying its agenda in a significant way. This 
is reasonable because this treaty established the field of Justice and Home Affairs, 
where the domain of organized crime was officially included in the EU framework, 
as mentioned in Chapter 4. 
Going further in time, we can appreciate an alternation between diversity and 
concentration of attention at different points over the years. After experiencing 
a remarkable concentration phase in the beginning of the 1990s, the attention of 
the institution spread from time to time and compressed later again. The findings 
on agenda diversity go in line with the previous analysis on agenda scope. This 
similarity is important because it confirms the validity of the results. The reason is 
that both features of the agenda refer to similar ideas, but are expressed slightly 
differently. Agenda diversity is about how similar or different the portions of 
Figure 6.3 Diversity of the European Council agenda on organized crime
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attention among topics are; and agenda scope is about how many different topics 
receive attention.
The European Council agenda on organized crime displays a pattern where 
the attention shrinks and stretches over the years. A similar dynamic was found by 
previous work by Alexandrova et al., who looked at all policy domains on the agenda of 
the institution (2012). They identified an oscillating pattern that becomes particularly 
evident after the Maastricht Treaty (Ibid: 81). According to them, the pattern evolved 
“from concentration to diversity and then back to concentration” (Alexandrova et 
al., 2012:81). In other words, in different occasions the European Council widely 
opened its scope of attention, dealing with many issues. However, also in diverse years 
the institution had the tendency to contract its consideration significantly, focusing 
only in very few issues. The institution needed to shrink its attention importantly in 
different occasions, given its short carrying capacity to deal with issues.
A critical test on the changing pattern of the agenda of the European Council was 
done by examining the level and distribution of attention changes. The statistical 
analysis shows a kurtosis with a positive value of 5,24915. This confirms that, as 
posited by the theory, the distribution of attention changes of the European Council 
agenda is positive, or leptokurtic, as the value is above 3.0. Thus far, little work has 
studied the level of kurtosis of the European Council agenda. From the existing work, 
the finding goes in line with Alexandrova and colleagues (2012). They have analyzed 
Figure 6.4. Distribution of attention changes on the European Council agenda
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the evolution of 21 policy domains on the agenda for the period 1975–2010, 
finding a positive score. The study in this project confirms a leptokurtic behavior in 
the attention shifts of the institution to a single domain. 
The kurtosis level is graphically shown in a histogram in Figure 6.4. The bars represent 
the frequencies and the black line shows the normal distribution. The frequency 
distribution of shifts displays the same “Quasimodo” kind of shape “with one 
shoulder peaking out” found by previous work (Alexandrova et al., 2012:78–79). This 
provides more evidence on the punctuated pattern. It shows that shifts in attention 
to the problem of OC over time were either very small or quite large, in line with 
the theory. This indicates that the restricted processing capacities of the European 
Council hindered it from having a balanced performance in attending the problem 
over time. This behavior suggests that institutions in the European Union have 
a similar policy dynamic as institutions in other political systems. 
6.3. What factors generate the attention of the European 
Council? 
The empirical evidence reveals that focusing events, political signals, policy 
inheritances, EU institutional milestones, public concerns and professional concerns 
triggered the attention of the European Council, as shown in Figure 6.5. The figure 
displays the occurrence of each factor in relation to all factors in the whole period. 
The total number of observations was 137.
The expectation in this study was that focusing events regularly trigger the institution’s 
attention. The evidence shows that these events were not the predominant stimulus 
for the high politics venue. Instead, they stand relatively in the middle in the range 
of factors that were ‘discovered’ and altogether included in the analysis.83 Therefore, 
the expectation can be confirmed only partially. The result can be explained in 
different ways. Not all focusing events are the same and their impact varies (Kingdon, 
2011:94–100). In other words, focusing events are not a guarantee of attention 
to a policy issue. In fact, previous research has found that the European Council 
responds to focusing events “on purely strategic interests”, which means that not 
all events receive the same attention (Alexandrova, 2015). Additionally, this type of 
event happens seldom. Thus, if the European Council would attend issues mostly 
or only triggered by focusing events, it would imply that the institution is out of 
the political scene for long periods until the subsequent occurrence of such factor. 
83 For a description on the way more factors than (only) focusing events were integrated to the analysis, 
see Chapter 5. 
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This would lead to a partial understanding of the functioning of the institution. 
As previously mentioned, the European Council is more and more involved in both 
selecting targeting and routine monitoring (Carammia et al., 2016). This suggests 
that, in one way or the other, the institution is constantly dealing with policy issues. 
The European Council was driven commonly by political signals and policy inheritances 
alike, each stimulating the institution’s attention in around a quarter of the cases. 
Put differently, more than half of the time the institution was triggered by the two 
factors together. On the one hand, it makes sense that the European Council is 
prone to react to indications from political actors, given that it is an institution 
highly political. This ‘match’ seems to promote that the institution takes such signals 
seriously. This may be also the reason why, by contrast, professional concerns are 
almost irrelevant. The reactive behavior on the basis of political signals can be also 
explained by the  limited  capacity of the institution to process issues. Due to its 
important constraints, the European Council does not devote much time to search 
for information. Instead, it largely processes the input it receives from political actors. 
Aware of the European Council’s top political profile, EU policy-making actors, such 
as the Commission and the Council, give indications of what they consider significant 
and urgent topics in the EU that deserve the prioritization of the high politics venue. 
This allows the European Council to be strategic about what issues to focus on and 
what to do about them. 









On the other hand, the relevant impact of policy inheritances seems to be related to 
the institution’s role of guiding the political path of the EU. The European Council 
often makes a sort of scanning of previous policy decisions taken by EU institutions 
and political agreements reached, for instance, in earlier summits. In this way, it 
evaluates the respective policy responses on such matters taken so far by the EU, 
estimates the missing actions to be accomplished and indicates the line to follow. 
This conforms to the developing role of the European Council in agenda setting, by 
which the institution is increasingly involved in routine monitoring (Carammia et al., 
2016). 
The results also show that EU institutional milestones, such as Treaty revisions, 
promoted the attention of the institution. This factor was in the middle in relation 
to the other drivers, together with focusing events. This finding can be surprising 
at first sight because one may think that this factor would have more significance. 
A reason to assume this is that, being the uppermost political venue in the EU, 
the European Council is responsible for ensuring that the development of the EU 
framework is not jeopardized, not to mention that it has a formal role in revising 
the Treaties. However, the explanation seems to be that, similarly to focusing 
events, EU institutional milestones do not happen regularly. For instance, EU 
treaties are not constantly revised, just as the accession of new members is not 
continuously negotiated by this institution. Other political bodies in the EU, such 
as the Commission and the Council, give continuation to structural arrangements 
decided on the matter by the European Council. Finally, public concerns had a mild 
effect. 
Previous research has shown that the European Council forms its attention in the 
policy field of energy mostly in two ways: by responding to focusing events and by 
reacting to the need of designing and monitoring policy plans (Alexandrova and 
Timmermans, 2014). The analysis here confirms those findings partially. This study 
demonstrates that focusing events drive only to a certain degree the institution’s 
attention to the domain of organized crime. However, this research is consistent 
with the earlier finding that the European Council also designs and monitors as 
a reaction. These behaviors are comparable to the effect of political signals and 
policy inheritances, respectively. On the one hand, the European Council reacts to 
indications from political actors on issues that require special attention and then the 
institution signals the strategy on how to proceed. On the other hand, the institution 
examines what has been done on previous policy commitments and announces how 
to move forward. 
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6.4. All together now: explaining dynamics in the European 
Council agenda
Thus far, the processes experienced by the European Council in setting the agenda 
have been described and explained in separate parts in this chapter. On the one 
hand, we identified that the institution moves its attention in an erratic way, given 
mostly its constrained information-processing capacities. On the other hand, we saw 
that the European Council’s attention is triggered commonly by political signals and 
policy inheritances, in part due to its high political profile. 
This section puts the parts of the story together. The explanation on the dynamics in 
the European Council draws from the findings previously presented, as well as from 
new insights. The analysis is facilitated by following Figure 6.6. The figure presents 
the results on the development of attention of the institution during the original 
research period, which started in 1975. It shows the number of occurrences per 
year in absolute terms. The analysis zooms in into central moments of attention over 
time. Furthermore, the study includes important episodes in the evolution of both 
the institution and the policy field.
No attention (1970s)
The finding that organized crime did not reach the European Council’s agenda 
during the 1970s indicates that the institution did not consider it to be a problem 






Figure 6.6. Development of the European Council’s attention  




for the European Union. This is reasonable, as the topic in this decade was barely 
present on the political agendas of the member states. According to scholars, at this 
time the OC problem was only starting to arise in some European countries (Van 
Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009; Carrapico, 2010b; Vander Beken, 2012), except for 
notable cases such as Italy where OC arrived on the agenda in the end of the 19th 
century (Van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009). This finding goes in line with Down’s 
‘pre-problem stage’ in his ‘issue-attention cycle’, where “some highly undesirable 
social condition exists but has not yet captured much public attention” (Downs, 
1972:39). 
The awakening of political awareness (1983) 
When the institution started to handle the problem for the first time in 1983, it 
paid extremely low attention. The reason seems to be that the European Union 
did not count at that time with competences to fight organized crime. In fact, the 
way to deal with this problem and other JHA issues was via informal and random 
intergovernmental groups outside of the EU framework (Monar, 2001; Occhipinti, 
2003). Many groups were established by the European Council. To mention only 
an example, the TREVI group was a forum set in the mid-1970s (European Council, 
1975, December), where the JHA ministers of the member states met initially to 
promote cooperation against terrorism and later to deal with other issues, such as 
drugs and organized crime.84 The circumstance that the European Council was able to 
set such political arrangements among member states without a legal framework is 
an indication of the institution’s significant political authority. Actually, the institution 
was in a way forced to set these informal groups, as it was expected to provide 
the EU with a political vision of where to go —and one way was to sense future risks. 
The analysis on the factors of attention shows that the European Council started 
to include the problem of organized crime on its agenda in 1983, driven by an EU 
institutional milestone: the construction of a European Union. Given its desire “to 
consolidate the progress already made towards European Union”, the European 
Council reaffirmed its commitment to promote “a common analysis and concerted 
action to deal with (…) organized international crime”, so much as it could be 
possible, considering that the topic was out of the European Union legal framework 
(European Council, 1983). This happened during the so-called ‘Solemn Declaration on 
European Union’ made by the institution (Ibid). The declaration established the need 
to move actively to further integrate and unite Europe. This event was particularly 
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significant for various reasons. It is considered the first stage in the conformation 
of the Single European Act (SEA), from which the idea of creating a single market 
originated.85 Furthermore, the Declaration recognized the European Council’s political 
role of providing “a general impetus to the construction of Europe” and initiating 
“cooperation in new areas of activity”, among other tasks (European Council, 1983). 
All in all, the Declaration attempted to provide a renewed stimulus to the future 
development of the European Union.
Intermittent political consideration (1984–1992)
After the problem entered the agenda of the European Council, its attention 
was overall low, especially until 1992. During this time, the institution stopped 
spasmodically attending OC issues in two years. The drops in attention can be 
explained to an extent by the lack of EU faculties to deal with the problem. However, 
ultimately the institution did not often neglect it, given the prevailing context. Two 
important developments happened in Europe in this period: the gradual abolition of 
borders within the Community which started in the mid–1980s, and the dismantling 
of the iron curtain in the beginning of the 1990s (Monar, 2012:720–721). First, 
the adoption of the SEA, which was signed in 1986 and entered into force in 1987, 
established the need to conform a single market “without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons and capital is ensured” (SEA:art. 8a). Accordingly, 
the internal market should be ‘progressively’ established and finally completed by 
December 1992. The introduction of the Single Market in the mid-1980s fostered 
a (in)security notion in the EU, due to the elimination of borders (Huysmans, 2000; 
Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004; Carrapico, 2010a). This circumstance forced member states 
to look for “compensatory measures to offset potential internal security risks resulting 
from the enhanced ‘freedoms’ of the internal market” (Monar, 2012:720). Organized 
crime was likely to be one of the risks. Second, the end of the Cold War brought 
an extra challenge to the existing OC problems, as well as to the management of 
frontiers and immigration flows, owing to the removal of the borders in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Monar, 2012:721). 
In this time period, the European Council set OC on its agenda stimulated by EU 
institutional milestones, political signals, policy inheritances and public concerns. 
From all, political signals were recurrently contributing to generate its attention. For 
instance, “on the basis of the Commission’s proposal on trade in [drug] precursors 
85 The proposal to conform a SEA was made in 1981 by Germany and Italy. They proposed a “European 
Act” to deepen the integration of Europe (CVCE, 2012), but it was not adopted back then. However, 
the Solemn Declaration paved the way for it.  
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with non-Community countries”, the European Council invited the Council in June 
1990 to arrive at an agreement before the end of the year (European Council, 1990). 
Similarly, in the same occasion the European Council “welcomed the Commission 
proposal to combat money laundering” and requested to finalize the adoption of 
appropriate measures before July 1991 (Ibid). 
Attention take-off (1993)
The year 1993 was essential for the evolution of organized crime as a policy issue 
on the agenda of the European Council. This year marked the point of departure 
towards the future consolidation of OC as a domain. Since then, the problem secured 
continuous space on the agenda every year. OC became “sticky” on it. In other 
words, the attention of the European Council took off in this year.
To understand this important episode in the development of attention, it is relevant 
to know the context back then: in the beginning of the 1990s organized crime 
shifted from a national to a European problem. Mainly four events contributed to 
the EU-wide change. First, the topic was high on the national agenda of practically 
all member states in the early 1990s (Den Boer, 2001). Second, the assassination 
in 1992 of two Italian judges fighting OC, Givonanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, 
provoked a widespread attention and awareness in Europe of the transnational 
potential of organized crime (Van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009; Vander Beken, 
2012). The  magistrates were assassinated ostensibly by the Sicilian Mafia using 
powerful bomb explosions. The motive: the judges’ role in prosecuting and convicting 
the mafiosi (FBI website). This had a relevant political impact because of the concern 
that this kind of event could spread to other countries in Europe, as argued by Vander 
Beken: “Fear that something similar would cross the Alps and infect other European 
states brought the issue to the European agenda as part of its growing interest in 
crime” (2012: 84). Third, the European Council agreed in 1991 to bring cooperation 
in the sphere of JHA into the Treaties (European Council, 1991; Monar, 2012). 
This happened to a large extent given the events in the previous decade related to 
a borderless region (Monar, 2012), as mentioned above. Fourth, the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. The treaty incorporated the area 
of JHA, which included the domain of OC, in the European Union framework. With 
this event, most of the existing random intergovernmental schemes used to handle 
JHA matters were absorbed by the formal structure of the EU. In this way, organized 
crime was officially introduced and thus formally born as an EU policy domain by this 
Treaty, as discussed in Chapter 4. The Maastricht Treaty also introduced for the first 
time the function of the European Council as the political guide of the EU (TEU: 
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art. D). Although the institution was granted no specific role on the OC domain, 
its broader assigned mandate enabled the European Council to handle this and all 
policy areas. With this situation, the European Council was placed at the top of 
the EU framework (Wessels, 2012:761). In addition, the Treaty entitled the institution 
to perform other tasks, such as amending the treaties (TEU: art 48).
According to the analysis of the factors of attention, four factors stimulated that 
the  European Council’s attention took off in 1993. These were: EU institutional 
milestones, political signals, policy inheritances and public concerns. The first two 
were particularly important. For instance, the institution was significantly driven 
by EU milestones. One of them was the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Given that “the Treaty on European Union has introduced the principle of greater 
co-operation in justice and home affairs”, the European Council set the topic on 
its agenda, asking the Council to prepare an action plan for the fight against drugs 
“including measures to counter laundering of profits from illegal activities” (European 
Council, 1993b). Another EU milestone was the achievement of the single European 
market, which was completed in December 1992 —as set by the SEA— and finally 
launched in January 1993. In this regard, the institution “stressed that the Single 
Market cannot be brought about without the full implementation of free movement 
of persons as well as of goods, services and capital”, which required measures on 
cooperation “aimed at combatting crime and drug trafficking” (European Council, 
1993c). Furthermore, the institution also acted often triggered by political signals. 
For instance, one response was to an indication made by the Council. The European 
Council reached an agreement “on the plan drawn up by the Council” on JHA 
cooperation, which covered drugs trafficking, money laundering, and international 
organized crime (European Council, 1993a). As another example, the institution took 
up a signal from the Commission. More specifically, the “European Council welcomed 
the presentation by the President Delors86 of a medium-term European plan for 
economic revival”, whose measures included the need to provide training courses for 
professions related to the fight against “crime” (European Council, 1993c).
Waves of attention (1994–2013)
After 1993, the attention of the European Council tended to go high and then quickly 
down, at least until 2013. This situation happened particularly in three occasions: 1995, 
1999, and 2004. From the three attention spikes, the most punctuated was in 1999 and 
the least pronounced in 2004. In all cases the consideration of the institution changed 
dramatically, even at the point of almost fading away after attaining a remarkably high 
86 Jacques Delors was the President of the Commission between 1985 and 1995.
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level. The most abrupt case of attention drop happened around the second peak. That 
is, in 1999 the institution devoted its highest political consideration from the entire 
period, but afterwards the attention rebounded so considerably that years later it 
reached its lowest level, making the problem nearly disappear from the agenda. 
The erratic behavior of the attention pattern over time can be largely explained 
by the severely constrained information-processing capacities of the institution. To 
begin with, the institution does not have an organizational structure that supports 
the development of its work. Rather, the heads of state or government deal mostly by 
their own with all issues. Furthermore, the institution entails a sort of ephemeral nature, 
in the sense that it basically ‘exists’ when its members gather, which occurs more or 
less every three months and only very shortly. The restrictions of the European Council 
become even more evident when we realize that organized crime is obviously not 
the only problem in the EU that the institution needs to handle. Rather, an enormous 
bunch of matters in the system require its attention. However, its agenda does not 
have enough capacity for each and every single problem. This promotes a ferocious 
competition among issues in all EU domains to get political space. It thus seems that, 
as a consequence, the European Council needed to move its attention quickly to be 
able to deal with other domains than organized crime. Thus, once the institution 
addressed the OC topic, the political body redirected its attention soon afterwards 
to other domains, instead of keep handling the same. In this way, the extreme low 
levels of attention that occurred almost right after a major peak are apparently also 
the result of its restricted agenda space. As Jones and Baumgartner have claimed, the 
way to cope with the cognitive limitations of institutions is by processing problems in 
an overdisproportionate way (2005). This is precisely what we observe: the European 
Council shifted its attention to the problem over time in an abrupt way. 
Let us look at the factors that stimulated the European Council to set the OC problem 
high on the agenda in each of the three moments. According to the analysis, the first 
attention spike in 1995 was triggered by focusing events, professional concerns, 
political signals and policy inheritances. From all, political signals were especially 
important. For instance, the European Council gave attention to the problem triggered 
by the “Council report on relations with the associated CCEE”, or Countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (European Council, 1995). The report dealt with matters 
on “enlargement relations” that included “questions relating to organized crime 
(drug trafficking, money laundering, traffic in vehicles)” (Ibid). Another political 
signal came, for example, from the member states. More specifically, the European 
Council welcomed “the Franco-British initiative on the Caribbean, which proposes 
regional action to combat trafficking in narcotics” (European Council, 1995).
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In the highest punctuation of attention that occurred in 1999, all factors, except 
for professional concerns, played a role in stimulating the institution’s attention. In 
particular, EU institutional milestones and political signals were recurrently driving its 
consideration to the OC problem. 
First, on EU milestones, the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May was 
strongly influential. This treaty demanded the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice (ASFJ), as a further development of the JHA field established by 
the Maastricht Treaty. In order to deal with the way forward to achieve the new area, 
the European Council held a meeting in October, where it placed the JHA domain 
at the top of its agenda, making it the only topic of discussion.87 The Conclusions 
of this meeting constituted the so-called Tampere Programme, a five-year action 
plan that outlined the objectives to be reached in the AFSJ field, which originated 
the establishment of ‘multi-annual programs’ in the field. The European Council 
emphasized in the Tampere Programme that “[t]he challenge of the Amsterdam Treaty 
is now to ensure that freedom, which includes the right to move freely throughout 
the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security and justice accessible to all”, 
circumstance that required “a consistent  control of external borders to stop illegal 
immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international 
crimes” (European Council, 1999). Therefore, in order to achieve “a unionwide fight 
against crime”, the European Council called for preventive measures and cooperation 
against numerous OC issues, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, 
money laundering, and corruption (Ibid). Additionally, with a view to achieve 
a  “stronger external action” to tackle organized crime, the institution urged to 
establish cooperation with third countries bordering the EU (Ibid). 
Second, also signals from policymakers often provided a stimulus to pay attention 
to the problem. To mention only an example, one of the indications taken up by 
the European Council was made by the Commission, as acknowledged by the former 
institution when stating: “Having regard to the Commission’s communication, 
minimum standards should be drawn up on the protection of the victims of crime, in 
particular on crime victims’ access to justice and on their rights to compensation for 
damages, including legal costs” (Ibid).
When the final attention spike happened in 2004, all factors of attention had 
an impact, except again for professional concerns. In particular, focusing events 
recurrently triggered the European Council to act. For instance, the terrorist attacks 
87 The fact that a single topic was on the European Council’s agenda was remarkable, given that this had 
never happened  before in the history of ordinary summits (Nilsson and Siegl, 2010:70).
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in Madrid in March had an important effect.88 This provoked that the institution 
estimated that the EU security “acquired a new urgency”, thus making an emphatic 
call to tackle more effectively cross-border issues, such as, human trafficking, 
terrorism and organized crime (European Council, 2004).
After 2004 the attention of the European Council did not punctuate again. This is 
remarkable because similar circumnstances that happened at previous moments of 
high attention (e.g. treaty revisions and focusing events) occurred also afterwards. 
To mention an example, in 2009 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. With this 
treaty, the  European Council finally acquired direct competences to deal with 
organized crime and the broader AFSJ. In effect, only at this point, the institution was 
finally assigned the mandate to deal with these topics, as mentioned in Chapter 4. 
Accordingly, the responsibility of the institution on the domain of organized crime, as 
part of the broader area of AFSJ, is to set “the strategic guidelines for legislative and 
operational planning” (TFEU: art. 68). However, interestingly, no spike of attention 
followed. An  explanation of the lack of further punctuations may be related to 
the  institution’s information-processing and political characteristics. It seems that, 
given that the European Council was particularly active attending the problem in 
the 1990s and to a certain extent in the beginning of the 2000s, the institution 
later moved its attention almost completely to other domains. It was able to do so, 
as it had already given indications to other EU institutions of how they shall further 
deal with this domain. Moreover, with the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council was 
finally appointed an EU institution. However, although its mandate in the domain 
and official upgrade came late, this did not matter much as the institution was active 
dealing with the problem of organized crime already in the previous decade, as 
the  evidence showed. This indicates that the late assignation of competences did 
not have a significant effect. Its seems that the institution’s high political attributes 
were more important. In fact, as argued by Schoutheete, the European Council 
has “exercised great power without any legal treaty basis for that power. That is 
a paradox to which the Lisbon Treaty has put an end” (De Schoutheete, 2012:46). 
This goes in line with the analysis in this study that suggests that the drastic shifts in 
the formal jurisdiction of the institution and its configuration within the EU structure 
were not that relevant for its performance in policymaking. 
The results of the factors of attention in the three years of punctuations are 
summarized in Table 6.3. 
88 The attack was against the Spanish train system, killing hundreds of civilians and injuring thousands 
of them. It had a powerful impact not only because of the important number of civilian people affected, 
but also because it represented the first major terrorist attack of that such a nature in the EU. This was 
especially relevant given that years before the 9/11 attacks happened in the United States.  
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As can be observed, there was no single predominant factor in all moments of high 
attention. The factors varied from punctuation to punctuation. In 1995 the most 
recurrent were political signals; in 1999 both political signals and EU institutional 
milestones were importantly present; and in 2004 focusing events predominated. 
All three different factors appeal to the high political attributes of the institution. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that the European Council was specially inclined to respond 
to these factors. The variation indicates that the institution did not set the issue high 
on its agenda driven constantly by the same stimulus. This can be explained by the its 
design as a serial processor. It seems that, in the same way as the European Council 
is prone to experience dramatic changes in attention over time, it is also inclined 
to have considerable variation in the factors that promote its high consideration to 
policy problems. 
The evidence indicates that political signals are especially important, as they predominated 
in two —out of three— spikes of attention. This speaks to both the  restricted 
information-processing capacities and high political attributes of the European Council. 
The institution cannot look extensively for information. Therefore, it is rather importantly 
reactive to the indications from analogous policy actors. The finding suggests that 
the European Council considers the recommendations from policymakers so seriously, 
that they can make the institution’s attention increase importantly. 
EU institutional milestones seem to be also powerful. In the year when the Amsterdam 
Treaty entered into force (1999), the level of attention of the European Council 
reached its highest point in the entire period. This result is similar to previous research 
that has found that the revision of the Treaties has an important effect on national 
Table 6.3. Summary of factors when the European Council’s attention punctuated
Punctuations
Factors 1995 1999 2004
Political signals ++ ++ +
Focusing events + + ++
EU institutional milestones - ++ +
Policy inheritances + + +
Public concerns - + +
Professional concerns + - -
The following information is shown per year of punctuation: (-) the factor that did not occur, (+) the factor that 
occurred; (++) the predominant factor, or the factor that occurred more in relation to all factors. 
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agendas, increasing the attention to issues (Breeman and Timmermans, 2012). While 
the European Council did not rise its consideration in every revision, it seems that EU 
milestones have the potential of leveraging the attention of the European Council 
to the top. 
Furthermore, in the highest punctuation, two factors predominated instead of only 
one, in contrast to what happened in the other the attention peaks. This suggests that 
the more impulses the institution receives, the higher the likelihood that its attention 
reaches its uppermost level. At the same time, it appears that the European Council is 
not open often for this situation to happen, as this occurred only once out of the three 
spikes in the research period. This makes sense, as we know that the European Council 
holds its political meetings always behind doors, which shows the close nature of 
the high politics venue. In addition, the importantly limited capacities of the institution 
to process issues discourage it to address all kind of impulses. 
While no factor was constantly predominant in all attention spikes, three factors 
were always present: political signals, policy inheritances and focusing events. This 
goes in line with the previous results on the analysis of the factors of attention over 
time that showed that political signals and policy inheritances regularly triggered 
the  consideration of the European Council. In addition, the finding that focusing 
events happened every time the institution’s attention punctuated is apparently 
because, as Kingdon has claimed, this type of events are regularly “accompanied 
by something else”, circumstance that can make that an issue becomes prominent 
on the agenda (2011: 98). In this regard, it seems that the European Council tends 
to overreact in front of focusing events, consistent with the theory that indicates 
that high politics venues are especially prone to respond to this type of events. 
The empirical analysis shows that this factor can reinforce other stimulus and thus 
push the attention of the European Council remarkably high. 
Finally, from all factors, professional concerns were almost absent when its attention 
punctuated. This suggests that they are irrelevant for the behavior of the institution 
in the long run. This circumstance is reasonable because this factor does not match 
the European Council’s high political profile.
6.5. Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed the dynamics of the European Council in agenda setting. 
It examined the expectations considered by the Agenda Dynamics Approach. 
The hypothesis that the pattern of attention of the institution is erratic over time 
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was confirmed. The attention of the institution experienced important oscillations, 
showing ups and downs in its way to process issues. However, the expectation that 
focusing events regularly drive its attention was confirmed only partially. The evidence 
revealed that more factors play a part: political signals, policy inheritances, EU 
institutional milestones, professional concerns and public concerns. From these, 
the first two factors, rather than focusing events, are especially relevant to generate 
the attention of the European Council over time. At highest moments of attention, 
the predominant factor varies, but political signals are particularly relevant. While 
in the beginning the explanatory arguments on the dynamics of the institution 
were based on the effects of the information-processing capacities and political 
attributes separately, the analysis showed that both are related. Therefore, another 
important conclusion of this chapter is that the European Council dynamics can be 
better understood by considering the two characteristics in their designs together, 
as the features mirror each other. The European Council is a serial processor and, at 
the same time, a high politics venue. Consequently, the processes of the European 
Council agenda stem from reasons altogether pertaining to the ‘twin features’ 
in the design of the institution. The following chapter introduces the analysis on 
the dynamics of the Commission and compares the results with the findings obtained 
in this chapter. 
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C h a p t e r  7
The previous chapter introduced the first analysis, demonstrating the processes of 
the European Council in agenda-setting. In this second analytical chapter, the Commission 
is studied. It answers the sub-question: what are the intra-agenda dynamics of 
the Commission? The empirical study shows the evolution of the Commission’s attention 
to OC over time. In doing so, the results obtained are compared to the previous 
findings on the European Council. The aim of the chapter is to identify and explain 
the processes occurring on the Commission agenda, while recognizing similarities and 
differences with the European Council agenda. The chapter is structured in the same 
way as the preceding one, in order to facilitate the analysis in a comparative perspective. 
Accordingly, this chapter has five parts. The  first section presents the expectations. 
The second part shows the pattern of attention of the Commission, explaining its logics. 
Next, a study of the factors triggering the institution to initiate issues on its agenda is 
introduced. It gives an explanation of the behavior. The fourth section puts together 
central elements of the previous two parts, as well as identifying more features and 
explaining the dynamics. In the last part, conclusions are drawn.    
7.1. Expectations
According to the Agenda Dynamics Approach, as described in Chapter 3, 
the organizational architecture of the Commission affects how the institution sets 
its agenda. First, its information-processing capacities have an impact on how it 
handles issues. Given that the capacity of the Commission is less limited to process 
information than the capacity of the European Council, I expect to see that 
the  Commission agenda displays over time more moderate shifts in attention, in 
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comparison with the European Council agenda whose attention changes are more 
drastic, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. Second, the political attributes of 
the Commission have implications for how its attention is generated. Given that, 
in comparison to the European Council, the Commission has less political authority 
and in turn a more technical profile, I expect to observe that the Commission 
attends issues mostly stimulated by professional concerns of expert groups. On 
the whole, the overarching expectation of ADA is that the intra-agenda dynamics 
of the Commission and the European Council are different. The methods used in 
the analysis were described in Chapter 5. 
7.2. How does the attention of the Commission move in time?
The content of the Commission agenda on organized crime is shown in Table 7.1. It 
presents all OC issues handled and discarded by the institution during the research 
period. Out of fourteen issues analyzed as set in the codebook (see Appendix 2), 
the institution gave attention to twelve. The Commission attended fewer issues than 
the European Council, which dealt with thirteen. 
Table 7.1. Content of the Commission agenda on organized crime (1984–2013)













Issues that did not receive attention
1 Trafficking in works of art
2 Trafficking in vehicles
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The way the Commission paid attention across OC issues is presented in Table 7.2. 
It shows the five more salient: drugs trafficking, organized crime, fraud, human 
trafficking and counterfeiting. They represent 82% of the agenda over time.89 
The first three issues were especially important, receiving altogether more than half 
of the Commission’s total attention (58%). 







Remaining 7 issues 17.65%
Total 100%
The variation in the allocation of attention to these issues can be better appreciated 
in Figure 7.1.90 To begin with, it shows that the problem of organized crime entered 
the agenda in 1984, not in 1975, as proposed by the original research period. It also 
shows that until the early 1990s, the attention of the Commission was scattered. 
The institution dropped the problem from its agenda in four years, in 1985, 1987, 
1988 and 1992. After its last drop of attention, the Commission attended the three 
most predominant OC issues in a more or less balanced way. During this period 
(1993–2013), the institution rarely diminished its attention so extremely to the point 
of completely neglecting them. 
In a comparative perspective, the Commission and the European Council allocated 
their attention in a similar way, in the sense that in the long run the first five issues 
on the two agendas were almost the same, except for one (see Tables 6.2 and 7.2). 
The four issues prioritized by both institutions were drug trafficking, organized crime, 
human trafficking and fraud. Next to these issues, counterfeiting had a predominant 
place on the Commission agenda, but not on the European Council agenda, where 
terrorism was prominent instead. However, the institutions assigned different 
proportions of attention to these five issues. 
89 For a complete overview on the allocation of attention across all issues, see Appendix 6, Table A.
90 For a visualization on the allocation of attention to all issues, see Appendix 6, Figure B.
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We can also observe the way their attention developed over the years in Figures 6.1 
and 7.1. In the 1980s, both actors handled the overall problem more or less alike, 
in that they introduced the topic on their agendas practically at the same time and 
considered it only spasmodically. In the 1990s and subsequent decades, the two 
institutions continued having a similar treatment, in the sense that both considered 
the topic OC as a whole constantly on their agendas with attention levels that went up 
and down. However, in the long run, the Commission dealt with OC issues in a more 
smooth way, attending relatively regularly almost all five issues, but specially the three 
most predominant. By contrast, the European Council distributed its attention across 
all (salient and non-salient) issues less equally. The different way both institutions 
dealt with the predominant issues has to do with their institutional designs. Having 
a broader agenda capacity allowed the Commission to deal with issues in a more 
stable manner over time. This contrasts with the behavior of the European Council. 
As previously seen in Figure 6.1., its attention to the two most important OC issues on 
the agenda fluctuated from one extreme to the other. As a consequence, sometimes 
such issues were practically the only topics of discussion, but in some other occasions 
they were completely neglected. It seems that being severely constrained in its agenda 
Figure 7.1. Allocation of attention across OC issues on the Commission agenda




Figure 7.1. Allocatio  of attention acro s OC issues on the Commission agenda 
* s ithout reported information means that no OC issue entered th  agenda 
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space forced the European Council to move fast across issues to be able to handle 
them. This generated considerable oscillations of its attention.
Another difference can be noticed. The finding that over time the Commission was 
predominantly busy with a triad of issues and the European Council with a pair does 
not seem to be a coincidence. This appears to be an effect of their different carrying 
capacity of their agendas. The former institution is less constrained than the latter 
institution. While it is true that the European Council can manage more issues by 
jumping faster to the next one, this is only possible for short periods. In a long-term 
perspective, this is not sustainable, due to its important limitations.
Further, the results of the scope of the Commission agenda are reported in Figure 7.2. 
According to the previous findings on the content of its agenda, the maximum possible 
range was twelve issues. The analysis here shows that the institution never addressed 
all these issues in a year. Eleven was the maximum number it processed yearly on its 
agenda. The maximum occurred in the second half of the 2000s. The way to reach 
this point was clearly incremental. In the beginning of the 1990s the attention of 
the  institution started to expand gradually and kept growing more or less steadily 
until the second half of 2000s. During the next couple of years, the Commission 
closed its scope to a certain extent, focusing on fewer issues. However, it never got 
into the point of completely neglecting all. Rather, the level reached was relatively 
mild. In the early 2010s, its attention opened again more or less gradually. 









In this way, the analysis reveals that on the whole an expanding scope prevails. Since 
the 1990s, the agenda displays predominantly an expanding but also incremental 
trend that touched its highest limit at the end of the 2000s, when it was shortly 
interrupted. This dynamic can be in part explained by the fact that the Commission 
needs to produce concrete policy proposals. This requires time to become familiar 
and specialized with problems and find the means to tackle them. Thus, the gradual 
expanding pattern seems to be the result of the institution’s acquaintance process. 
Another part of the explanation may be that Commission also needs to deal with 
routine issues.   
To facilitate a comparison of the agenda scope between the institutions, a visualization 
of the findings of both analyses is presented in Figure 7.3. The Commission is represented 
by the circles and the European Council by the squares. Their trends are shown by 
the continuous and dashed lines, respectively. Neither institution dealt in a year with 
the possible limits of their scopes (twelve issues for the Commission and thirteen 
for the European Council). Moreover, in the long run the scope of the Commission 
agenda was characterized by an expanding trend, while the European Council followed 
a  pattern were expansion alternated with concentration. This does not mean that 
the Commission’s attention never became concentrated. It indeed shrank, but not in 
such an extreme way as the European Council’s attention. Another variation can be 
appreciated in their patterns at the end of the research period. The continuous trend 





Figure 7.3. Scope of the OC agendas of the institutions  
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line suggests that the attention of the Commission kept expanding further in time. By 
contrast, the dashed line indicates a decreasing trend for the European Council that, 
according to the pattern found, likely increased again afterwards. In addition, it seems 
that timing between the institutions was different, in the sense that the Commission 
was particularly busy dealing with OC issues in a later period than the European 
Council. More specifically, the former institution was more active in the 2000s and 
the latter institution in the 1990s.
The results on the analysis of the Commission’s agenda diversity are presented 
in Figure 7.4. The average entropy value was 1.29 for the whole period. During 
the  time that OC issues were constantly on the agenda —between 1993 and 
2013— the minimum value reached was 1.01 and the maximum 2.01. These scores 
are registered exactly at the beginning and end of such period. This means that 
the Commission started this period by concentrating its attention in few issues and 
finished it by significantly diversifying its consideration in many and treat them with 
the same dedication. This finding is not surprising at this point, given that the previous 
results on attention allocation and agenda scope already pointed in the  direction 
of this dynamic. The  agenda diversity analysis confirms statistically those results. 
The reason of the Commission’s behavior has to do with its institutional nature as 





Figure 7.4. Diversity of the Commission agenda on organized crime 
* Years without a reported level of entropy mean that no issue entered the agenda 
 
  
Figure 7.4. Diversity of the Commissi n agenda on org nized crime
* Years without a reported level of entropy mean that no issue entered the agenda
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When we compare the diversity of the agendas of the Commission and the European 
Council, two important findings become evident. First, the level of agenda 
diversity in the Commission is higher. We know this because the average entropy 
score of the Commission is higher than the value of 1.25 obtained in the analysis 
of the  European Council. This confirms that the agenda of the Commission is 
less concentrated over time, or more diverse. This result is actually confirmed by 
the previous findings on the allocation of attention that showed that more than half 
of the Commission agenda was occupied by a larger number of issues over time than 
the European Council agenda.    
Second, there is a difference in the time period when the institutions were particularly 
busy dealing with the domain. The analysis on agenda diversity adds evidence 
to the previous analysis of agenda scope that indicated that one institution was 
more extensively attending the problem earlier than the other. Figure 7.5 provides 
a  visualization of the results of both institutions to facilitate the comparison. 
Following the dashed line in the figure, it is notable that the European Council 
attended the broadest variety of issues mostly in the 1990s. By contrast, observing 
the  continuous line, we can identify that the Commission stretched its agenda 
especially in the 2000s. Actually, in the 2000s, the behaviors of the institutions 
somehow switched. The European Council narrowed down the scope of OC issues 
it attended, while the Commission handled basically all. This provides a key insight. 
In the long run there was a gap in the time when institutions were more engaged in 
handling the problem. The European Council agenda was more diverse at an earlier 
point in time. Put differently, since the 1990s the European Union agenda on 
organized crime started to grow, but this situation did not occur simultaneously 
between institutions. 
The variation in the processing time between the institutions can be explained in 
different ways. One reason has to do with the role of the institutions vis-à-vis their 
issue-processing capacities. Although both political bodies have a similar role in 
agenda-setting, in strict sense it is not the same to provide political guidelines than to 
elaborate policy proposals. The former involves policy talk, the latter is about policy 
action. An analogy can be done with what Hobolt and Klemmensen have called 
“rhetorical responsiveness” and “effective responsiveness” (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 
2008). The first relates to the extent the political speeches of a government respond 
to the preferences of its citizens, and the second to the extent the budgetary 
priorities of a government respond to the preferences of its public (Ibid). These two 
notions are relevant because of the idea that there is a difference between rhetorical 
and effective policy commitment. This distinction is useful to capture the nature of 
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the functions of the European Council and the Commission. While both institutions 
take part in setting the agenda, they do it in different ways. To put it simply, one 
talks, the other writes. This is important to recognize because the time and resources 
required to process issues are quite different. The Commission requires to invest 
more. To be able to draw an initiative, the institution needs an important amount of 
time to become familiar with the problem, monitor it, look for solutions and finally 
transform the information into a concrete initiative. It is true that the Commission 
has considerably more capacity than the European Council and that can manage 
many more issues simultaneously. However, at the end of the day, the Commission’s 
capacities are also limited. Thus, regardless of its broader resources, the Commission 
can never be faster than what its capacities allow it to process. 
Another reason may be that the European Council is quicker than the Commission, 
as the former institution is expected to guide the EU. It thus seems that, as 
a consequence, the European Council first signals the Commission what to do. This 
may serve as a means to provide the Commission with initial input that it could later 
transform into output. 
A final explanation seems to be related to the notion of ‘legitimacy barrier’ (Wilson, 
1979). This barrier has to do with the way governments grow. When a government 
becomes involved in new areas, this obstacle is demolished. This can happen in two 





Figure 7.5. Diversity of the OC agendas of the institutions  
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and Jones, 2015:190). The former way occurs when a government increases its 
traditional functions and existing programs (Jones, 2012:23). The latter happens 
when a government takes up new responsibilities (Ibid). After the barrier is breached 
in one way or the other, there is no question on the governments’ validity to take 
action on a given field (Jones, 2012:23–24). 
Looking at the case of the organized crime domain in the EU, broadening is 
particularly relevant. The reason is that OC was not included in the competences 
of the European Union in its origins, as noticed in Chapter 4. This was to an extent 
due to EU’s ‘subsidiarity principle’, by which a given issue can be taken up at the EU 
level only when it cannot be solved more efficiently at the national level. It seems 
that the EU as a whole broke the legitimacy barrier with the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993, when the domain was introduced as part of the new responsibilities of the EU. 
However, the empirical findings indicate that the Commission and the European 
Council actually broke the ‘legitimacy barrier’ at different moments. The Commission 
required more time to pass completely such obstacle, which finally achieved 
in the  2000s. An  important reason is that the Commission was granted a wider 
jurisdiction in the  area of JHA only in 1999, with the Amsterdam Treaty. Before, 
it had the faculty to deal only with a limited number of issues in this area. In this 
sense, the Commission required to acquire broader competences in the domain to 
be able to have a comprehensive performance. By contrast, the European Council 
did not need this formalization, as it was able to perform widely. This difference 
between the institutions seems to be an effect of the more limited political authority 
of the Commission in comparison to that of the European Council. The latter 
institution had always a ‘tacit’ faculty to deal with the domain, enabled by its higher 
political attributes. However, the Commission needed the actual legitimization of 
the Amsterdam Treaty to have a more active role, as suggested by Nugent when 
saying that the “[i]ncorporation of a policy area into the Treaty has the effect of 
further increasing the Commission’s powers because the appropriateness of the EU 
being involved in the area cannot then be questioned” (Nugent, 2001:208). As 
a consequence, it finally became legitimate that the Commission tackled new and 
more issues in the domain of organized crime. 
Lastly, the Commission agenda passed a critical test on its level and distribution of 
changes. The evidence shows that the value of kurtosis of the Commission agenda 
was 3,085560. This reveals that the distribution of its annual attention changes has 
a positive score. This indicates that the trend is leptokurtic. This statistically confirms 
that the attention of the institution was mostly incremental, but it sometimes 
punctuated. This finding is relevant because this is the first analysis on the level and 
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distribution of attention changes of the Commission in its role in agenda setting, 
and proves a leptokurtic behavior.91 Figure 7.6 shows the results in a histogram. 
The bars represent the frequencies and the black line the normal distribution. Its 
frequency distribution displays a shape close to a normal degree. This indicates that 
the changing pattern was mostly regular in the long run, yet not entirely incremental 
—as shown by the positive value obtained. 
In a comparative perspective, the agenda of the Commission and the European 
Council are similar in that they are leptokurtic. This means that the patterns of the two 
institutions are incremental with important variations from time to time. Both change 
their attention in a disproportionate way, given their limited information-processing 
capacities. This constraint in their designs restrained both institutions from giving 
the problem a balanced treatment over time, consistent with the Processing Model. 
However, the institutions have different levels of change. The score of the Commission 
was lower than the European Council’s that was 5.24915. Comparatively speaking, 
this difference can be appreciated in three ways: between the two institutions, 
in relation to institutions in traditional political systems, and in comparison with 
institutions in the EU. 
91 For a similar type of analysis regarding the Commission’s role in the budgeting process, see Baumgartner 
et al., 2012.  
Figure 7.6. Distribution of attention changes on the Commission agenda
120
Chapter 7
First, comparing the results between the institutions, the finding that the kurtosis level 
of the Commission agenda is lower signifies that the changes are less pronounced 
on its agenda. In other words, it is more stable. The reason is that the Commission’s 
institutional design entails much less restraints than the European Council, so 
the former political body can deal with issues on a more regular basis. 
It can be also noted that the scores do not differ much. This finding is relevant because 
it indicates that the institutions have similarities. In effect, one important feature they 
share is that they have a similar role in agenda setting. The finding that the scores 
are not quite apart from each other may be because the two agendas belong to 
the same stage in the policy process. This circumstance is, however, not theorized by 
the Processing Model. The theory does not posit how to study this situation and what 
behavior to expect from agendas within the same policy stage. As a consequence, 
one may easily think that such agendas behave in the same way. But this reasoning is 
not necessarily correct. As the series of analyses previously conducted demonstrate, 
the Commission and the European Council have some similarities, but on the whole 
their patterns are mostly different. In this way, the agendas of these institutions 
passed a sort of critical test, as the results here also showed the level of variation 
expected, in line with their distinct architectures, even when the institutions belong 
to the same stage in the policy-making process. 
Second, in comparison to other political systems, the values obtained here are similar 
to scores of policy input agendas in countries, as for instance, presidential elections in 
the United States (US) (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 182) and demonstrations and 
newspapers stories in Belgium (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 612). Policy input agendas 
include matters that come into the government from the outside environment for 
internal processing, such as election outcomes, organized public opinion and media 
coverage. In this sense, the findings in this study deviate from the Processing Model 
and its “progressive friction hypothesis” (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 609). According 
to such hypothesis, the kurtosis value is supposed to increase the further the agenda 
moves in policymaking —passing from policy input to policy process and then to 
budgetary output. For this theory, policy input agendas are not part yet of the policy 
process. Examples of policy process agendas are senate hearings in the US, questions 
to the minister in Denmark and party platforms in Belgium (Baumgartner et al, 2009: 
611). Following the classification conceived by the Processing Model, the Conclusions 
and the COM docs shall belong to the category policy process agendas. However, 
the evidence obtained in this research suggests that the Commission and the European 
Council behave rather as agendas in the category of policy input, as their kurtosis 
value are lower than policy process agendas. 
121
Intra-agenda dynamics of the Commission
7
This finding indicates that the agendas of these two institutions act in a way differently 
than traditional policy process agendas. This suggests that the dynamics of political 
institutions in the European Union are somewhat different than those of their counter 
partners in other domestic systems. From this result, two important features are 
pertinent to note. To begin with, this difference makes sense considering the distinct 
nature of EU policymaking in comparison to the process in national governments. In 
the European Union, issues mostly pursue a distinct “career” than in other political 
systems (cf. Cobb et al., 1976). That is, issues in the EU regularly enter and evolve 
on the political agenda within policy-making institutions (Lelieveldt and Princen, 
2011:211). Thus agenda-setting dynamics in the EU are characterized for following 
an “inside access” model (Ibid). As a result, there is no direct relationship with 
the public agenda (Ibid). The participation of diverse groups in EU policy formation 
is quite distinct than in countries. Citizens do not have a direct say in EU politics, 
but via the national representatives of their countries in the Parliament. Moreover, 
although these representatives are elected in the ‘EU elections’, these elections 
are basically governed by the national political agenda of member states (Marsh 
and Norris, 1997:155). While both the Commission and the European Council play 
the role of executives in the EU, neither is elected. Political responsiveness in the EU 
happens in a different way than in national political systems, where governments 
are expected to address the demands of their constituencies. In fact, according to 
previous research, there is little evidence that indicates that the European Council 
is responsive to the priorities of the European citizens (Alexandrova et al., 2016). 
Actually, there is an extensive debate around democratic deficit in the EU. On top 
of this, there is no such thing as ‘European’ media. Instead, there are a large variety 
of domestic media dealing with EU topics and groups of outlets that cluster news 
stations of different member states. Arguably, such media do not have much impact 
on EU politics, in contrast to what happens in countries. 
The situation just mentioned bring us to the other feature. Because of these 
conditions, the distinction of public and media agendas is blurred in the EU system. As 
claimed by Princen and Rhinard, their existence is actually contested (2006:1121). As 
a consequence, the existence of the so-called “policy input agendas” in the context 
of the European Union becomes also questionable. This suggests that the study of 
policymaking in the EU following the same terms as done in countries is not entirely 
appropriate. The EU system is not designed to be equally responsive —or at least 
not through the same channels— as national systems. It seems that input and policy 
process agendas are somehow combined in the EU. Both the European Council and 
the Commission appear to act as policy input. They are fundamental actors not only 
in the policy process as such, but also apparently in providing input to it. 
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Third, regarding the comparison of the findings with EU institutions, there is little to 
say as there is barely work done in this regard. I thus refer to two studies —one per 
institution. On the one hand, Baumgartner and colleagues have conducted research 
on the Commission in the budgeting process (Baumgartner et al., 2012).92 They 
measured the level of kurtosis for short and long periods of time. The results obtained 
were 39.95 and 308.59, respectively (Ibid: 89). Thus, in the two cases they found 
considerably higher levels of kurtosis than the values obtained in this research. In 
this regard, the result of the Commission in agenda setting is consistent. The reason 
is that this process belongs to the initial phase in policymaking. Setting the agenda 
and assigning the budget are stages located practically at the opposite extremes in 
the policy-making spectrum. In theory, as mentioned above, this situation signifies 
that the kurtosis value of an initial stage shall be considerably lower than the score 
of a final stage. This is what we actually see, when comparing the empirical results 
of this study and the previous research. 
On the other hand, Alexandrova and colleagues have analyzed the European Council 
agenda (2012). They have studied the development of the whole agenda during 
more than three decades. They found “a mild level of leptokurtosis” (Alexandrova et 
al., 2012:78). The results presented here are in line with their finding, showing also 
a modest degree. However, their analysis obtained a score of 17.26 (Ibid: 77-78). One 
possible reason of the difference in the results may be related to a methodological 
aspect. While this research is about one policy field, the other study analyzed more 
than twenty policy domains.  
All in all, when we compare the attention patterns of both institutions, we observe that 
neither agenda was stable in the long run. Their attention to the OC problem changed 
over the years. The institutions started to deal with the problem in the beginning of 
the 1980s and considered it randomly during the rest of the decade. This situation 
changed as from the early 1990s. Since then, the domain as a whole was constantly 
present on the two agendas and over the years the attention of the institutions 
developed in waves, but never faded completely away, at least until 2013. 
7.3. What factors generate the attention of the Commission?
The analysis identified that diverse factors contributed to form the attention of 
the institution, rather than (only) one —professional concerns—, as originally 
hypothesized. The results are presented in Figure 7.7. The figure shows the occurrence 
of each factor in relation to all factors. The total number of observations was 415. 
92 The budgetary stage happens almost at the end in policymaking, after a decision on a policy proposal 
has been taken.
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The expectation was that professional concerns drive regularly the attention of 
the  Commission. The analysis demonstrates that these concerns contributed to 
generate its consideration, but they were not triggering it on a regular basis. Therefore, 
the expectation can be only partially confirmed. This was the second recurrent factor 
driving the institution to handle issues. The institution reacts to the indications made 
by experts and epistemic communities on the critical status of issues, as it needs to 
be alert and informed on the evolution of policy problems and handle specialized 
material to give shape to its proposals and policy communications. The institution 
counts with an apparatus that allows it to process different problems in simultaneous 
ways. It can thus develop strategies on how to tackle new problems and better ways 
to deal with existing issues.
The Commission is predominantly driven by policy inheritances. Half of the time 
the institution gives attention to all kinds of commitments taken in the past either 
by itself or other EU institutions. The Commission is somehow compelled to deal 
with political agreements made by key political actors, especially by the European 
Council, because such commitments entail a strong political weight. At the  same 
time, the Commission deliberately revises the agreements to use them as a source 
of justification, or legitimization, for handling a given issue and generating 
initiatives. So, in one way or another, the institution cannot overlook such decisions. 
Furthermore, the Commission has to an important extent the duty to deal with 









earlier policy choices. This can be explained by the institution’s more technical profile 
in the policy-making process. For instance, the Commission must produce annual 
reports on certain issues, such as fraud, given its function as budget holder. Also 
the institution needs to supervise the appropriate implementation of EU policies by 
member states. In effect, adopted policies establish the Commission’s obligation to 
report on the status of implementation. As a result, certain issues eventually need 
to re-appear on its agenda. The Commission is able to attend a great amount of 
issues inherited from previous commitments, due to its broad information-processing 
capacities. Further, EU institutional milestones stand in the middle range of factors 
affecting its attention. In addition, signals from political actors, such as the European 
Council and the Parliament, occupy a mild position. Finally, public concerns and 
focusing events have a limited impact. 
When comparing the factors generating the attention of the Commission and 
the European Council (see Figure 7.7 and 6.5, respectively), diverse conclusions can 
be drawn. First of all, six factors stimulate the two institutions to take up policy issues 
on their agendas, namely, policy inheritances, political signals, professional concerns, 
EU institutional milestones, focusing events, and public concerns (see Table 7.3). 
As mentioned in Chapter 5 on the methods, the analysis was conducted first on 
the basis of the theoretical expectations in this research, by which focusing events and 
professional concerns were observed. Later, some notions in the literature related to 
domestic political systems were explored, from which the rest of the factors emerged. 
It is not argued in this study that these are the only factors that drive the attention 
of the political bodies. Instead, the argument is that at least these six factors play 
a part in the process, as noted from the references in the policy documents issued by 
the institutions. In practice, many more factors can be influential of course. Also we 
cannot rule out the existence of more features not recognized in the data. 
Finding a palette of six factors of attention, instead of only two or even one per 
institution as originally expected, is not surprising. Previous work on agenda setting 
Table 7.3. Factors that generate the attention of the Commission and the European Council 
1 Policy inheritances 
2 Political signals  
3 Professional concerns 
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and representation has found that governments in other political systems are 
somewhat prone to react to these factors. 
For instance, policy inheritances play a relevant role in policymaking in domestic 
systems, according to Rose and Davis (1994). The evidence shows that this factor 
is also significant for both the Commission and the European Council. There 
are, however, differences between the institutions. Policy legacies are especially 
relevant for the Commission, reacting in half of the occasions to this stimulus. By 
contrast, the European Council responds to inheritances in a quarter of the cases. 
In addition, the institutions react on the basis of different structural motives and 
goals. The Commission is inclined to act in front of inheritances, in order to assure 
the continuous development of policies and proper administration of the EU, as 
well as to make its point stronger about dealing with a given issue on the agenda. 
In the meanwhile, the European Council is influenced by legacies, as it can evaluate 
them to estimate the way the EU shall move forward. Thus, policy inheritances have 
a different meaning for each institution.
Moreover, the policy-making process in general involves indications of political actors 
in order to feed the machinery of policy production. This research shows that political 
signals trigger the attention of the institutions, but specially of the European Council. 
This is one of the two most relevant factors that drive its consideration to issues.        
Next, previous research on national agendas has demonstrated that changes in 
European legislation and policy, particularly regarding the revision of EU treaties, 
impact the Dutch legislative agenda, according to Breeman and Timmermans 
(2012). They call this an “institutional milestone effect” (Ibid: 160–161). Similarly, 
the findings here demonstrate that the Commission and the European Council react 
to substantial shifts in the EU legal framework, such as Treaty revisions, and other 
key developments on European integration. The two institutions respond relatively in 
a similar degree to EU institutional milestones. 
Furthermore, governments in traditional political systems are expected to act according 
to the demands of their citizens. However, the finding that both the Commission 
and the European Council respond to public concerns was not entirely anticipated. 
The reason is that previous work on agenda-setting in the EU has claimed that this 
system behaves differently in this regard. Princen has argued that “it is still very 
difficult for political actors to appeal to a European public” (Princen, 2007:31). 
Consequently, according to Princen, in the European Union “the direct accountability 
of decision-makers to the public cannot be taken for granted” (Ibid). This happens 
to an extent because the existence of a European “public sphere” is “questionable” 
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(Princen and Rhinard, 2006:1121). Based on the evidence obtained in this study, 
two points can be noticed. First, the voice of the public is to an extent taken into 
consideration by the institutions. This conforms to previous research that has found 
proof of correlation between the attention of the European Council and public opinion 
(Alexandrova et al., 2016). However, it cannot be argued that the Commission and 
the European Council are actually accountable to the public. The institutions respond 
to citizens, but they do it with a low-key approach. Second, it can be observed that 
the Commission is less prone to attend issues out of the demand from the public. 
Put differently, the European Council is more responsive to citizens’ concerns. This 
finding is surprising, especially because the latter institution is by far less open —even 
gathering behind closed doors. The more reactive behavior of the European Council 
may be the result of a reflective attitude of the Heads of State or Government as 
they meet all together, willing to gradually open their antenna to citizens beyond 
the national level, with a  view to support EU integration. It thus seems that, as 
Carammia et al. have argued, “the European Council is developing into the EU’s 
de facto government” (2016: 809). A possible explanation for the reaction of 
the  Commission may be that professional concerns, which are considerably more 
relevant for the institution, generally stem from the idea of preventing citizens’ 
ill-being. This indirectly involves public concerns.
Finally, it was demonstrated that the original factors considered in this research —
focusing events and professional concerns—, have a considerably different weight 
between the institutions. Focusing events are almost irrelevant for the Commission, 
but not for the European Council. This is reasonable because the low politics 
venue is much less sensitive to these type of events than the high politics venue. 
Professional concerns are practically neglected by the European Council. By contrast, 
the Commission is importantly moved by them given its more technical profile.
7.4. All together now: explaining dynamics in 
the Commission agenda
The chapter has shown the way the Commission sets its agenda over time and 
compared the findings to the trend followed by the European Council. Two separate 
sections above dealt with this. First, we observed that the attention of the Commission 
evolves in a more stable way than the consideration of the European Council. This 
is a  consequence of the less restricted information-processing characteristics of 
the former institution in comparison to the latter institution, whose capacities are 
importantly limited in this regard. Second, we saw that over time the Commission 
is triggered predominantly by policy inheritances, in comparison to the European 
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Council that is importantly stimulated by both political signals and policy inheritances 
alike. It was identified that policy inheritances play a relevant role for the two 
institutions, but in different degrees and for different reasons and goals, according 
to their low and high political profiles. 
In this section, these ideas are placed together. The processes of the Commission 
agenda are explained, on the basis of the previous results and new insights. 
The  visualization in Figure 7.8 helps follow the analysis. It shows the results on 
the development of the attention of the institution during the research period, as 
initially proposed, so starting in 1975. It includes the number of occurrences per 
year in absolute terms. The study focuses on central moments in the evolution of 
the Commission’s agenda. It also considers important events in the development of 
the institutions and the policy domain. To facilitate a comparison, the figure includes 
the previous results of the European Council agenda. The continuous line represents 
Commission and the dashed line the European Council.





Figure 7.8. Development of the Commission’s and Europea  Council’s attention 
  
No attention (1970s)
Following the pattern of the continuous line in the figure, we can see that the problem 
did not reach the Commission agenda in the 1970s, just as it happened in the case 
of the European Council agenda. Both institutions shared the view that OC was 
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not a problem in the European Union, so they left the issue completely out of their 
priorities. The reason seems to be that in this time the problem hardly occurred 
on the national agendas of member states (Van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009; 
Carrapico, 2010b; Vander Beken, 2012). 
The awakening of political awareness (1984) 
The Commission attended the problem of organized crime for the first time in 1984, 
giving it low consideration because the European Union did not have competences 
on the topic. Comparing the findings between the institutions, we can see that both 
started to include the problem of organized crime on their agendas around the same 
year. This means that the history of organized crime as an EU policy problem, as 
set by the two institutions, began in the 1980s. This was not anticipated for two 
reasons. First, as just mentioned, the problem of OC was not within the jurisdiction 
of the  European Union. Second, OC started to be high on the agenda of almost 
all member states only after the early 1990s (Den Boer, 2001). In fact, “in the late 
1980s, many Western European politicians did not think it a real problem in their 
own country” (Van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009:263). 
A further comparative examination of the results reveals that the European Council 
took the lead in initiating to handle the problem in 1983. The finding that this 
institution, not the Commission, was the first in doing so seems to be related to 
their distinct political attributes. This can be noticed on the different way the two 
institutions were allowed (or not) to deal with OC issues at that time. On the one 
hand, based on the fear of the repercussions of free frontiers within the Community, 
diverse ad hoc mechanisms were created before the domain was introduced in 
the EU framework, in order to compensate the risk of an increase in organized crime. 
Such schemes had predominantly an intergovernmental basis, as the borders of 
many countries were involved. Thus OC problems were regularly handled through 
informal intergovernmental groups. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many 
of these groups were established by the European Council to an extent due to its 
high political authority. It seems that these circumstances eventually facilitated that 
the institution raised the issue on its agenda before the Commission. 
On the other hand, the Commission was less encouraged to initiate action. Diverse 
events indicate this. For instance, the Commission was seldom allowed to actively 
perform within the intergovernmental schemes. Its participation was not easy to 
achieve, particularly in relation to the TREVI group that was mentioned in the previous 
chapter. But the Commission was finally accepted due to its know-how “on 
the Internal Market related to internal security issues”, but it was hardly influential 
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(Monar, 2010:27). Its participation was mainly as an observer and supplier of 
information (Ucarer, 2001:4; Lewis and Spence, 2006:295). Another example of how 
the Commission was discouraged to be the first in attending the OC problem, but 
the European Council encouraged can be found in the so-called ‘Solemn Declaration 
on European Union’, adopted in 1983. The declaration clearly assigned different roles 
to each institution. While it defined the Commission’s function in the  integration 
process mostly “within the framework of the Treaties”, the declaration entitled 
the European Council to initiate collaboration “in new areas of activity” (European 
Council, 1983). In this way, it was less easy for the Commission to begin action 
because OC was not an EU competence. 
The analysis on the factors of attention shows that OC arrived on the agenda 
of the  Commission for the first time, due to professional concerns and policy 
inheritances alike. First, the concerns were about how the Community market, 
including the customs union, may be affected by OC due to the facilitation and 
growth of international trade at that time. In effect, as Milner has argued, in 
the early 1980s a “widespread liberalization of trade policies” started, promoting 
“freer trade among countries across the globe” (Milner, 1999:91–93). In this 
context, the Commission was concerned about the free movement of goods, in 
particular regarding the situation of products subject to counterfeiting and fraud 
that involved not only member states but also third countries. For this reason, 
the Commission recommended, for instance, to establish cooperation between 
the fraud services of member states and Switzerland to control fraud in the wine 
sector, given that “the  quantity of adulterated or misleadingly described wine 
gives cause for concern” (Commission, 1984b). Second, out of policy inheritances, 
the  Commission took up, for instance, the issue of counterfeiting. It issued 
a proposal against this problem promoted by the fact that “action against piracy 
can now be based on certain provisions in the Solemn Declaration on European 
Union adopted at Stuttgart on 19 June 1983”, in particular sections 3.3 and 3.4 
(Commission, 1984a). 
Comparatively speaking, the problem was introduced for the first time on each of 
the  two agendas pushed by distinct factors. While the Commission was triggered 
by both professional concerns and policy inheritances, the European Council was 
stimulated by EU institutional milestones. This is not surprising given their distinct 
designs. It can be also noticed that the problem entered the agendas from different 
perspectives. The Commission prioritized specific offenses, such as fraud and 
counterfeiting. By contrast, the European Council addressed the problem in a generic 
way, centering on its quality as international crime. This behavior goes in line with 
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their different architectures, by which the Commission deals with problems in a more 
specialized manner, while the European Council looks at them more generally. It thus 
seems that a sort of arrangement started to be played between the institutions to 
deal with the problem. The European Council, as a serial processor, pointed broadly 
at the problem and later passed it over to the sphere of the Commission, as a parallel 
processor, for more detailed consideration. 
Intermittent political consideration (1985–1992) 
As previously noted in the analysis on the allocation of attention, the Commission 
neglected the OC problem in four years during the period between the moment 
the topic debuted on the agenda of the institution and the early 1990s. Its intermittent 
consideration was probably because the institution did not have enough legitimacy to 
initiate policy proposals in an area where the Community had no faculties. However, 
as just mentioned, the Commission achieved to participate given its expertise in 
the internal market. But also the institution acted on the basis of other “Community 
competences”, such as “development cooperation”, which according to the Council, 
enabled the Commission to negotiate the United States Convention against illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (Commission, 1989).
In a comparative perspective, in this period both institutions attended the problem of 
organized crime interruptedly, taking it on their agendas in some years and dropping 
it in some others. This finding deviates to an extent from previous work that has 
claimed that organized crime was “hardly taken at the European level”, but until 
the beginning of the 1990s (Vander Beken, 2012:84). It is true that the two EU 
institutions attended the problem irregularly, but the analysis suggests that the seeds 
were established in this period. The latter conclusion is similar to earlier research 
that has found that the introduction of OC as an EU policy domain, together with 
other JHA matters, “was not a creatio ex nihilo” (Monar, 2012:718). In other words, 
the idea of transforming organized crime into an EU competence originated at this 
stage. It seems that in this period both institutions started to become acquainted 
with the problem.
During these years, the Commission’s attention was driven by all factors, except 
for EU institutional milestones. In particular, policy inheritances often provided 
a stimulus. For instance, the Commission issued in 1990 a proposal on chemical 
substances required for the production of drugs, so-called drug precursors, with 
the aim to avoid their illicit use and the competition distortion of the licit market 
(Commission, 1990a). The proposal contained diverse measures, “as required by 
the 1988 UN Convention, to monitor the manufacture and placing on the Community 
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market of precursors of psychotropic and narcotic substances” (Ibid).93 As another 
example, the Commission proposed in 1991 to amend the existing regulation on 
measures to discourage the trade on drug precursors, given the recommendations of 
the Chemical Action Task Force, as expressed by the Commission: “It is the intention 
of the present proposal to adapt the Community legislation according to the CATF 
recommendations” (Commission, 1991b).94 
Comparing the results between the institutions, their attention during this time 
was commonly induced by different factors. While mostly policy inheritances 
triggered the Commission to set OC issues on its agenda, political signals stimulated 
the European Council. 
Attention take-off (1993)
There was a fundamental change in the development of the organized crime policy 
problem in 1993, as conceived by the Commission. As from this year, the institution 
did not neglect the problem again. In fact, looking at the results of the European 
Council, it becomes evident that the attention of both institutions took off at 
the same time, in the sense that after 1993 the problem was on their agendas every 
year and started to develop. 
This finding is significant because it means that the moments of drops of attention 
happened only before the formal inclusion of the topic in the EU framework by 
the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in this year. This is an indication 
that on the whole competencies play a role. This circumstance is not entirely in 
line with previous work. For instance, Princen has claimed that “the rise of issues 
on the EU agenda does not depend on a legal competence in the EU treaties”, 
as the  proponents of a given issue can appeal to other legal and even non-legal 
forms to be able to make their case (Princen, 2012:43). This argument is partly true 
because, as the analysis shows, the two institutions indeed dealt with the problem 
before competencies were granted. However, their attention was intermittent. In this 
way, the study suggests that, while faculties are not entirely necessary for issues to 
reach the EU agenda, competences do facilitate that problems become sticky on it. 
Put differently, faculties matter to an extent. 
93 “The 1988 UN Convention against illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances was 
signed by the Community on 8 June 1989” (Commission, 1990a). This United Nations Convention “is 
part of the worldwide effort to combat illegal drugs. Within its sphere of competence, the Community 
participated in the negotiation and concluded the Convention on behalf of the Community by means of 
Council Decision 90/611/EEC” (Council of Ministers, 2004).  
94 The CATF recommendations were adopted on 17 July 1991 by the European Community and the G-7 
group, in the framework of the London Economic Summit. The aim was to tackle chemical diversion in 
relation to drug trafficking (Commission, 1991a).
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It seems also that competences are not equally important between the institutions. 
They are less relevant for the European Council than for the Commission, due to their 
distinct political features. Although this was previously noticed, important evidence 
can be also found in the way the Maastricht Treaty established the official position of 
each institution. On the one hand, this Treaty gave the Commission the role to tackle 
organized crime, but in a restricted way. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the institution 
acquired the right of initiative only regarding fraud, but not in the areas of police and 
customs cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of organised 
crime (TEU, Art. K.1, K.3). Instead, member states were entitled to initiate proposals 
in these and all JHA fields. A reason for this delimitation was that member states 
“were reluctant to deputize the Commission in policy-initiation through significant 
and constitutionally conferred powers” (Ucarer, 2001:4). Another reason is that 
prior to this Treaty, the European Union was used to handle OC issues based on 
intergovernmental schemes which made that the introduction of the domain into 
the EU framework followed the same arrangement (Monar, 2010:27–30). That is, 
a superior control of the member states on OC policies than that of the European 
Union. This consequently diminished the chances of the Commission to exercise 
a  greater role in the fight against OC. In this context, while the JHA field was 
officialized by the Treaty, no Directorate General on the area was created. This means 
that, when organized crime finally became a competence of the EU, the Commission 
was not granted a permanent department specialized to develop initiatives to face 
the OC problem and other issues in the area of JHA. However, a ‘Task Force’95 on JHA 
was created years later, in 1995, under the leadership of the Commission’s General 
Secretariat (Lewis and Spence, 2006:307; Bunyan, 2013:2). The task force dealt 
especially with drugs, among other matters (Ucarer, 2001:6). It was the predecesor 
of the Directorate General JHA. An important reason for establishing a Task Force 
instead of a proper DG was that the Commission had scarce competences in the JHA 
area (cf. Monar, 2010:37). According to Ucarer, the restricted power confered to 
the Commission in terms of agenda setting in this area, together with the authority 
given to the Council to decide by unanimity, “constrained the leverage and leadership 
potential of the Commission in the policy-making cycle” (Ucarer, 2001:2). 
On the other hand, although the Maastricht treaty did not give the European Council 
any specific role in the OC domain, the Treaty assigned the institution the function 
of providing political guidelines to the EU in all policy areas, as described in 
Chapter 4. The formal assignation of its role only at this point —almost 20 years 
after its establishment in 1975— is remarkable. However, it makes sense given 
95 A task force is a transitory unit specialized in a particular policy field.
133
Intra-agenda dynamics of the Commission
7
the institution’s higher political authority, which allowed it to actively perform since 
its creation, even in the absence of official competencies. The Maastricht Treaty also 
entitled the institution to amend EU treaties. However, in reality, the Heads of State 
or Government traditionally have “played some role” in treaty negotiations since 
the Treaty of Rome (De Schoutheete, 2012:61) and “almost constantly” in institutional 
reforms since the SEA (Werts, 2008:40). Moreover, although the Maastricht Treaty 
did not give the European Council the formal status of EU institution, its performance 
and high political profile have not been hindered, as identified in this research and 
previous work (cf. De Schoutheete, 2012). 
The finding that formal competences matter more for the Commission than for 
the European Council is reasonable. It is not the same to issue policy proposals, as 
the Commission does, than to provide political guidelines, as the European Council 
does. To conduct the former activity, competences on a given area together with 
a  technical apparatus are required. By contrast, to carry out the latter activity, 
an official mandate is not entirely necessary. Instead, a high political authority is 
practically a must. 
According to the analysis on the factors of attention, in 1993 the Commission paid 
attention to the problem driven by EU institutional milestones and policy inheritances. 
Specially the latter predominated. For example, the Commission took up the problem 
due to a commitment with the Council acquired already in 1990, as part of its 
strategy against fraud. Back then, the Commission undertook to present every year 
a report on the activities and progress done about this issue (Commission, 1990b). 
On this basis, the Commission issued in 1993 “the fourth such annual report”.96 
The institution published the report together with a new action program on fraud, 
which updated the existing version of 1989, “since the programme has for the most 
part already been implemented” (Commission, 1993). 
In a comparative perspective, the factors that triggered the attention of the institutions 
differed. While the driver of the Commission was mostly represented by policy 
inheritances, the European Council was specially stimulated by EU institutional 
milestones and political signals alike. 
Waves of attention (1994–2013)
Once the attention of the Commission took off in 1993, it developed more or less 
gradually over time. Its consideration was particularly high in three years: 1998, 
96 Interestingly, in this year the status of these documents was upgraded. Although the reports on fraud 
had been issued since 1990, they were previously considered merely working documents, i.e. SEC docs 
(Commission, 1990b, 1991c, 1992) . They became official policy documents, i.e. COM docs, only in 1993.
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2004, and 2011. The two final spikes of attention were the most pronounced and 
reached a similar level. Each time after a significant increment, the attention of 
the Commission dropped in a slight way, reaching a mild level in relation to the entire 
period. The gradual development of its attention to OC over the years happened in 
a similar way as how the Commission got involved in the policy-making process in 
the broader area of JHA, as argued by Lewis and Spence: “It was a slow process, 
but the Commission established itself little by little as a body known for its growing 
expertise in the field [of JHA]” (Lewis and Spence, 2006: 297). 
Making a comparison between institutions, the Commission was more moderate 
than the European Council and increased its attention particularly in the 2000s. By 
contrast, the European Council’s attention changed more erratically, especially in the 
1990s. Similarly, the most pronounced punctuations of the institutions occurred in 
different decades. While the Commission devoted its highest attention in 2004 and 
2011, the European Council did it in 1999. Altogether, the OC topic was not always 
high on their agendas, but was always present after the beginning of the 1990s. 
This finding is consistent with previous research on EU agenda setting that has found 
that “[a]ll problems decline at some point and for some period to lower status. But 
not all policy topics disappear entirely from the political agenda” (Alexandrova and 
Timmermans, 2014:48). The domain of organized crime is a clear example of this 
situation. It was constantly on the two agendas, albeit receiving different levels of 
attention, sometimes high, sometimes low, but without fading away completely, at 
least between 1993 and 2013.
The Commission’s more incremental attention pattern in relation to the European 
Council seems to be largely an effect of the design of the former institution. 
The  information-processing capacities of the Commission are limited, but much less 
than the resources of the European Council. The Commission has a support apparatus 
divided into different fields of specialization. This allows the institution to handle all 
sorts of problems in diverse areas and at the same time. As a result, the agenda of 
the Commission is much broader. A less restricted agenda makes institutions process 
problems less disproportionately, according to the theory (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005). The pattern of the Commission mirrors this. The institution moved its attention 
in a more stable way, given that the topic was processed by the various departments 
within its organization. This allowed the Commission to focus more or less regularly on 
the problem without the need to rush and suddenly change to another policy problem, 
as by contrast the European Council did. Furthermore, the Commission was less erratic 
in changing its attention because it required to process certain issues by routine. This 
stemmed from, for instance, the institution’s obligation of reporting continuously on 
the status of implementation of policy instruments by member states. 
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Let us examine the factors that generated the attention of the Commission in each of 
the three punctuations. The first spike in 1998 was stimulated by all six factors. From 
them, again policy inheritances frequently triggered its consideration. For example, 
the Commission handled the problem, due to matters of legacy after “the European 
Council in Amsterdam, in June 1997, endorsed an Action Plan to combat Organised 
Crime, in which, among other things, it calls on the Council and the Commission 
to examine and address, by the end of 1998, the issue of fraud and counterfeiting 
relating to all non-cash payment instruments” (Commission, 1998). As a consequence, 
the Commission published a communication on this topic (Ibid). Comparatively, it can 
be noted that the attention of the European Council did not punctuate in this year, but 
it was about to experience already its second punctuation, which would occur in 1999. 
The Commission’s first punctuation of attention happened one year before 
the establishment of the Directorate General in Justice and Home Affairs. This set 
up was possible only after the entry into force of Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. This 
Treaty entitled the institution broad right to initiate proposals on any matter related 
to organized crime, as mentioned in Chapter 4. However, a transitional period of 
five years was established for OC issues related to the free movement of people, 
e.g. human trafficking, which means that the Commission enjoyed exclusive power 
of initiative on such issues only in the end of 2004. As a consequence of its wider 
mandate, the Commission expressed its need to count with another setup to handle 
issues on JHA, arguing that the existing Task Force was inadequate to accomplish 
the new demands (Ucarer, 2001:11). Consequently, DG JHA was finally created in 
1999 (Nugent, 2001:135; Lewis and Spence, 2006:307).97 This is the main office within 
the Commission’s organization that drafts initiatives in the field of organized crime. 
According to Nugent, the creation of this DG “was a response to the Commission’s 
developing role in this policy sphere since Maastricht and the increasing responsibilities 
it was assigned under the Amsterdam Treaty” (2001: 135). In this way, the legal 
and institutional novel arrangements experienced by the Commission in the end of 
the 1990s were pivotal for its increasing involvement and authority in policymaking 
regarding JHA issues, including organized crime (cf. Monar, 2010: 38). 
The second attention spike of the Commission, which happened in 2004, occurred 
also in the year when the provision of the Amsterdam Treaty on the role of 
the  Commission on OC issues related to the free movement of persons entered 
into force. Thus its competences in the domain became broader.98 All six factors 
97 The name of this DG has changed over time, e.g. DG Justice; DG Home Affairs; DG Justice, Freedom 
and Security; and DG Migration and Home Affairs, among others.
98 Regarding other treaties, the Nice Treaty that entered into force in 2003 did not signify an important 
change for the function of the Commission in the OC field. With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Commission’s 
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played a role in promoting the interest of the Commission to deal with the problem, 
but policy inheritances were again especially relevant, driving recurrently its 
attention, just as observed in the previous punctuation. For instance, one legacy 
was about its traditional task “to transmit each year to the European Parliament and 
the Council a report” on the protection of the European Union financial interests 
and the fight against fraud, as set by the treaties (Commission, 2004). In this year, 
the European Council’s attention also punctuated. However, this was the lowest and 
last peak experienced by this institution. Regarding the factors of attention, these 
differed between the political bodies: while mostly policy inheritances influenced 
the Commission, focusing events had an important impact on the European Council. 
The last punctuation of the Commission’s attention in 2011 was stimulated by all 
factors of attention, except for focusing events. Policy inheritances were again 
particularly relevant. For instance, one legacy stemmed from “Article 9 of Council 
Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in 
the private sector”, which committed the institution to report on the implementation 
of such policy instrument (Commission, 2011). 
The results of the factors of attention in the three attention spikes of the Commission 
are summarized in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4. Summary of factors when the Commission’s attention punctuated 
Punctuations 
Factors 1998 2004 2011
Policy inheritances ++ ++ ++
Professional concerns + + +
Political signals + + +
EU institutional milestones + + +
Public concerns + + +
Focusing events + + -
The following information is shown per year of punctuation: (-) the factor that did not occur, (+) the factor that 
occurred; (++) the predominant factor, or the factor that occurred more in relation to all factors.
  
power of initiation became absolute for all OC issues. However, before this could be completely valid, 
a transitional period of five years applied (TEU, Protocol 36: art. 10). This means that the Commission’s full 
authority over all organized crime matters is a reality as from December 2014. From more information on 
this, see Chapter 4.
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We can see that one same factor clearly predominated always when the Commission 
devoted high attention to the OC problem: policy inheritances. By contrast, each 
of the three attention spikes of the European Council were promoted primarily by 
a  different factor (i.e. political signals, EU institutional milestones, and focusing 
events). The finding on the Commission’s behavior is supported by the previous 
results that indicated that policy inheritances were especially relevant to stimulate 
the institution’s interest to set the problem on its agenda over time. The reason seems 
to be that the Commission is virtually obliged to keep systematic track of past policy 
commitments, due to its more technical profile and because it has the capacity to 
process old and new issues. This regular pattern of the same predominant factor at 
highest moments of attention goes in line with the Commission’s more stable dynamic 
over time. This contrasts to the European Council’s more irregular pattern by which 
no single factor prevailed in all punctuations. This suggests that the Commission is 
more ‘predictable’ than the European Council in what drives the institutions to give 
high consideration to issues. The explanation may be that the high political attributes 
of the European Council make this institution less attached to act always in front 
of determined impulses, as it entails sufficient authority to be able to move more 
in its own way. Another possible explanation is that the European Council needs to 
adapt its agenda more, according to important contemporary occurrences because 
it needs to deal with the ‘hot’ issues in the EU. It thus seems that the  European 
Council agenda entails a higher degree of freedom and flexibility than that of 
the Commission. 
Four factors were constantly present when the attention of the Commission 
punctuated, in addition to the predominant occurrence of policy inheritances. 
Namely, professional concerns, political signals, public concerns, and EU milestones. 
From these findings, three points are important to observe. First, focusing events did 
not have a regular influence on the institution to set the issue high on its agenda. 
This makes sense because the theory indicates that low politics venues are not 
sensitive to this type of events, but high politics venues are. By contrast, in the case 
of the European Council, focusing events were always present, ‘accompanying’ other 
factors. 
Second, while a previous analysis in this chapter showed that public concerns were 
almost neglected over time by the Commission, the analysis here reveals that such 
concerns can be eventually relevant to contribute that the institution sets the problem 
high on its agenda. A possible reason is that it may add important value to consider 
the worries of the society, in order for the Commission to legitimize its work in 
the process of policy formation.
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Third, the Commission responded in all cases of high attention to a larger number 
of impulses than the European Council. This may be explained by the much more 
open design of the Commission, in comparison to the European Council. It seems 
that the Commission’s more technical attributes demand the institution to search 
for information and thus considerably broaden its source to feed its political radar, 
in contrast to how it happens with the less exposed way to process issues of 
the European Council. 
7.5. Conclusions 
The chapter analyzed the agenda dynamics of the Commission, also in comparison 
to the processes of the European Council. In doing so, the ideas proposed by 
the Agenda Dynamics Approach were examined. The expectation that the attention 
pattern of the Commission is more moderate than the trend of the European Council 
was confirmed. However, the expectation that professional concerns regularly drive 
the attention of the institution was confirmed only partially. It was demonstrated that 
the same six factors that affect the European Council also affect the Commission, 
albeit in different ways. 
We saw that the agenda dynamics of the Commission and the European Council 
vary. This variation happens in how they attend issues over time and the reasons 
why they do so. On the one hand, the Commission changed its attention more 
steadily over time, while the European Council did it in a more pronounced way. 
On the other hand, the Commission initiated issues on its agenda triggered mostly 
by policy inheritances in the long run. In the meantime, the European Council took 
issues on board stimulated by political signals and policy inheritances in a similar way. 
It was identified that, although both institutions respond to policy inheritances, they 
do it at different levels and due to distinct motives and aims. Furthermore, when 
the Commission’s attention punctuated, policy inheritances always predominated. 
By contrast, at moments of high attention, the predominant factor for the case of 
the European Council was every time different: political signals, EU institutional 
milestones and focusing events. It was also revealed that the institutions are, however, 
not completely different. Some similarities are present, but to a much lesser extent. 
In addition, it was shown that official competences to tackle the problem play also 
a part in agenda setting, circumstance that is less relevant for the European Council. 
Ultimately, the chapter confirmed the overarching expectation that the intra-agenda 
dynamics of the European Council and the Commission are largely different, as 
posited by ADA. Such processes were explained by a combination of the information-
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processing and political characteristics of the institutions. These characteristics go 
practically hand in hand. The Commission is a parallel processor and a low politics 
venue. Similarly, the European Council is a serial processor and a high politics 
venue. While both features fit logically together, the ‘twin features’ in the nature 
of each of the two institutions have been studied mostly separately in the literature. 
Thus, as also noted in the previous chapter, a relevant conclusion is that combining 
both institutional features, rather than considering them apart, allows us to better 
comprehend the behavior of the institutions in the policy process. The next chapter 
presents the analysis on the dynamics between the two agendas.  
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The two previous chapters showed the empirical analysis of the dynamics of 
the European Council and the Commission, respectively. We thus identified how each 
institution sets its agenda. The final step in this research is to see how the institutions 
relate to each other in agenda setting. This is the last analytical chapter of the project 
and studies the dynamics between the agendas. It addresses the following question: 
what are the inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council and the Commission? 
The answer provides evidence on the underlying pattern in their interaction, showing 
the governing directionality between their agendas in the long run. The  aim of 
the chapter is to identify the logics in the interplay and explain them. The chapter 
has three sections. The first part deals with the analytical implications of the research 
topic for the way to study it. The second section introduces and discusses the findings. 
In the final part, conclusions are provided.  
8.1. Much speculation, little evidence: analytical implications
This project has empirically demonstrated that the European Council and 
the Commission set their agendas mostly in a different way, as expected according 
to the Agenda Dynamics Approach. The basis for such expectation stemmed from 
central postulates of the Processing Model and the Routes Framework, which were 
tested to study the behavior of each of the two institutions. 
It is time now to analyze the relationship between the political bodies. ADA includes 
diverse ideas on their interplay, but no specific expectation that accounts for 
Inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council 
and the Commission
C h a p t e r  8
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the directionality of the interaction. This is because in theory different patterns are 
possible, as mentioned in Chapter 3. The European Union has not established how 
the  relationship should formally function, in the first place. It has not been even 
indicated whether in the EU’s institutional framework the two institutions are expected 
to work together. This silence indirectly promotes more noise. It feeds the academic 
discussion, as there is ample room for speculation. What is more, it fosters confusion, 
given that the interplay between the institutions is not officially patent. Therefore, 
given that their interaction has no treaty-basis and their intra-agenda dynamics 
largely differ, one can question whether, to begin with, a relationship between 
the institutions exists. Further, in the debate in academia, contrasting streams of 
thought can be distinguished. One points at a unidirectional relationship. Within this 
discussion, some scholars believe that the European Council impacts the Commission 
and others suggest that the Commission is rather influential. Another scholarly 
stream indicates the existence of a bidirectional interaction, in which the institutions 
affect each other. 
One way to deal with the discussion is simply to pick sides and test a given line of 
thinking. For instance, it can be assumed that the institutions indeed interact and 
that their interplay is bidirectional. This would be reasonable to do, as this pattern 
can be attributed to their distinct information-processing capacities that enable 
them to complement each other’s limitations in policymaking. It thus would make 
sense to test the hypothesis that their interaction is bidirectional. However, there are 
also reasons to believe that the relationship is unidirectional. The European Council 
has considerably more political authority, so it can be argued that the Commission 
must follow its indications. But, at the same time, the Commission has significant 
capabilities in terms of expertise and resources. Therefore, it can be claimed instead 
that this makes the European Council dependent on the Commission to be able to 
obtain information and process it, in order to form its political guidelines. 
A serious problem in all the discussion is that there is little empirical research and no 
systematic analysis on a long-term basis, which can demonstrate the governing trend 
in their interaction. Thus the academic debate, which goes in different ways, rests 
on substantially limited evidence. These circumstances hinder a clear orientation to 
study the interplay between the European Council and the Commission.  
In this atmosphere of ambiguity, where no formalization has been set, the literature 
points to all directions, and the empirical work is considerably restricted, it is not obvious 
where to precisely look at. The ideas on their interaction are unconsolidated. The Agenda 
Dynamics Approach thus distinguishes four possible patterns: no relationship; 
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a  unidirectional relationship, in which the European Council leads; a  unidirectional 
relationship, in which the Commission leads; and a bidirectional relationship.
This chapter takes up these lines of reasoning and identifies which one is the most 
substantiated, in terms of the regular trend in their interaction in the long run. Although 
the four options may be considered the expectations of the study on the inter-agenda 
dynamics, the analysis in reality follows a theory-building perspective. The data 
will ‘talk’ in order to obtain a better view on conditions to explore the relationship 
between the institutions and thus see which of the four ideas has the strongest 
empirical basis to determine the directionality. Vector Autoregression techniques 
were used, as described in Chapter 5.
8.2. How do the institutions relate to each other in agenda 
setting?
The results on the directionality in the interplay of the European Council and 
the  Commission can be observed in Table 8.1. The table shows the findings of 
the analysis on Granger causality. It includes the results of all the combinations of 
relations in the model. The most relevant in this study is the set of variables highlighted 
in bold, per panel, as they represent the relationship between the institutions. In 
the first panel, from left to right, we observe the impact of the European Council 
on the Commission. In the second panel we see the effect of the Commission on 
the European Council. 
Table 8.1 Granger causality 
Independent variable Policy domain Dependent variable
European Council 
Commission
 2.63 → 
(0.0244)










Numbers reported are F statistics with p-values in parenthesis. The arrows indicate Granger causal relations 




Looking at the p-values (reported in parenthesis) of the two cases, we can identify that 
only the impact of the European Council on the Commission is statistically significant 
at the 5% level (symbolized by the arrow). There is thus evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that the European Council does not Granger-cause the Commission (see 
first panel). However, the null hypothesis that the Commission does not Granger-
cause the European Council cannot be rejected (see second panel). 
Therefore, the results reveal that the European Council agenda influences 
the Commission agenda, but not the other way around. In other words, the institutions 
have a unidirectional relationship. This pattern is confirmed by the Impulse Response 
Functions (IRF) reported in Figure 8.1. The figure shows a visual representation of 
the model and the simulations. It includes graphs for all combinations of IRF relations. 
Per graph, the solid line is the response of the dependent variable to a  simulated 
shock to the independent variable. The dashed line is the 95% confidence interval. 
The y-axis shows the shock and effect in terms of one standard deviation. The x-axis 
represents the time, which is quarters, over fifteen periods. The graphs in the first 
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Figure 8.1. Impulse response functions 
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the response of the European Council. From these, the most important parts in 
the study are the two graphs located in the extremes with the letters A and B in 
parenthesis, as they represent the relationship between the institutions. The graph 
in the bottom left (letter A) shows the response of the Commission agenda after 
a shock in the European Council agenda. In other words, it indicates the effect that 
the European Council has on the Commission. Conversely, the graph in the top right 
(letter B) indicates the response of the European Council agenda after a shock in 
the Commission agenda. This graph thus shows the effect of the Commission on 
the European Council. 
When we focus on the graph on the bottom left (letter A), we can see that one 
standard deviation shock in the European Council agenda leads to more or less a 0.20 
standard deviation in the Commission agenda around the sixth quarter. This means 
that a sudden increase in the attention of the European Council produces variation in 
the attention of the Commission that builds up gradually. The Commission’s attention 
decreases in the first periods and then increases, reaching a peak point at period six. 
Afterwards, it turns to its equilibrium in the horizon. 
By contrast, the graph on the top right (letter B) shows that the effect of one standard 
deviation shock in the Commission agenda on the European Council is statistically 
insignificant at all times. Although some kind of reaction can be observed this shall 
not be considered. This is statistically insignificant given that the confidence interval 
includes zero. This indicates that the European Council does not react to the impulse 
of the Commission. The results of Granger causality tests and IRFs are consistent —
the findings of the former tests are confirmed and complemented by the later.  
To get a more accurate impression of the magnitude of the response between 
the  institutions, the actual values are reported in table 8.2. It includes the scores 
for all fifteen periods, as observed in Figure 8.1. The first column shows the time 
(quarter). The following three columns show the values of the graph on the bottom 
left (graph A). Likewise, the last three columns show the values of the graph on 
the top right (graph B). The values are statistically significant at the 5% level, if 
the  confidence interval (represented by the columns on lower and upper bound) 
in a given time does not cross zero. Looking at the columns related to a shock in 
the European Council agenda, we can identify that such shock produces a response 
of 0.23 standard deviation in the Commission at time six. In contrast to this, when 
we observe the rest of the columns, it becomes evident that all the scores regarding 




8.2.1. The European Council: the leading institution in agenda setting
From the results obtained, several conclusions can be drawn. To begin with, 
the institutions interact in agenda setting through time. There is strong evidence to 
support the scholarly stream that conceives that the European Council influences 
the  Commission. For instance, Werts has claimed that “it seems today as if 
the European Council and the Commission form a tandem, albeit a tandem driven 
and governed by the former” (Werts, 2008:54). Similarly, Ponzano and colleagues 
have argued that “the Commission has increasingly considered itself politically 
committed to following up to the ‘conclusions’ of the European Council” (Ponzano 
et al., 2012:Executive summary, point 4). 
Consequently, the idea in academic research that the Commission has the ability 
to influence the European Council does not have empirical basis. Likewise, 
a bidirectional pattern in their interaction has no fundament, in contrast to what 
Table 8.2. Impulse response functions values 















0 -.193386 -.382934 -.003839 0 0 0
1 .001582 -.189473 .192636 .162874 -.0292 .354948
2 -.177443 -.367797 .012911 .033616 -.149687 .216918
3 -.212118 -.404198 -.020039 .106285 -.081895 .294464
4 -.013011 -.207352 .18133 .056758 -.126717 .240234
5 -.112486 -.309903 .084931 -.009493 -.196992 .178005
6 .232829 .030491 .435168 -.043976 -.229364 .141413
7 -.10334 -.239886 .033205 .015071 -.084729 .11487
8 .030893 -.104049 .165834 .007141 -.079002 .093283
9 -.016234 -.139496 .107028 .006278 -.073122 .085678
10 .032696 -.079241 .144633 -.022849 -.090409 .044711
11 .020875 -.081814 .123565 .014165 -.038856 .067185
12 -.019983 -.107738 .067773 -.00013 -.049289 .04903
13 -.008741 -.08659 .069109 .005647 -.042965 .054259
14 .032267 -.034842 .099377 -.008996 -.052301 .034308
15 -.003278 -.065543 .058987 -.004797 -.044397 .034804
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previous empirical research has found. For example, Bocquillon and Dobbels 
have suggested that the study of the interaction of the European Council and 
the Commission shall entail an approach “in which they are considered as 
partners, engaged in a reciprocal relationship of joint agenda-setting” (2014: 
23). After conducting the empirical analysis, these scholars have concluded that 
the institutions have a ‘competitive-cooperation’ relationship, where “overall 
cooperation seems to dominate” (Ibid: 34). The difference between Bocquillon 
and Dobbels’ result and the finding obtained in this research seems to be related 
to the methodology. Their work followed a  cross-sectional approach, exploring 
contemporary cases happening before and after the Lisbon Treaty, that is, around 
2009. By contrast, the current study is longitudinal. While the interaction between 
the institutions may be bidirectional at more specific points in time as was analyzed 
by them, the evidence obtained from the time-series analysis indicates that their 
relationship is unidirectional. Therefore, this study does not agree with the idea 
that “in many cases the European Council-Commission relations are two way rather 
than purely top-down” (Ibid: 26). The dynamic governing the interaction between 
the institutions flows in one direction in the long run. Such a contrasting variation 
in the empirical outputs is because, as Soroka reminds us, the “lack of congruence 
between the dynamic agenda-setting process and cross-sectional designs has 
been noted by a number of agenda-setting authors, aware of the possibility that 
cross-sectional methods may fail to identify the significance of a relationship over 
time between two agendas” (S. N. Soroka, 2002:12).
The leading position of the European Council in its interaction with the Commission 
seems to be grounded on its mandate to give the EU “the necessary impetus for 
its development” (TEU: art. 15). The institution is indeed “a signalling authority for 
policy-making” (Elias and Timmermans, 2014). After all, “[a]lthough the European 
Commission has a monopoly over legislative initiatives, the impulse for legislative 
proposals often comes from the European Council”, as argued by Alexandrova and 
Timmermans (Alexandrova and Timmermans, 2013:319). Thus the latter institution 
is inherently a source of stimulus in the European Union. The “consolidation of 
the  leadership role of the European Council”, as claimed by Ludlow, occurred in 
the second half of the 1980s, mostly as a result of its institutional incorporation in 
the Single European Act, by which the Conclusions of its summits got a “quasi-legal 
status” (1992:62). In fact, as Alexandrova and colleagues have argued, the European 
Council “has become an institution of political leadership which pulls the strains 
of the integration process to the extent and in the direction of activity it desires” 
(Alexandrova et al., 2016:611). 
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The pattern in the relationship stems also from their distinct political attributes. On 
the one hand, the European Council is the uppermost political body in the EU (cf. 
Alexandrova et al., 2012). Given that it is composed by the highest political leaders 
at the national and European level and in charge of guiding the EU, the institution 
has a substantial and strategic meaning. Its strong political authority ‘empowers’ 
the  institution (cf. Johansson and Tallberg, 2010). In this sense, one characteristic 
of the European Council’s design that is especially relevant is it “bargaining power” 
(Tallberg, 2008). According to Tallberg, such power entails three dimensions, 
namely, state, institutional and individual. These sources of power, especially 
the state dimension, grant influence in the institution (Ibid). This apparently equips 
the European Council with a significant advantage over its opponent when playing 
the political game of setting the EU agenda. Therefore, in its relationship with 
the Commission, the European Council essentially leads. On the other hand, in view 
of its more technical profile, the Commission follows because its proposals have 
more chance to be decided after the European Council’s political legitimization of 
policy problems. In this way, the ability of the Commission to place an issue on 
the agenda becomes empowered. 
Another explanation of their interactive pattern has to do with their roles in agenda 
setting. The European Council is responsible to provide general guidelines, while 
the  Commission must issue initiatives on specific issues. This has implications in 
the policy process. Although in general terms the institutions accomplish a similar 
function, strictly speaking there is a difference, as noticed in the analysis of 
the intra-agenda dynamics. Based on the distinction made by Hobolt and Klemmensen 
on the types of responsiveness in national governments (2008), the European Council 
has a ‘rhetorical’ policy commitment and the Commission an ‘effective’ one. Put 
shortly, the latter institution talks politics and the former writes policy. As a result, 
the  Commission needs to invest considerably more resources and time to deliver 
actual proposals. This suggests that the Commission is busier working in consequence 
than trying to set the pace. In this sense, their roles are complementary.
A powerful reason of the way they interplay is related to the way they deal with 
information. Being a serial processing institution, the European Council indicates 
problems more generally. Then the Commission takes up the issues to process 
them in detail. It also handles them simultaneously with new and existing problems 
and policies. This is supported by the previous results that demonstrated that 
the Commission’s agenda is importantly moved by policy inheritances and to a lesser 
degree by political signals. In both cases, the indications made by the European 
Council appear to be highly relevant for the Commission. In other words, the two 
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factors of attention represent strategic channels of influence of the European Council 
on the Commission. In this way, the European Council has it hands free to be able 
to move its attention to handle other issues in the EU that also require its attention, 
which is significantly limited. In the meantime, the Commission can give problems 
specialized and routine treatment because it has a large apparatus. The distinct 
processing capacities of the institutions thus allow them to proceed in these ways.
But where does the European Council take the energy from to be an entrepreneur, 
being importantly constrained in its design? Put differently, how does its small size 
machinery get the impulses? The analysis on the intra-agenda dynamics suggests that 
the institution highlights and monitors policy issues largely on the basis of indications 
from diverse political actors, including the Commission. Accordingly, the European 
Council responds importantly to political signals. Here the Commission takes 
the opportunity to influence the institution. And it is often successful. This indicates 
that the finding that the European Council has an impact on the Commission, 
but not the other way around, does not mean that the latter does not influence 
the former at all. It rather signifies that the European Council does not respond to 
the Commission on a regular basis. Other indications that also move the European 
Council come from other political bodies, such as the Council and the Parliament. 
Altogether these signals support the European Council’s job. Moreover, it was shown 
that the European Council is likewise triggered by policy inheritances. The influential 
role of the Commission in this case is significantly limited, given the institution’s 
constrained, not to say null, decision-making faculties. As a result, the European 
Council relies on other EU institutions, including itself. Thus, while the designs of 
the Commission and the European Council are complementary, the latter institution 
does not constantly need the former to be able to advance its agenda. 
There are three main explanations of why the European Council is not regularly 
moved by Commission. First, the European Council is more detached from following 
recurrently the same type of stimulus, as can be seen from the findings on the factors 
that drive its attention over time. The institution takes up relatively similar portions 
of impulses from different sources. For instance, it considers policy inheritances 
and political signals equally important, as well as it gives focusing events and EU 
institutional milestones the same weight. By contrast, the Commission is by and large 
attached to policy inheritances. Although it also reacts importantly to professional 
concerns, this factor is far away from the level of response the institution concedes to 
legacies. This pattern explains also why over time the Commission regularly follows 
the European Council. The Commission has the tendency to reply commonly to 
the same source of political inspiration. 
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Second, the European Council is politically compelled to adapt to the changing and 
uncertain environment. It needs to be flexible enough to deal with the hot issues 
that suddenly come on the EU scene. The institution thus requires a free political 
spirit that enables it to adapt. In addition, its limited resources and ephemeral-type 
of configuration require the institution to be quick in dealing with issues in all policy 
domains, not only in organized crime, basically no matter what. These conditions 
further indicate that it is not in the institution’s design to be fixed to the desires or 
influence of a particular factor. This can be also observed in the previous results on 
the intra-agenda dynamics. As demonstrated, the predominant factor contributing 
that its attention punctuated was not always the same. This conforms to previous 
research that has argued that “the European Council is free to set its own agenda” 
(Alexandrova et al., 2016:612). This behavior clearly contrasts significantly with 
the performance of the Commission, where the (one) predominant factor —policy 
inheritances— triggered all its spikes of attention. 
Third, the findings on the intra-agenda dynamics showed that competences 
play a role for the institutions, but especially for the Commission. In this regard, 
their unidirectional way of interacting seems to be result of the combination of 
the Commission’s adaptation process of obtaining broader faculties in the domain 
of organized crime —which, as we saw, have been granted incrementally over 
the  years by the Treaty— and the institution’s more gradual way to handle policy 
issues, as also demonstrated in this study. It seems that this situation eventually 
hinders the institution to take the lead through time, as well as to give feedback to 
the European Council on a regular basis. 
Ultimately, the distinct individual patterns of the institutions also are a reason why 
a bidirectional flow in their relationship is not present over time. The two political 
bodies respond quite different to potential sources of influence over the years, 
including at high moments of fluctuations in their attention. And there is also 
another explanation for why their interaction is not bidirectional. As Ludlow has 
claimed, “of the Commission’s basic strengths, three have repeatedly proven to be 
a major importance: its right of initiative, its permanence, and its multinational and 
pluralist character.” (1992: 64) Indeed, the institution counts with several key assets 
for policymaking. However, it does not have decision-making power. This seems to be 
what makes an important difference between having a relationship under the lead of 
the European Council and closing a circle between the two institutions. Given that 
the European Council monitors issues also largely on the basis of previous policy 
decisions, it finds support in other EU institutions than the Commission. In the end, 
although the European Council and the Commission have complementary capacities 
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and roles in agenda setting, their distinct architectures and more broadly different 
faculties in the policy process make the institutions less inclined to have a constant 
relationship of circular flow. 
The result obtained in this study, where the European Council has an impact on 
the Commission, is similar to previous work that has studied the influence between 
political institutions in national systems, using VAR techniques. Research on agenda 
setting in the United States has found that the President influences the Congress 
(Peake, 2001; Rutledge and Larsen Price, 2014). Although the European Council and 
the Commission are both executives in the structure of the EU, it is possible to make 
an analogy with the US government. As recent work has found, the European Council 
has gradually become “the EU’s de facto government” (Carammia et al., 2016). 
This institution has evolved into a sort of political executive (Puetter, 2013, 2014). 
This can be relatively comparable to the role of the President. In the  meanwhile, 
the  Commission does a similar task to that carried out by the Congress in that 
both propose laws. It is thus make sense that in the EU the European Council has 
an impact on the Commission, similar to what happens with analogous institutions 
in traditional political systems. 
8.2.2. The Commission: digesting the new impulses
As observed above, the evidence shows that in the interaction with the European 
Council the Commission is reactive. But the analysis also demonstrates another 
characteristic: it takes time for the Commission to react. The Commission does not 
increase its attention immediately, but builds up the process. Initially the institution 
diminishes its attention to reorient its priorities and prepare to produce policy output; 
afterwards, its consideration grows. In other words, the Commission needs time to 
digest the new impulses from the European Council. 
This dynamic is not surprising for different reasons. To begin with, a time difference 
has been suggested by previous work that has argued that member states together 
in the European Council “predetermine” the agenda of the Commission “months 
and years in advance” (Allerkamp, 2010:2). In addition, the response is consistent 
with the empirical findings on the intra-agenda dynamics. Accordingly, the European 
Council and the Commission do not only have different ways to deal with issues, 
but also different tempos to do so. The European Council processes issues serially, 
but the Commission does it in parallel. Consequently, their institutional rhythms to 
handle problems essentially differ. The European Council jumps from one problem 
to the next providing general guidelines of policy, as the institution cannot process 
issues otherwise, given its limited resources. The European Council is thus quick in 
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dealing with policy problems. But the Commission cannot follow its pace. Although 
the Commission has a big apparatus to deal with many more issues simultaneously 
than the European Council, it also has limitations at the end of the day. It requires 
time to develop a dossier to get to know problems and address them. This explains 
in part the gradual pattern in the Commission’s reaction. 
Another part of the explanation is that the institution is committed to deal with 
routine issues and past arrangements. Thus the Commission cannot simply shift its 
priorities right away. As demonstrated, policy inheritances play an important role for 
both political bodies, but in particular for the Commission. The relevance of policy 
inheritances in EU agenda setting is reasonable because is similar to what occurs in 
countries. As argued by Hogwood and Peters, “[i]n reality, ‘new’ policies are rarely 
written on a tabula rasa, but rather on a well-occupied or even crowded tablet of 
existing laws, organizations and clients” (1983:1). Indeed, there is often a significant 
“legacy from the past” that current governments need to face, which “consists of 
the accumulation of commitments made”, as claimed by Rose (1990:266). According 
to the findings in this study, half of the Commission’s attention was generated 
on the basis of policy legacies. By contrast, the European Council’s was triggered 
by such factor only in a quarter of the cases. The Commission is thus specially 
devoted to process issues on the basis of previous commitments. This suggests that 
the  Commission does not raise its attention right away to the European Council 
because it is importantly dealing with inheritances. 
The Commission has a preexisting agenda that tries to fulfill, but the institution 
eventually moves to deal with new issues set by the European Council. This also 
suggests that an important part of the current agenda of the Commission is already 
set by the agenda previously established, largely by the European Council. These 
conditions ultimately indicate that the Commission does not wait for the European 
Council to send a new impulse. The Commission does not only react. It also works 
in the absence of a novel pointer, at least for a while. It is an ongoing process where 
the Commission knows already what to do without the need of a new indication 
from the European Council. At the same time, the European Council relies purposely 
on the Commission simply because the former does not have the capacity to deal 
by itself with many issues simultaneously, but the latter can. This situation occurs 
on the tacit understanding that the Commission is working on the previous matters 
decided by the European Council, but also will work eventually on the new ones. 
In this way, the European Council does not need to send recurrent indications on 
the same issues and, instead, can move freely to attend different policy problems for 
an important period of time until the new cycle comes. 
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An additional explanation of the Commission’s reply has to do with the distinct 
political attributes of the institutions. The low politics route, where problems are 
introduced by the Commission, is a “gradual, indirect one” (Princen, 2012:34). Here 
policy issues slowly “creep” to reach the agenda. By contrast, the high politics route 
by which issues are initiated by the European Council is “quick and direct” (Ibid). In 
this case, problems suddenly “crash” on the agenda. In this context, it seems that 
no preferential concession to the European Council’s issues happens. The priorities 
of this institution need to wait in line as well. Put differently, problems advocated 
by the European Council also need to creep to make it to the Commission agenda. 
This situation is apparently a matter of design, not a will from the Commission. 
Ultimately, the dynamic of the Commission’s route is also an explanation why 
a  unidirectional relationship under the leadership of the Commission does not 
happen. The nature of this institution is to act gradually, which prevents it to go 
first over time.     
The slower moving way to proceed of the Commission is understandable. In 
domestic systems, the attention of political institutions is largely promoted “by 
strong inertial forces” due to “routines of governing” and “prior commitments 
of the government” (Edwards and Wood, 1999:341). Moreover, policy-making 
organizations in general are designed to resist change, being more keen on 
retarding any adjustment in the system as much as possible, rather than responding 
directly to needs in it (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005:147). In other words, political 
institutions are designed on the whole not to be volatile. The architecture of 
the Commission makes it less disproportionate than the European Council regarding 
shifts in attention to problems on its agenda. Furthermore, the Commission is by 
design inclined to induce stability in the system. Its institutional essence is to have 
a gradual performance, in contrast to the architecture of the European Council. 
Consequently, the new desires of the  European Council do not directly transmit 
an “issue contagion” in the Commission (cf. Coombs, 2002:215). According to 
Coombs, this type of “contagion” affects the management of issues by changing 
the way they are prioritized (Ibid). The empirical evidence in this research indicates 
that, in the handling of policy problems between the European Council and 
the Commission, it takes time for such contagion to happen. While the similar roles 
of the institutions point at the need of being regularly in policy tune, continuous 
tuning is hindered by their different configurations. Although willing change and 
achieving it are different things, the attempt to promote change is necessary to 




8.2.3. Implications of the European Council’s leadership for 
the Commission’s role 
Base on the findings, it is clear that the European Council impacts the Commission 
in the long run. However, according to the Impulse Response Function analysis, 
the  magnitude of the effect (see Table 8.2) does not occur in such a high level 
as many scholars have argued it happens. For instance, previous research has 
claimed that the European Council (together with the Council) is “undermining” 
the Commission’s role in policy initiation (Allerkamp, 2010) and has “significantly 
eroded” its power in this regard (Ponzano et al., 2012: Executive summary, 
point 4). This study did not find empirical evidence to support the argument in 
academia that the Commission has a “subservient position” in its relation with 
the European Council (Werts, 2008:45). The European Council is a determinant 
actor in shaping the Commission’s attention, but the former institution does not 
take overwhelming control of the  agenda of the  latter. There is also space for 
other elements to play a role on how the Commission shapes its priorities. This is 
consistent with the  previous findings on the intra-agenda dynamics, where was 
identified that diverse factors promote the  attention of the  Commission. This is 
makes sense because “the Commission does not carry out its work in a vacuum” 
(Princen, 2007:23). 
The institutions have developed an interface, in which the Commission works mostly 
on the basis of the European Council agenda, but also has to an extent room of 
maneuver to decide what to handle. While this cannot be called a win-win situation, 
it appears a fair deal for the Commission because, although its agenda is determined 
in first place by the European Council, the former institution can also produce some 
output on the basis of other sources, thus following its own choices. Moreover, 
this is also a reasonable arrangement, considering that the ‘chunk’ influenced by 
the European Council entails a dose of legitimization, which makes it more likely for 
the Commission to succeed in setting the agenda on those issues.      
While the Commission agenda is primarily influenced by the European Council 
agenda, this does not mean that the former has no chance to contribute to shape 
the latter’s priorities. As the findings on the intra- and inter-agenda dynamics showed, 
the European Council does take up the signals of the Commission, but at discretion. 
The European Council is selective with the moments to consider the indications of 
the Commission. This suggests that the Commission has a discretionary effect on 
the European Council, as determined by the latter.  
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8.3. Conclusions 
This chapter studied the dynamics of the interaction between the European Council and 
the Commission in agenda setting. It showed that the topic has received much speculation 
based on little empirical evidence. On the whole, existing ideas and assumptions of 
how their interplay happens are unsubstantiated. Therefore, based on the  Agenda 
Dynamics Approach, four patterns were explored. It was thus analyzed whether 
the institutions interact in the first place; whether their relationship is unidirectional and, 
if so, who influences whom; or whether their interaction is bidirectional. The systematic 
analysis conducted by means of vector autoregression techniques enabled us to order 
the different ideas and examine which has the strongest foundation. 
The study delineated one straightforward way their inter-agenda dynamics work. 
The relationship flows predominantly in one direction in the long run, in which 
the Commission is affected by the European Council. The analysis revealed relevant 
characteristics of their interaction. For instance, it demonstrated that the institutions 
communicate importantly through policy inheritances and political signals. It was 
also revealed that the effect of the European Council is not so high as conceived 
by an important stream in academia. There is also space for the Commission to 
decide what issues to include on its agenda. It was also shown that the Commission 
needs time to digest the novel indications from the European Council. All in all, 
the European Council is the strategic actor in agenda setting, while the Commission 
has the machinery to develop the process broadly. 
The chapter also explained their behavior. The explanatory power of the ‘twin 
features’ in the institutional design of each institution became evident, as also 
concluded in the analysis of the intra-agenda dynamics. The European Council is both 
a serial-processing institution and a high politics venue. Similarly, the Commission 
is both a parallel-processor type of organization and a low politics venue. Thus, 
the institutions interact in the way they do, largely as a result of a combination of 
the  two characteristics. Their interaction is more generally a consequence of their 
intra-agenda dynamics, as proposed by ADA.       
In this way, the analysis of their inter-agenda dynamics provided substantial elements 
to inform the scholarly debate on the relationship between the European Council 
and the Commission. This helps theorizing their interaction. The Agenda Dynamic 
Approach is thus a useful view to get a better understanding of the way the institutions 
interplay in agenda setting. The next chapter deals with the conclusions of the whole 
project, showing the contributions of this research.   
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Conclusions on EU agenda setting
The previous chapter presented the analysis of the interaction between the European 
Council and the Commission agendas, revealing the dynamics of their relationship. 
The current chapter draws the conclusions of the project, reflecting on what was 
done and achieved. The aim is to identify the main lessons learned from this research. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. First, a short overview of key elements and 
findings of the project is presented. The second part introduces the contributions of 
this research. Next, the limitations of the project are discussed. The final section deals 
with possible avenues for future work.  
9.1. Similar roles, distinct designs: the European Council 
and the Commission
The main research goal of this study was to identify and explain the dynamics of 
the European Council and the Commission in setting the agenda of the European 
Union. The project was motivated primarily by an intriguing phenomenon of the EU 
institutional framework: these political institutions have a similar role, but entail 
distinct designs. More precisely, they are the core actors in agenda setting, but their 
information-processing capacities and political attributes differ significantly. Other 
EU institutions, such as the Council and the Parliament, can have a say in this policy 
stage but they are not an inherent part of it. Connected to this, another puzzling 
feature is that the relationship between the European Council and the Commission 
in agenda setting is not formalized, in contrast to the regulated interaction between 
other EU institutions.  
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The central research question was: How can the agenda dynamics in and between 
the  European Council and the Commission be explained? The answer showed 
the intra- and inter-agenda dynamics of the institutions. First, the processes of each 
institution in agenda setting were revealed by addressing two sub-questions: What are 
the intra-agenda dynamics of the European Council? and What are the intra-agenda 
dynamics of the Commission? Second, the dynamics of the relationship between 
the agendas were demonstrated by answering the third sub-question: What are 
the inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council and the Commission? The three 
questions were explained under the theoretical framework proposed and applied 
in this project: the Agenda Dynamics Approach. The agendas of the institutions on 
the domain of organized crime were analyzed.
The empirical findings of this research can be succinctly expressed in two ideas. First, 
the European Council and the Commission set their agendas mostly differently over 
time. Second, the European Council influences the Commission in the long run. 
9.2. Contributing to a better understanding of EU agenda 
dynamics 
9.2.1. A theoretical framework for the study of the institutions 
in agenda setting
Research that focuses on the effect of the different designs of the European Council 
and the Commission on agenda setting is scarce. The ideas in the literature on 
the relationship between the institutions are unconsolidated. The Agenda Dynamics 
Approach included these conditions and delivered an integrative theoretical 
framework. ADA helped in analyzing how the relationship between the two 
institutions emerges in the absence of formal regulation of their interaction. This was 
the first attempt to theorize altogether the individual and interactive agenda dynamics 
of the institutions. ADA provided a framework to study the complete chain of ways 
the political bodies perform in setting the agenda. This was achieved by making 
a distinction between their intra- and inter-agenda dynamics, and combining the two 
types of dynamics. With this, ADA provided an innovative frame for the analysis 
of EU agenda setting, identifying and explaining the patterns of the processes, as 
experienced by the institutions. In doing so, the approach strengthened the position 
of existing theories used for the study of policymaking not only in the EU but also in 
countries. This enabled the examination of paradigms and paths of reasoning. 
In the study of the intra-dynamics, the Processing Model and the Routes Framework 
were tested. The validity of existing postulates was confirmed and new theoretical 
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elements were discovered. More specifically, we saw that the propositions of 
the  Processing Model —on how the attention of policy actors evolves in national 
political systems— are valid for the analysis of the EU political system, as they 
hold true for the ways the European Council and the Commission behave. Further, 
the  proposition of the Routes Framework on what triggers the institutions to set 
issues on the EU agenda was empirically analyzed. The original theory proposes two 
factors, namely, focusing events and professional concerns, which were confirmed 
by the empirical evidence. But also four more factors were found. We discovered 
that the attention of the European Council and the Commission is driven as well by 
EU institutional milestones, political signals, policy inheritances and public concerns. 
These four theoretical concepts emerged from the empirical analysis, drawing from 
notions in and beyond the literature on agenda setting in domestic systems and 
EU politics. This adds scholarly value because we know little about what makes 
the European Council prioritize issues on its agenda, as recent work has recognized 
(Alexandrova et al., 2016), situation that is similar for the case of the Commission 
agenda.
In addition, we noticed that the political attributes and the information-processing 
capacities are equally important in determining how the institutions set the agenda 
and in explaining their dynamics. It thus became evident that their institutional 
designs entail ‘twin features’ —the features mirror each other—: the European 
Council is both a serial processor and a high politics venue; similarly, the Commission 
is both a parallel-processor type of organization and a low politics venue. We thus 
realized that recognizing the twin characteristics at once, rather than placing each 
feature in separate analytical containers as commonly done in academic research, 
is useful to study the dynamics of the institutions and better understand the ‘black 
box’ of EU agenda setting. As a result, we can confirm that the Processing Model and 
the Routes Framework have complementary postulates, as argued in the beginning of 
the project. Together these theories can help in explaining agenda-setting processes 
in the EU political system.
In the study of the inter-agenda dynamics, we adventured into the world of policy 
makers and explored how the relationship between the European Council and 
the Commission work. The exploratory study was done given the broad variety of 
theoretical indications, the lack of formal rules and the limited empirical evidence. 
This was done on the basis of the different ideas of how scholars think the interaction 
happens, from which four possible patterns to discover emerged. This allowed us to 
unravel the underlying dynamics, confirming a specific line of academic reasoning 
and discarding the others. 
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Ultimately, we empirically showed, as initially proposed by ADA, that the dynamics 
happening in the agendas of the institutions affect the dynamics between them. 
In this way, the Agenda Dynamics Approach entails a holistic view. The story of 
the interaction is not only about the interaction itself. It is also about the individual 
processes of each institution. An appropriate way to know the dynamics of their 
relationship is by knowing first the single logics. This is especially useful, given that 
there are formal rules on the function of each institution in agenda setting, but 
not on their interplay. Based on ADA, the role and performance of each of the two 
institutions shall be put in perspective. Thus, this theoretical framework has a less 
extreme view than other perspectives that revolve around the idea of which of 
the two institutions is more powerful than the other, such as the principal-agent 
approach. 
Much of the academic debate on the functioning of the European Council and 
the Commission has dealt traditionally with their nature as intergovernmental and 
supranational bodies. This study showed that these political actors can be better 
understood by looking at their institutional designs. Their architectures affect their 
attention to policy issues, as posited by ADA. On the whole, the designs have an effect 
on their individual and interactive performance in the policy process. In other words, 
institutional designs matter in EU agenda setting. As a result, by thinking ‘out of 
the box’, we were able to appreciate other characteristics of the institutions and thus 
broaden our knowledge and understanding of how and why these political actors 
behave the way they do. This helps us better comprehend how political arenas in 
the European Union move and how policymaking in this political system works, also 
in comparison to national systems.
9.2.2. Fostering empirical and theoretical knowledge on 
the dynamics of the institutions
Intra-agenda dynamics
Our knowledge on the similarities and differences in the longitudinal trends of 
the  European Council and the Commission in agenda setting was limited prior 
to this study. This is the first in-depth and systematic analysis that compares their 
patterns over decades. A main conclusion of the project is that, while the European 
Council and the Commission have a similar agenda-setting role, their intra-agenda 
dynamics are mostly different. For instance, the European Council agenda is more 
erratic in how issues are addressed than how it occurs on the Commission agenda, 
which is more gradual. Moreover, the European Council is especially affected by both 
political signals and policy inheritances to set issues on its agenda. The Commission 
161
Conclusions on EU agenda setting
9
is mostly driven by policy inheritances. While both institutions often respond to 
policy inheritances, they do it in different degrees and for different motives and 
with distinct political goals. There are also similarities in their dynamics. For example, 
neither agenda is stable over time. Both follow instead a punctuated equilibrium 
pattern. The institutions take up policy problems triggered by at least the six factors 
mentioned in the section above, albeit in different ways. The similar features in their 
processes were far less present than the differences, but this finding is important 
because it indicates that the institutions ultimately share some logic in setting 
the agenda. Therefore, the conclusion that the dynamics of the institutions mostly 
differ does not mean that the institutions are entirely disconnected. 
It is not for nothing that the institutions were created with a similar function and 
different designs. The circumstance that both set the agenda and have distinct 
information-processing capacities and political attributes enables the EU political 
system to deal with a large number of matters, highlighting policy issues, producing 
proposals and monitoring problems. The institutions handle problems in different 
ways, depending on what the system requires. For instance, “the routine needs of 
a society can be handled in parallel. But adaptation to the novel and the unexpected 
does require focusing attention on them” (Simon, 1983:83). The designs of 
the institutions are complementary. This composition avoids certain problems to be 
in the territory of the European Council and, as a result, the institution can have its 
hands free to attend other issues instead because the Commission is dealing with 
many of them and handling routinely some others. Simple division of labor at first 
glance. Yet a complex one in reality, as this research demonstrated. 
Inter-agenda dynamics
The project introduced a new method for the analysis of the relationship between 
political institutions in the European Union. Drawing from the field of econometrics, 
Vector autoregression (VAR) techniques were applied, which until now were used to 
study the interactions of organizations in domestic political systems. This research 
thus contributed with the use of an innovative way to analyze EU policymaking.   
By means of VAR, agenda-setting scenarios were modeled and interactive dynamics 
between the European Council and the Commission in the long run were observed. 
Four possibilities were explored: no interaction; unidirectional interaction, where 
the European Council leads; unidirectional interaction, where the Commission leads; 
and bidirectionality. This is thus the first research that deals with all potential ways 
the interplay between the institutions can happen. This was done based on the results 
of the time-series analysis itself and supported by the findings on the intra-agenda 
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dynamics. The evidence revealed that the European Council is the leading institution 
in agenda setting. From this finding, the four paths of reasoning were addressed.   
First, the study touched upon the scholarly line that considers that the European 
Council influences the Commission, which is mainly based on the idea that the strong 
political power of the former institution makes the latter dependent. This research 
confirmed that the European Council’s high political attributes are relevant. They 
empower the initiatives of the Commission and, as a result, the institution follows 
the European Council. But the analysis also indicated that the distinct way the two 
institutions process information is important, as the European Council signals problems 
more generally and the Commission takes them up to handle them in a specialized 
way. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the European Council does not exert 
total control of the Commission agenda. The European Council agenda determines 
in first instance the Commission agenda, but there is space for the latter institution to 
decide part of the issues to include on its agenda. Accordingly, this research identified 
that the Commission also takes up policy problems from at least six sources, as just 
mentioned. This adds academic value because the existence of other factors has 
been often overlooked when conceptualizing and analyzing the relationship between 
the institutions. Noticing this situation can avoid an overrepresentation of the impact 
of the European Council on the Commission, as well as an underappreciation of 
factors beyond the two institutions. 
This research gave us key insights on how the European Council and the Commission 
communicate in their relationship. As noticed above, the European Council responds 
specially to political signals and policy inheritances likewise, and the Commission mostly 
to policy inheritances. These are their means of communication. The Commission is 
responsive to both political signals and policy inheritances from the European Council. 
In the meanwhile, the European Council takes up issues out of political signals from 
the Commission. In the latter case, the communication flows only through one 
channel because the Commission does not have decision-making power. As a result, 
there is practically no line for the European Council to follow.  
The study empirically demonstrated for the first time the way the reaction between 
the institutions happens. On the one hand, the European Council does not respond 
to the Commission on a regular basis. On the other hand, the Commission needs 
time to digest the new impulses from the European Council. An important reason 
for the Commission’s behavior is that it is dealing with policy inheritances, largely 
on the basis of political agreements made by the European Council and earlier 
policy decisions. Thus the Commission does not sit and wait until the next new 
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desire of the European Council comes. The Commission is also busy with previous 
commitments. It works without a novel indication, at least for a while. This situation 
facilitates that the European Council turns its view to deal with other issues for some 
time, given that it does not need to re-send the same pointer. It is a continuous 
process. In this way, this research also showed that policy inheritances matter in EU 
agenda setting. 
This is a concrete example that their intra-agenda dynamics impact their inter-
agenda dynamics. On the whole, each institution works on its matters, but they 
also attend issues together. It is thus important to consider all parts of the story to 
avoid a  partial view of their processes. Knowing their intra-agenda dynamics can 
importantly contribute to comprehend their inter-agenda dynamics and enrich our 
understanding of the complexity of the policy process. 
Second, this research addressed the line of thinking that the Commission has 
the ability to influence the European Council. Such idea has its ground mostly on 
the relevance of the broad resources of the Commission, which stimulates that 
the European Council follows. The results in this study showed that the Commission’s 
capacities indeed play a key role. However, it also demonstrated that the Commission 
is characterized by a gradual performance, circumstance that makes it unlikely to 
be the leader over time. Moreover, the study showed that the European Council is 
regularly stimulated by different sources to take up problems on its agenda, given its 
need to be flexible to adapt to contemporaneous issues as they may suddenly come 
in the environment of the EU. This makes the European Council less prone to be 
moved by the Commission on a regular basis. 
Third, this study touched upon the stream in the literature where the relationship 
is seen as reciprocal, meaning that the institutions need each other. The basis of 
such scholarly reasoning is that the Commission requires the European Council 
to legitimize its initiatives and, at the same time, the European Council needs 
the  Commission to complement its significant limitations to process issues. This 
research empirically confirmed the first part of the proposition, as noted above. 
However, it showed that the second part happens only partially. While it is true 
that the European Council needs broader resources to be able to process policy 
issues, we realized that the Commission is not the only way to fill its institutional 
gap. The European Council becomes complemented by the Commission and other 
EU institutions, including the European Council itself. And an important reason is 
that, as previously mentioned, the Commission practically lacks decision-making 
authority. This is a  central insight because so far we have been commonly paying 
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attention only to ‘the usual suspect’ —the Commission— and consequently we have 
practically overlooked other actors the European Council also relies on to fulfill its 
role in agenda setting.  
In this way, another conclusion is that the European Council depends not only on 
the Commission in this regard. It finds important support also on institutions that can 
make the times of the Commission qua broad apparatus but with a decision-making 
role. The European Council is an entrepreneur that uses different possibilities within 
the EU political configuration to have alternative ways to process information and 
promote its leadership. As a result, the relationship between the European Council 
and the Commission is not likely to have a circular flow of interactions over time.
Lastly, the findings in this study also addressed the path of reasoning that no interaction 
occurs. The conclusions are discussed below in a separate section because this idea is 
linked to an intriguing element in the EU framework, as mentioned in the beginning 
of this study when delineating the research puzzle: the lack of formalization of 
the relationship between the institutions and its effect on agenda setting. 
All in all, an important conclusion is that in their interaction, the European Council 
has the strategy and the Commission the machinery. There is thus a difference in EU 
agenda setting in terms of ability and capacity. The European Council has the ability to 
lead the process and the Commission has the capacity to move it further. Thus, when 
analyzing the individual and interactive performance of the European Council and 
the Commission in the policy process, the approach shall be nuanced, in that the role 
of the Commission shall not be underestimated, just as the role of the European 
Council shall not be overestimated. Recognizing the differences —and similarities— 
of the institutions can make us better appreciate their different contributions in 
the agenda-setting process.   
Based on the findings on the inter-agenda dynamics, this research does not 
entirely agree with scholarly work that conceives that the interdependency of 
political institutions is a prevailing feature of the policy process in the European 
Union. For instance, Marks and colleagues have claimed: “Policy-making in the EU 
is characterized by mutual dependence, complementary functions and overlapping 
competences” (Marks et al., 1996:372). Similarly, Bocquillon and Dobbels have 
argued that the European Council and the Commission “are highly interdependent 
and mutually influence each other” (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:34). In the same 
way, Alexandrova has also claimed that, although the ways and communication 
approaches are different between the European Council and the Commission, their 
interdependencies and central roles in agenda setting “lead to a circular pattern of 
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interaction” (Alexandrova, 2014). In this study, no empirical evidence was found 
that indicated that the European Council and the Commission have a bidirectional 
relationship over time, even when they have complementary designs and overlapping 
roles. This research thus challenges the idea in academia that political institutions in 
the EU often have a relationship in which they are regularly mutually dependent in 
the policy process. 
Linked to this, this project disagrees with the view that the relation between 
the European Council and the Commission is “often collaborative rather than 
antagonistic” (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014:26). After the analysis, the conclusion 
is that the institutions are neither partners nor adversaries. The dynamics observed 
suggest that the political bodies can simply be in their own worlds to a certain 
extent and then they eventually talk to each other. Even when the institutions may 
have the  will to cooperate, their architectures —rather than a sense of rivalry— 
estimulate their dynamics to be dissimilar over time. In consequence, the claim in 
the literature that their relationship “can be best characterized as one of ‘competitive 
co-operation’” (Ibid: 34) is not shared by this research. The institutions are not 
competitors. Competition between them does not necessarily takes place. A reason 
is that, as observed in this project, the institutions were created with different 
designs largely to perform their role in agenda setting in a different way. Thus each 
of the two actors implicitly has its sort of niche. 
Further, the research revealed that the rhythm of the political bodies to attend and 
process issues is different. This finding has methodological implications for the study 
of EU agenda dynamics. The discussion in academia commonly takes place without 
considering differences in their institutional tempos. In the meanwhile, empirical 
studies have commonly observed their interplay on a yearly basis. However, as 
the results in this study showed, making assumptions in this regard may be misleading. 
This research thus brings forward the relevance of making a refined estimation of 
the time interval and lag length for the analysis, in order to appreciate the processes 
of the institutions adequately.
This project demonstrated in an extensive way how the European Council and 
the Commission have attended the policy problem of organized crime across decades. 
Organized crime has been barely investigated from a political science perspective, 
and even less as a field of agenda setting. This is the first systematic study on how EU 
policy-making institutions have dealt with this matter on their agendas. It provided 
a substantive analysis on the evolution of their OC agendas even before the problem 
was established as an EU policy domain, showing how it was born as a policy issue 
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and developed as a field. It also highlighted key moments in the development and 
showed the mechanisms that moved the institutions to deal with OC and how 
the political bodies relate to each other in handling the topic. 
It would be a mistake to conceive that all policy domains are the same. Different 
types of issues may stimulate institutions to have different preferences in agenda 
setting (Soroka, 2002; Alexandrova, 2017). However, while the project analyzed 
the policy area of organized crime, the theoretical framework developed in this study 
and the theoretical insights on the patterns of the intra- and inter-agenda dynamics 
can be transferred to broader contexts, as this domain is far from unique and extreme 
for the institutions. This policy field has received a relatively similar political treatment 
altogether by the two institutions, in that the field attained a permanent space on both 
agendas over the years with attention levels that went up and down. This comparable 
political handling is remarkable, especially in the EU context. It is difficult to find policy 
domains that are considered more or less uniformly by any pair of EU institutions, in 
comparison to the way each deals with other fields, because of the complex EU policy-
making configuration. The analysis of the domain of organized crime allowed us to 
observe and compare policy processes of the European Council and the Commission 
under relatively similar and balanced conditions for both institutions. 
In this way, this study serves as a baseline of their agenda dynamics. The general 
contours of the logics of the institutions, as identified and shaped by the Agenda 
Dynamics Approach, can be potentially translated to further domains. For the first 
time, central features of their behaviors in agenda setting in the long run were revealed 
and explained in detail. As a consequence, we now know, for instance, the factors 
regularly affecting the attention of each institution and the reasons of this. As another 
example, we are now aware of the mechanisms and rationale in the interaction of 
the political bodies, also taking into account their individual processes. ADA thus 
opened an important door that contributes to theorize and obtain a firm grasp of 
how the  institutions work. Considering a ‘possibilistic’ perspective (cf. Blatter and 
Haverland, 2012), there are potential arrangements that in theory are likely to occur 
also in other policy fields. The explanatory elements provided in this study can serve 
as a means to better understand the performance of the institutions in setting 
the agenda in other domains. This adds value to the literature on agenda setting and 
EU institutions.   
No formal rules, but emerging conventions of interaction 
Initially as part of the research puzzle, we noted that the relationship between 
the  European Council and the Commission in the EU legal framework is not 
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formalized. During the development of this project several insights were generated 
that help better understand this situation. 
To begin with, there is no requirement for the European Council and the Commission 
to work together and be efficient to fulfill the demands of the public, in contrast to 
what is traditionally expected from national governments. The EU system differs in 
this regard, as these political institutions are not directly accountable to European 
citizens. Paradoxically, both actors are by mandate at the core of the agenda-setting 
process. Given that there are no rules on what the institutions shall or not do together, 
this study distinguished the four scenarios mentioned above to demarcate possible 
ways this may happen. One possible pattern was that, discouraged by the absence of 
regulation, the institutions do not interact in the long run. The evidence demonstrated 
that, despite the lack of formalization, the institutions do interplay and the European 
Council leads.  
The question then turns to why no regulation exists and how the institutions have 
been able to work together, in the absence of rules. Although this study did not 
directly investigate this topic as such, some ideas to provide possible answers can 
be taken from the analysis and further examination of the literature. According to 
March, in order to make a decision that follows a “rational procedure”, “four basic” 
elements of information are required, namely, alternatives, expectations, preferences 
and decision rules (March, 1994:2–3). In the interaction of the European Council 
and the Commission, these features are blurred and some even missing. Therefore, 
it seems that the lack of formal rules does not stem from a “logic of consequence”, 
by which choices are rationally taken according to the expected results and based 
on a calculation between alternatives (Ibid:2). In other words, the lack of regulation 
does not appear to be a rational choice in the EU institutional configuration.
The absence of formal lines in their interaction gives room of maneuver for 
the  European Council to set political guidelines, according to its mandate. At 
the same time, the Commission can be independent, according also to its mandate. 
In this way, the institutions are flexible to deal with issues. Apparently, their 
relationship takes place in an ‘arena without rules’ (Dudley and Richardson, 1998). 
It would not be the first time that a sort of ‘carte-blanche’ event has occurred in 
the EU framework. For instance, the fact that the European Council was appointed 
an EU institution only recently (in 2009), but politically positioned many decades 
ago at the top of the EU institutional organization, promoted that its actions “could 
not be subject to any judicial review”, as Wessels has argued (Wessels, 2012:761). 
According to Wessels, with this circumstance, “the European Council was located 
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outside of the EC’s institutional architecture with its checks and balances, which its 
characterized by the fact that each organ has to respect the tasks of the others laid 
down in the treaty” (Ibid). By contrast, the Commission is an EU institution already 
since its origins in the 1950s, which means that it has been always required to behave 
according to EU regulations. However, in spite of being formally embedded in the EU 
framework, the  Commission has not needed to follow rules on how to relate to 
the European Council in agenda setting. This situation is perhaps because this would 
also signify to put rules on the latter institution, thus hindering its freedom.   
After all, the designs of the European Council and the Commission somehow push 
the political bodies to arrive at one view sooner or later. Their information-processing 
capacities are complementary and, regarding their political attributes, the peer 
pressure from the European Council on the Commission appears to be a regulatory 
mechanism itself. Rules are not only formal and strict or imposed by law. Also they 
“can reflect subtle lessons of cumulative experience” (March and Olsen, 1989:22). 
For example, they can be “routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies” (Ibid). 
It seems that their relationship has been shaped out of the repetition of informal rules 
and conventions that have evolved into a quasi-formal set of rules of interaction. 
From this, a gentlemen’s agreement of policy delivery and political timing has been 
set. Although we cannot substantiate empirically this claim in this research, there 
is evidence that indicates that an interface has been established. So eventually 
a certain level of “predictability” can be secured. A certain dynamic has emerged and 
institutionalized out of habit, setting tacit norms in their interaction over the years. 
In effect, “[n]orms do not as a rule come into the existence at a definite point in 
time, nor are they the result of a manageable number of identifiable acts. They 
are, rather, the result of complex patterns of behavior of a large number of people 
over a protracted period of time” (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977:8). It thus appears that 
the decision not to formalize their regulation is based on a ‘logic of appropriateness’, 
by which the interaction between the institutions is “rule following” (March, 
1994:57–59), according to what is appropriate in the political reality of the EU. We 
can thus say that, while at first sight the interplay of the European Council and 
the Commission in the EU framework revolves around a ruleless atmosphere, their 
interaction has apparently come to be channeled by emerging convention between 
them.
Implications of EU agenda dynamics for policy change 
Policymaking in democratic systems requires that institutions interact and reach 
explicit or tacit agreements to be able to produce policies. But the need to cooperate 
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gives friction to the policy process (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 87-88). Conflict is 
actually central and the struggle of institutions to determine policy choices promotes 
policy formation (Schattschneider, 1957, 1960). As scholarly work in domestic 
political systems has claimed, “[u]nderstanding the complexity and dynamics of how 
the national agenda is set is essential to an explanation of the policy-making process” 
(Thurber, 2011:vii). A powerful reason is that agenda setting is a structuring factor 
for policy change. The former process sets the stage for the latter.  
This study identified that the designs of the European Council and the Commission are 
limited to a greater or lesser extent and, consequently, the institutions are not able to 
deal with all sorts of issues on their agendas. In effect, they have bounded rationality 
(cf. Jones, 2002). Thus, their discussion about policy problems in the EU is essentially 
incomplete. As a result, the institutions are “inefficient” to handle information, 
similar to organizations in countries (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005:43-49). However, 
this does not mean that the European Council and the Commission fail in their 
policy-making functions. Although they cannot tackle each and every single issue 
in the EU, they do address a significant number of problems. In this context, this 
research demonstrated that their intra-agenda dynamics are mostly different. This 
situation does not facilitate to attain policies. This suggests that policy changes in 
the EU are prevented. The reason is that when each political body regularly prioritizes 
problems in its way, it can overlook the view of the other. It was also shown that 
the institutions are sensitive to policy inheritances. These conditions suggest that their 
agendas are mostly incongruent over time and a change in the way the institutions 
deal with issues is not easy to happen. As also demonstrated, their relationship is led 
in the long run by the European Council. It thus appears that cooperation between 
them is more an exception than a constant. 
This suggests the regular presence of a policy-formation lock in the EU. An important 
condition for policy production in the EU is that the agendas of the two institutions 
match. According to the Routes Framework, while issues in the EU are initiated 
on the agenda by any of the two institutions, the two routes need to connect at 
a certain point to make issues move further on the agenda for decision making 
(Princen and Rhinard, 2006). Based on the findings, agenda congruence does not 
seem to happen regularly. The institutions entail designs that complement their 
institutional capacities, stimulating the formation of policies. But, at the same time, 
the architectures promote mostly dissimilar patterns in and between the agendas 
in the long run, which rather obstruct such formation. There is thus a hindrance 
to policy production. This signifies a hindrance to policy change. Policy change is 
conditional on the interplay between the institutions. These circumstances may be 
170
Chapter 9
to secure stability in the EU system. This does not mean that policy change in the EU 
is impossible, but implies that shifts in policies are unlikely to occur often. After all, 
even when there is normally friction in the interaction between organizations, abrupt 
changes may happen once the resistance is finally overcome (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005: 145). 
Avoiding change and being unable to arrive at a consensus about change are two sides 
of the same coin. Thus, on the one hand, one may wonder whether the discrepant 
dynamics of the European Council and the Commission are conceived to happen in 
this way by the designers of the EU, in order to avoid volatility in the policy-making 
system. On the other hand, we may wonder whether these circumstances represent 
unintended costs that the EU institutional framework needs to pay to be able to 
handle a significantly large number of problems in the system. The first situation is 
typical for countries (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). It would then seem reasonable 
to apply the same logic to how the EU works. However, there is a difference. 
The EU configuration has accounted for the similar roles —and distinct designs— of 
the European Council and the Commission, but not for the formalization of their 
interaction. This research suggested that there are emerging conventions in their 
relationship. It seems that this situation has enabled the creation of policies. Therefore, 
there is room to think that there is a trade-off. The two institutions process a huge 
amount of policy issues, according to the different needs of the EU —whether faster 
or slower, or in a generalized or more specialized way—, in spite of not producing 
often a common agenda. In any case, regardless of the reason, the consequences 
are mixed. It may be an advantage when shifts in policies are not necessary, as in 
domains that entail a consolidated legislation. But, in more novel fields, it may be 
rather a drawback when the production and adaptation of policies is required to 
promote development. In this way, this research shows under what conditions policy 
change in the EU can happen and helps better comprehend why such shifts are not 
likely to happen frequently. 
9.2.3. Discovering ‘blind spots’ in agenda-setting theories 
During the analysis of the intra-agenda dynamics, the two theories that supported 
the development of the Agenda Dynamics Approach were tested. In doing so, some 
‘blind spots’ were discovered. 
What are the dynamics of political institutions in the same policy stage?
When the Processing Model was used, we identified that the theory does not account 
for the differences in the behavior of political institutions accomplishing a similar 
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function in the policy-making process. According to the Model, “the institutional costs 
increase as a proposal moves through the policy stages” (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005: 175). This means that the theoretical expectations vary depending on how 
little or far advanced is the process that we analyze. But it has not been theorized 
what happens when we study the dynamics of distinct types of political institutions 
within the same policy phase. 
Therefore, this theory needs a complimentary perspective. It does not indicate how 
or whether to differentiate when comparing institutions belonging to one phase 
in the policy process. The empirical work done so far using this theory has not 
touch on this matter either. A possible reason of this omission is that the Model 
has a more generalist approach, in the sense that it was developed for the study 
of the whole policy process and thus probably leaving out of its scope the nuances 
within the different stages. Lacking this knowledge can easily make us assume that 
the behavior of institutions in the same policy stage is the same. This project, however, 
showed that this assumption is incorrect, at least for agenda setting. It revealed 
that differences are also present between policy actors within a similar function in 
the policy stage, provided distinct institutional designs. 
What factors drive the European Council and the Commission to set 
issues on their agendas? 
In testing the Routes Framework, it became evident that the theory provides a limited 
scope of what stimulates the institutions to initiate issues on their agendas. According 
to the Framework, the European Council is triggered basically by focusing events and 
the Commission by professional concerns from the expert community. 
While this project confirmed that these two factors play a role, it identified that there 
is more ‘out there’. The analysis revealed that much more affects the attention of 
the institutions. In this regard, the study also adds important value to the literature of 
EU agenda setting, where a fundamental question is “where do issues come from?”, 
but our knowledge is still limited. As mentioned above, the research demonstrated 
that at least six factors drive the European Council and the Commission to attend 
policy issues. 
This means that the picture on agenda setting is actually broader than the original 
theory presents. As a consequence, also the picture is somewhat different. 
The Routes Framework claims that major and sudden events do not necessarily drive 
the orientation of experts. However, it was identified that focusing events and EU 
institutional milestones do play a part in stimulating the Commission’s attention. 
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Similarly, it was revealed that the latter factor has also an effect on the European 
Council. Moreover, as demonstrated, policy inheritances have a relevant role. It was 
also identified that the institutions react in front of signals made by political actors. 
Finally, we saw that public concerns also trigger their attention. 
In this way, we discovered that on the whole the two institutions do not respond to 
a single type of stimulus. Perhaps a reason why the Routes Framework did not address 
more elements that can stimulate the consideration of the institutions is that the goal 
of the theory is much broader than to explain this phenomenon in particular. Instead 
the aim is to understand the four ‘careers’ followed by issues in the policy process.   
How important are competences in EU agenda setting? 
Princen and Rhinard state that the Routes “framework gives rise to some empirical 
expectations. One expectation is that institutional structures will play an important 
mediating role as an issue’s agenda career unfolds (…) Legal limitations to the EU’s 
competences, for instance, will constrain issue initiation” (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006:1123). In other words, this theory conceives the possibility that faculties limit 
the entrance of issues on the agenda in the European Union and does not distinguish 
the effect between the institutions. 
Two findings in this research can help address expectations on the implications of 
competences for EU agenda setting. First, EU competences are important to a certain 
extent. As observed in this study, faculties were necessary for the OC policy problem 
to obtain a fixed place on the agenda, but not to enter it. A reason for a given 
problem to consolidate itself on the agenda is that competences in a domain create 
the responsibility and the obligation of political institutions to pay attention to it. 
However, EU competences are not a prerequisite for an issue to make it to the agenda. 
An issue can attract the attention of the European Council and the Commission even 
without faculties to deal with it for two reasons. Both institutions are expected to 
feed the policy machinery by sensing and indicating problems in the EU. Besides, 
the political bodies cannot deny a possible collateral damage —or spillover effect— 
of problems apparent in policy areas where the EU does have jurisdiction. 
Second, competences matter in a different way for each institution. The formalization 
of faculties to deal with a specific domain is less relevant for the European Council. 
As shown, the European Council did not require official competences in the OC 
field to play an active part in the policy process, in contrast to the Commission. To 
provide political guidelines, as the European Council does, a high political authority 
is more relevant. Its top political configuration allows this institution to get involved. 
173
Conclusions on EU agenda setting
9
By contrast, the Commission with its more technical policy-making profile requires 
faculties together with expertise and a broad apparatus in order to issue policy 
proposals. It is not argued here that the Commission is paralyzed until competences 
are granted to it, but faculties leverage its performance. 
9.2.4. The ‘uniqueness’ of the EU political system
A fundamental question in EU comparative politics is: to what extent do political 
institutions in the European Union behave like those in national political systems? 
This research was importantly based on theoretical propositions formulated for 
the study of countries. Therefore, the study can give an indication of the degree of 
peculiarity of the EU system.
After examining the findings, two important remarks can be done. First, the EU political 
system is largely similar. Many behaviors proved valid for national agendas also happen 
on EU agendas, as indicated in the analytical chapters. Additionally, theoretical notions 
applicable to national governments were also valid for the EU system. The EU institutions 
act in many ways similarly to institutions in countries, regarding both the intra- and 
inter-agenda dynamics. As an example of the former dynamics, the European Council 
agenda and the Commission agenda display a punctuated equilibrium trend over time, 
as also policy agendas of institutions in domestic political systems. As an example of 
the latter dynamics, the finding that the European Council influences the Commission 
is in line with previous work that has found a similar pattern for the relationship 
between the President and the Congress in the United States. 
Second, some differences with national systems can be also appreciated. One of 
the most evident peculiarities of the EU system is that EU institutions play different 
roles in policymaking. The European Council and the Commission do other tasks 
besides setting the agenda. To mention an example, the Commission proposes 
legislation, implements policies, represents the EU abroad, and manages the EU 
budget. In effect, as Peterson has argued, the Commission is “the European Union’s 
largest administration and main policy manager, as well as a source of political and 
policy direction” (Peterson, 2012:96). On paper the different roles are officially 
demarcated, but in practice all functions intertwine. The empirical findings indicate 
that the attention of the European Council and the Commission are related also to their 
other functions in the policy-making process. This means that the mixed composition 
of their roles ultimately echoes on their agendas. For instance, the Commission is 
stimulated by policy inheritances to set an issue on its agenda because the institution 
needs to look after policy implementation. The mixed configuration in the EU 
policymaking has implications on how to observe and analyze agenda dynamics in 
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this system. Therefore, a study on EU agenda setting shall be placed in context. While 
such study can gain from previous work on national agendas, an adequate analysis of 
EU agendas shall account for the nature and broader functioning of political bodies 
in the EU institutional framework. Having a complete picture of what the institutions 
do beyond agenda setting enables a better understanding of the behaviors and 
mechanisms that make the institutions react and attend policy issues. 
Another important characteristic peculiar to the EU became manifest during 
the  analysis. The agendas of the European Council and the Commission behave 
differently to what is expected, when considering the classification conceived by 
the  Processing Model. According to this classification, in theory the two agendas 
belong to the category policy processes agendas —between the input from 
the  agendas outside the government and the policy output of decision making. 
However, this research showed that the agendas of the European Council and 
the Commission behave like policy input agendas —agendas feeding the government 
from outside of it. This behavior is due to a particular feature of the European Union. 
In the EU, the distinction between public and media European agendas is blurred and 
even contested. By contrast, in countries, the distinction is clear. This is a significant 
difference from what happens in national political systems, such as in the US where 
the Processing Model was originally developed and has been widely applied. As 
a consequence, the applicability of the notion of policy input agendas for the study of 
policymaking in the European Union becomes questionable. Input and policy process 
agendas in the EU are somehow fused and thus likely to be part of the same concept. 
In this sense, the European Council and the Commission have a hybrid performance 
in EU agenda setting, in that they act in some way as both types of agendas.  
Based on these results, it is appropriate to study the EU institutions with a flexible 
approach under which they are given ‘the benefit of the doubt’ on being similar 
to political institutions in national systems, rather than neglecting such possibility 
right away. At the same time, it is important to be cautious not to overstretch such 
flexibility, trying to make EU policymaking fit national behavior at any rate. Studying 
the nature of the institutions by conceiving them completely different —or totally 
similar— to national organizations runs the risk to limit and bias our appreciation and 
understanding on their dynamics in the EU policy process. 
9.2.5. Practical implications 
Another type of contribution of this project refers to the ‘so-what’ question or, more 
precisely, what the relevance of this research is for the non-academic world. It is useful 
for EU policymakers. Thorough profiles of the European Council and the Commission 
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in setting the agenda were delineated. These outlines revealed different features of 
the political bodies, showing from the more evident characteristics of their dynamics 
to the more subtle ones. The profiles also demonstrated the way the relationship 
between the two institutions works. These revelations can be useful to make 
the political bodies more aware of how they are perceived by outsiders. In addition, 
the conclusions of this study can be a way for the institutions to reflect on how they 
have performed over the years. For instance, as discussed above, their dynamics in 
agenda setting seem to hinder policy change. While volatility of the EU system is not 
desirable, putting change too much on hold can also damage the development of 
the system. In this way, the study serves as a mirror and exposure of the behaviors 
of the European Council and the Commission in policymaking. This can stimulate 
the institutions to establish mechanisms of confirmation and correction of the way 
they act and react in certain areas in the policy process. 
The study is also valuable for governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. 
They can learn from the comprehensive profiles of the institutions, as developed 
in this project. By these means, interest groups and experts in policy domains are 
more informed of the logic followed by the European Council and the Commission 
in agenda setting. The research is especially relevant because the strategy mostly 
followed in the EU to influence policy-making is ‘inside lobbying’ (Lelieveldt and 
Princen, 2011:141–142). According to this strategy, lobbying is done within the EU 
institutional framework by trying to directly influence EU policy-making institutions. 
This study can make stakeholders more alert on the conditions to push their issues on 
the EU agenda. In this regard, this study is also useful for stakeholders to realize that 
policy change in the EU is unlikely to happen often, condition that can be relevant to 
shape their strategy on how to influence policymaking. 
This research is significant for EU citizens. The study revealed that public concerns 
stimulate the institutions to initiate policy issues on their agendas. However, it was 
also observed that this factor seldom triggers their attention. These findings can add 
value to the way people think around the notion of democracy in the EU. The result 
can be read in two different ways. On the one hand, it suggests that EU institutions 
are not entirely disconnected from citizens, as the worries from the public sometimes 
play a role in the process of setting the EU agenda. This can help promote a positive 
perception of the society on the political institutions in the EU system. On the other 
hand, the result suggests that EU citizens are not that relevant for policy-making 
organizations in the EU, in comparison to national citizens in countries, because 
EU institutions do not respond regularly to the needs of the society. This can add to 
the discussion on democratic deficit in the EU.  
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9.3. Limitations of this research 
Analyzing a single policy domain was useful because it allowed for an in-depth 
examination of the processes and arrangements of the European Council’s and 
the Commission’s performance under relatively similar conditions. The disadvantage 
is that we do not know with certainty whether such mechanisms occur in policy 
fields where the interest and faculties of one of the two institutions substantially 
predominate. Another shortcoming is that the amount of data was limited in 
comparison to studies that observe many policy fields. Furthermore, the research 
provided new knowledge and key insights of how the interaction between 
the  institutions happens in the long run, as revealed by the use of vector 
autoregression techniques, but a limitation is that the study cannot inform us about 
temporary changes in their directionality. In addition, while the participation of 
other political actors —than the European Council and the Commission— in agenda 
setting was also investigated, the study can inform us only in a general way on this, 
given that their role was observed as a whole, by looking at the effect of political 
signals and policy inheritances. 
9.4. Avenues for further work
This study is only a small contribution to get a better understanding of agenda-setting 
processes in the European Union. A lot of work remains to be done of course. Lines 
for further research may follow after the development and application of the Agenda 
Dynamics Approach. This framework provided indicators of mechanisms and effects 
regarding how the institutions behave, opening the door to explore and confirm 
the patterns and processes demonstrated in this study. 
In this sense, ADA serves as a point of reference for further research in other policy 
domains. This research showed the dynamics of the institutions on the basis of a field 
attended relatively similar by both institutions. What dynamics do we observe for 
more ‘extreme’ issues that are mostly handled by one of the two institutions over 
time? For instance, do the institutions have different intra-agenda dynamics also in 
foreign affairs, to which the European Council regularly devotes high attention? It 
was identified that the European Council regularly influences the Commission in 
a policy field where neither institution clearly governs in the policy-making process. 
Does this pattern of interaction also occur in other pillars mostly under the dominion 
of one of the two institutions? So, for instance, research in the future may observe 
a policy area in the (ex) first pillar, which is more the ‘territory’ of the Commission. On 
this basis, a comparative analysis of the inter-dynamics among (ex)pillars can follow. 
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Also future work can expand the model of agenda-setting scenarios, on the basis of 
the pool of factors of attention found in this study. 
This research showed the agenda dynamics of the governmental agenda in the EU. 
Further studies can look at the decision agenda and compare the patterns. Following 
the theoretical logic applied in the construction of ADA and the results, it may be that 
the dynamics of the Council and the Parliament are similar, because their institutional 
designs are similar —or at least not remarkably different as the European Council and 
the Commission architectures are. Future work can confirm this.   
Finally, this study argued that agenda setting has a powerful effect on the policy-
making process. The project thus suggested that the results of the intra- and inter-
agenda dynamics have implications for policy change. On this basis, a proposition 
was that agenda incongruence in the EU is likely to predominate in the long run, 
discouraging shifts in policies. Further empirical analysis can endorse such proposition. 
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Appendix 1: Catalogue on organized crime issues
Clusters
A .  DENOMINATION B .  ACTIVITIES C .   ACTORS
1. Crime 8. Drug trafficking 22. Criminal individuals
2. International crime 9. Counterfeiting 23. Criminal groups
3. Cross-border crime 10. Cigarette smuggling 24. Criminal states
4. Transnational crime 11. Corruption 25.  Victims
5. Organized crime 12. Human trafficking
6. Serious crime 13. Environmental crime










Appendix 2: Codebook on organized crime issues
Code Issue
1 Organized crime 
–  It includes generic ways to refer to OC (e.g. crime, international crime, cross–border crime, 
transborder crime, transnational crime, serious crime, white collar crime). 
–  When the issue refers to a specific activity, the issue is coded in the specific activity (e.g. 
‘money laundering crimes’ is coded as 14; ‘such crimes’ referring to drug trafficking is 
coded as 2).
–  It includes OC activities that are not specified (e.g. all forms of trafficking/smuggling) 
–  Crimes that do not relate to OC (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes 
of opinion) are not included.
2 Drug trafficking
E.g. drugs, narcotics, illegal/illicit production/manufacture/trade/diversion/transit of them. 
–  Drugs related to drug (ab)use (such as addiction, consumption and dependence) are not 
included.
3 Counterfeiting
E.g. piracy, pirating, forgery, intellectual property crime/infringement, counterfeit/pirate/
falsified products and goods, forged documents
4 Cigarette smuggling 
–  tobacco smuggling, cigarette illegal/illicit trade
5 Corruption
–  corrupt officials/enterprises
6 Human trafficking
–  trafficking in persons, people smuggling, trade/sale of persons, prostitution, sexual 
exploitation, pornography, organ trafficking.
–  Sexual abuse is not included.
7 Environmental crime
–  ecological crime, illicit waste traffic, illicit trade of hazardous substances/fissile/radioactive/
nuclear material, waste trafficking, trafficking in endangered species, green crime, illegal 
fisheries
8 Trafficking in works of art 
–  trafficking in cultural goods/heritage, antique theft
9 Arms trafficking
–  trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD)/small arms and light weapons (SALW)/
ammunition,  gunrunning, illicit production of (fire)arms. 
– Arms proliferation is not included.
10 Terrorism 
–  terrorist attacks, terrorist acts, terrorist financing. 
11 Fraud
–  defrauded/fraudulent services/goods 
12 Trafficking in vehicles





–  computer crime, high–tech crime, cyber attacks, attacks against information systems
14 Money laundering
–  laundering of illegal proceeds/profits 
Each category includes: 
a)  authorities that tackle the issue (e.g. European Committee to Combat Drugs -coded as 2) and their 
abbreviations (e.g. CELAD – coded as 2). When the complete name and its abbreviation appear 
together, it is coded only one time.
b)  criminals and criminal groups who commit the issue (e.g. criminal organizations in general –coded 
as 1; illegal networks of human trafficking –coded as 6; offenders of cybercrime –coded as 13).
c)  victims of the issue (e.g. victims of crime in general – coded as 1; cybercrime victims – coded as 13)
d)  venues where the issue is discussed (e.g. United Nations Conference on Drugs – coded as 2) and 
their abbreviations (e.g. UNCD – coded as 2). When the complete name and its abbreviation appear 
together, it is coded only one time.
e)  policy instruments tackling an issue (e.g. Fraud Prevention Action Plan – coded as 11) and their 
abbreviations (e.g. FPAP – coded as 11). When the complete name and its abbreviation appear 
together, it is coded only one time.
The unit of analysis is words. They can sometimes be ‘composed’ words based on the  keywords in 
the codebook. For example, the issue of money laundering is composed of two words and coded as 14. 
However, laundering of drug trafficking profits includes words from two different categories, therefore it 
is coded as 14 and 2. 
Note on the issues analyzed for the study of the inter-agenda dynamics
While the analysis of the intra-agenda dynamics considered all 14 issues, as set in the codebook, the study 
on the inter-agenda dynamics included 11 issues. The eleven issues were (in brackets the code): organized 
crime (1), drug trafficking (2), counterfeiting (3), corruption (5), human trafficking (6), environmental 
crime (7), arms trafficking (9), terrorism (10), fraud (11), cybercrime (13) and money laundering (14). 
The reduction was done, based on the findings of the intra-agenda dynamics.
Three issues were discarded, because they received less than 1% of attention on each agenda or no 
attention. The three issues were (in brackets the code, as set in the codebook): cigarette smuggling (4), 
trafficking in works of art (8) and trafficking in vehicles (12). This low percentage was set as a threshold, 
given that their presence was almost negligible for the two institutions. This basically signifies that both 
considered them equally irrelevant, thus even less relevant for their relationship. Important to note is that 
when an issue received less than 1% of attention only in one agenda, but more than this percentage in 
the other, the issue was not discarded. The reason is that this dissimilarity, where one deals with an issue 
and the other not, is an indication of their different intra-dynamics and is thus relevant for the analysis 
of their interactive processes. For instance, cybercrime in the European Council agenda received around 
0.60% of attention, while in the Commission agenda received 1.47%.
Coding rules specific for the issue terrorism
The topic is included only in the context of organized crime. To define this, some rules apply, depending 
on the type of data. When coding the Conclusions, terrorism is considered only when it is accompanied 
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by another OC issue in the same paragraph. When coding the COM docs, terrorism is included when any 
of two conditions occurs. 1) Terrorism appears in the title accompanied by another OC issue. 2) Terrorism 
appears in a paragraph accompanied by another OC issue. When the title does not include any other OC 
issue connected to terrorism, terrorism must be accompanied by another OC issue in the same paragraph. 
When the title of the policy document includes terrorism accompanied of another OC issue, all hits on 
terrorism in the text are included because the link was already established in the title. 
Coding rules specific for COM docs
The texts in the introductory part of the communications are analysed. The  introductory part is called 
explanatory memorandum in the case of proposals. Other COM docs, such as reports and communications, 
contain an introductory part with a different name but similar function. Some interchangeable names are 
introduction, summary and background. In case a document included two types of introductory parts, 
the first choice is to analyse the explanatory memorandum. When there is no explanatory memorandum, 
the next first choice is to analyse the so-called introduction. In case there is no introduction, the first 
introductory part is analysed. Further, the  technical subsections within the introductory part are not 
considered. These parts are regularly referred to as “legal elements of the proposal”, which contain for 
instance the legal basis of the proposal, commentaries on individual articles, explanation on the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, and budgetary implications. Finally, footnotes are not considered. 
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Appendix 3: Data: Conclusions on organized crime 
# YEAR DAY MONTH CITY
1983 17, 18, 19 June Sttutgart
1985 29, 30 March Brussels
1985 2, 3 December Luxembourg
1986 26, 27 June The Hague
1986 6 December London
1988 27, 28 June Hannover
1988 2, 3 December Rhodes
1989 26, 27 June Madrid
1989 8, 9 December Strasbourg
1990 28 April Dublin
1990 24, 25 June Dublin
1990 14, 15 December Rome
1991 28, 29 June Luxembourg
1991 9, 10 December Maastricht
1992 26, 27 June Lisbon
1992 11, 12 December Edingburgh
1993 21, 22 June Copenhagen
1993 29 October Brussels
1993 10, 11 December Brussels
1994 24, 25 June Corfu
1994 9, 10 December Essen
1995 26, 27 June Cannes
1995 15, 16 December Madrid
1996 29 March Turin
1996 21, 22 June Florence
1996 13, 14 December Dublin
1997 16, 17 June Amsterdam
1997 12, 13 December Luxembourg
1998 15, 16 June Cardiff
1998 11, 12 December Vienna
1999 3, 4 June Cologne
1999 15, 16 October Tampere
1999 10, 11 December Helsinki
2000 23, 24 March Lisbon
2000 19, 20 June Santa Maria da Feira
2000 7, 8, 9 December Nice
2001 23, 24 March Stockholm
2001 15, 16 June Göteborg
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# YEAR DAY MONTH CITY
2001 21 September Brussels
2001 19 October Ghent
2001 14, 15 December Laeken
2002 15, 16 March Barcelona
2002 21, 22 June Seville
2003 20, 21 March Brussels
2003 19, 20 June Thessaloniki
2003 16, 17 October Brussels
2003 12, 13 December Brussels
2004 25, 26 March Brussels
2004 17, 18 June Brussels
2004 4, 5 November Brussels
2004 16, 17 December Brussels
2005 16, 17 June Brussels
2005 15, 16 December Brussels
2006 15, 16 June Brussels
2006 14, 15 December Brussels
2007 8, 9 March Brussels
2007 21, 22 June Brussels
2007 13, 14 December Brussels
2008 13, 14 March Brussels
2008 19, 20 June Brussels
2008 11, 12 December Brussels
2009 19, 20 March Brussels
2009 18, 19 June Brussels
2009 10, 11 December Brussels
2010 16 September Brussels
2011 11 March Brussels
2011 24, 25 March Brussels
2011 23, 24 June Brussels
2011 8, 9 December Brussels
2012 30 January Brussels
2012 1,2 March Brussels
2012 28, 29 June Brussels
2013 14, 15 March Brussels
2013 22 May Brussels
2013 24, 25 October Brussels




Data: COM docs on organized crime (continued)
# Reference Date Year Title
1 COM (1984) 
290
23-03-84 1984 Proposal For A Council Recommendation On Action 
Against Audio-Visual Piracy
2 COM (1984) 
177
28-03-84 1984 Recommendation For A Council Regulation(Eec)Providing 
For Direct Cooperation Between The Authorities 
Of The Member States Of The European Economic 
Community Responsible For The Prevention Of Fraud 
And The Corresponding Authorities In The Swiss 
Confederation
3 COM (1984) 
261
11-05-84 1984 Recommendation For A Council Decision Accepting On 
Behalf Of The Community The Recommendation Of 
The Customs Cooperation Council Concerning Action 
Against Customs Fraud Relating To Containers
4 COM (1984) 
705
11-12-84 1984 Proposal For A Council Regulation(Eec)Laying 
Down Measures To Discourage The Release For Free 
Circulation Of Counterfeit Goods
5 COM (1986) 
457 – 1
31-07-86 1986 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
On Community Contribution In The International 
Conference On Drug Abuse And Illicit Trafficking
6 COM (1986) 
457 – 2
31-07-86 1986 Recommendation For A Council Decision On 
Community Participation In The Preparatory Work And 
The International Conference On Drug Abuse And Illicit 
Trafficking
7 COM (1989) 
26
26-01-89 1989 Proposal For A Council Decision Of The United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And 
Psychotropic Substances Concluded In Vienna On 20 
December 1988
8 COM (1989) 
654
19-12-89 1989 Proposal For A Council Decision On The Conclusion 
On Behalf Of The European Economic Community Of 
The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In 
Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances, Adopted 
In Vienna On 19 December 1988
9 COM (1990) 
106
21-03-90 1990 Proposal For A Council Directive On Prevention Of 
The Financial System For The Purpose Of Money 
Laundering
10 COM (1990) 
215
06-06-90 1990 Proposal For A Council Regulation (Eec) Laying Down 
Measures To Be Taken To Discourage The Diversion 
Of Certain Substances To The Illicit Manufacture Of 
Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances
11 COM (1990) 
353
27-07-90 1990 Amended Proposal For A Council Decision On The 
Conclusion On Behalf Of The European Economic 
Community Of The United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic 
Substances, Adopted In Vienna On 19 December 1988
Appendix 4: Data: COM docs on organized crime
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Data: COM docs on organized crime (continued)
# Reference Date Year Title
12 COM (1990) 
597
18-12-90 1990 Proposal For A Council Directive On The Manufacture 
And The Placing On The Market Of Certain Substances 
Used In The Illicit Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs And 
Psychotropic Substances
13 COM (1991) 
455
22-11-91 1991 Proposal For A Council Regulation (Eec) Amending 
Regulation (Eec) No 3677/90 Of 13 December 1990 
Laying Down Measures To Be Taken To Discourage 
The Diversion Of Certain Substances To The Illicit 
Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic 
Substances
14 COM (1991) 
463
27-11-91 1991 Proposal For A Council Regulation(Eec)On 
The Establishment Of A European Drugs Monitoring 
Centre And A European Information Network On Drugs 
And Drug Addiction(Reitox)
15 COM (1993) 
141
20-04-93 1993 Annual Report From The Commission On The Fight 
Against Fraud - 1992 Report And Action Programme 
For 1993
16 COM (1993) 
299
22-07-93 1993 Proposal For A Council Regulation (Eec) Amending 
Council Regulation (Eec) N. 302/93 On The 
Establishment Of The European Monitoring Centre For 
Drugs And Drug Addiction
17 COM (1993) 
329
13-08-93 1993 Proposal For A Council Regulation (Eec) Laying Down 
Measures To Prohibit The Release For Free Circulation, 
Export Or Transit Of Counterfeit And Pirated Goods
18 COM (1994) 
92
23-03-94 1994 The Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy - Work 
Programme For 1994 - Protecting The Financial 
Interests Of The Community - The Fight Against Fraud
19 COM (1994) 
94
23-03-94 1994 Protecting The Community’s Financial Interests 
The Fight Against Fraud : 1993 Annual Report
20 COM (1994) 
234
23-06-94 1994 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament On A European Union 
Action Plan To Combat Drugs (1995-1999)
21 COM (1994) 
383
07-09-94 1994 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament - The Illicit Traffic In 
Radioactive Substances And Nuclear Materials
22 COM (1995) 
23
08-02-95 1995 Work Programme For 1995 - Combating Fraud
23 COM (1995) 
54
03-03-95 1995 Report From The Commission - First Commission’s 
Report On The Implementation Of The Money 
Laundering Directive (91/308/Eec) To Be Submitted To 
The European Parliament And To The Council
24 COM (1995) 
108
29-03-95 1995 Communication From The Commission - Fraud 
In The Transit Procedure,Solutions Foreseen And 
Perspectives For The Future
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Data: COM docs on organized crime (continued)
# Reference Date Year Title
25 COM (1995) 
98
29-03-95 1995 The Fight Against Fraud (Protecting The Community’s 
Financial Interests) - Annual Report 1994
26 COM (1995) 
296
30-06-95 1995 Proposal For A Coucil Regulation (Ec) On North-South 
Cooperation In The Campaign Against Drugs And Drug 
Addiction (Budget Heading B7-5080)
27 COM (1995) 
398
06-09-95 1995 Report From The Commission On The Recovery Of 
Traditional Own Resources In Cases Of Fraud And 
Irregularities (Methodology And Sample A 94)
28 COM (1995) 
585 - 1
29-11-95 1995 Proposal For A Council Decision Concerning The Signature 
And Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Control Of 
Drugs Precursors And Chemical Substances Between 
The European Community And Bolivia
29 COM (1995) 
585 - 2
29-11-95 1995 Proposal For A Council Decision Concerning The Signature 
And Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Control Of 
Drugs Precursors And Chemical Substances Between 
The European Community And Colombia
30 COM (1995) 
585 - 3
29-11-95 1995 Proposal For A Council Decision Concerning The Signature 
And Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Control Of 
Drugs Precursors And Chemical Substances Between 
The European Community And Ecuador
31 COM (1995) 
585 - 4
29-11-95 1995 Proposal For A Council Decision Concerning The Signature 
And Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Control Of 
Drugs Precursors And Chemical Substances Between 
The European Community And Peru
32 COM (1995) 
585 - 5
29-11-95 1995 Proposal For A Council Decision Concerning The Signature 
And Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Control Of 
Drugs Precursors And Chemical Substances Between 
The European Community And Venezuela
33 COM (1995) 
690
20-12-95 1995 Proposal For A Council Regulation (Ec,Euratom) 
Concerning On - The - Spot Checks And Inspections 
By The Commission For The Detection Of Frauds And 
Irregularities Detrimental To The Financial Interests Of 
The European Communities
34 COM (1996) 
17
31-01-96 1996 Work Programme 1996 - Fight Against Fraud - 
Protection Of The Community’s Financial Interests
35 COM (1996) 
171
19-04-96 1996 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament - Illicit Trafficking In Nuclear 
Materials And Radioactive Substances - Implementation 
Of The Guidelines Laid Down In The Communication 
From Commission Of 7 September 1994 Com(94)383 
And In The Conclusions Of The Essen European Council
36 COM (1996) 
173
08-05-96 1996 Annual Report 1995 - The Fight Against Fraud - 
Protecting The Community’s - Financial Interests
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Data: COM docs on organized crime (continued)
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37 COM (1996) 
567
20-11-96 1996 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament On Trafficking In Women 
For The Purpose Of Sexual Exploitation
38 COM (1996) 
622
02-12-96 1996 Proposal For A Council Decision Concerning 
The Conclusion, On Behalf Of The Community, Of 
An Agreement Between The European Community And 
The United Mexican States On Cooperation Regarding 
The Control Of Precursors And Chemical Substances 
Frequently Used In The Illicit Manufacture Of Narcotic 
Drugs Or Psychotropic Substances
39 COM (1997) 
146
11-04-97 1997 Commission Report To The European Parliament 
And The Council Of The European Union And For 
Information To The Economic And Social Committee 
And The Committee Of The Regions On The Activities 
Of The European Monitoring Centre For Drugs And 
Drug Addiction (1994/1996) In Accordance With Article 
18 Of Council Regulation (Eec) 302/93 Of 8 February 
1993
40 COM (1997) 
205
06-05-97 1997 Proposal For A Council Decision Authorizing 
Conclusion, On Behalf Of The Community, Of 
An Agreement On Drugs Percursors And Chemical 
Substances Between The European Community And 
The United States Of America
41 COM (1997) 
199
06-05-97 1997 Work Programme 1997/1998 - Protection Of 
The Community’s Financial Interests: Fight Against Fraud
42 COM (1997) 
200
06-05-97 1997 Annual Report 1996 - Protection Of Community 
Financial Interests - Fight Against Fraud
43 COM (1997) 
192
21-05-97 1997 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament On A Union Policy 
Against Corruption
44 COM (1997) 
249
23-05-97 1997 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament On The Control Of New 
Synthetic Drugs (Designer Drugs)
45 COM (1997) 
259
09-06-97 1997 SECOND REPORT On The Recovery Of Traditional Own 
Resources In Cases Of Fraud And Irregularities (Sample 
B 94)
46 COM (1997) 
489 - 6
06-10-97 1997 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) Amending 
Council Regulation (EC) Nr. 302/93 Of 8 February 1993 
Establishing A European Monitoring Centre For Drugs 
And Drug Addiction
47 COM (1997) 
528
20-10-97 1997 Proposal For A Council Decision On A Joint Action 
Establishing A Programme Of Exchanges, Training And 
Cooperation For Persons Responsible For Action To 
Combat Organised Crime (Falcone Programme)
202
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48 COM (1997) 
670
08-01-98 1998 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament With A View To 
Establishing A Common European Union Platform For 
The Special Session Of The UN General Assembly On 
International Cooperation In The Fight Against Drugs
49 COM (1998) 
22 - 1
23-01-98 1998 Proposal For A Council Regulation (EC) Amending 
Regulation (EEC) N. 3677/90 Laying Down Measures 
To Be Taken To Discourage The Diversion Of Certain 
Substances To The Illicit Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs 
And Psychotropic Substances.
50 COM (1998) 
22 - 2
23-01-98 1998 Proposal For A European Parliament And Council Directive 
Amending Council Directive 92/109/EEC Relating To 
The Manufacturing And Placing On The Market Of 
Certain Substances Used In The Illicit Manufacture Of 
Narcotic Drugs Ans Psychotropic Substances.
51 COM (1998) 
25 - 1
28-01-98 1998 Report From The Commission On The Implementation 
Of Council Regulation (EC) N. 3295/94 Of 22 
December 1994 As Regards Border Controls On Trade 
In Goods Which May Be Counterfeit Or Pirated.
52 COM (1998) 
25 - 2
28-01-98 1998 Proposal For A Council Regulation (EC) Amending 
Regulation (EC) N. 3295/94 Laying Down Measures 
To Prohibit The Release For Free Circulation, Export, 
Re-Export Or Entry For A Suspensive Procedure Of 
Counterfeit An Pirated Goods.
53 COM (1998) 
276
06-05-98 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 1997 - Fight Against Fraud - Protection 
Of The Financial Interests Of The Communities 
54 COM (1998) 
278
06-05-98 1998 Protection Of The Communities’ Financial Interests - 
Fight Against Fraud - Work Programme 1998/1999 
55 COM (1998) 
395 - 1
01-07-98 1998 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION To 
The European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Central Bank And The Economic And Social Committee 
On A Framework For Action On Combatting Fraud And 
Counterfeiting Of Non-Cash Means Of Payment
56 COM (1998) 
395 - 2
01-07-98 1998 Proposal For A JOINT ACTION On Combating Fraud 
And Counterfeiting Of Non-Cash Means Of Payment
57 COM (1998) 
401
01-07-98 1998 SECOND COMMISSION REPORT To The EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT And The COUNCIL On The Implementation 
Of The Money Laundering Directive
58 COM (1998) 
474
22-07-98 1998 Commission Communication To The Council, 
The European Parliament And The European 
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59 COM (1998) 
359
03-09-98 1998 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning 
The Conclusion Of The Agreement Between 
The European Community And The Republic Of Chile 
On Precursors And Chemical Substances Frequently 
Used For The Illicit Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs And 
Psychotropic Substances
60 COM (1998) 
569
15-10-98 1998 GREEN PAPER : Combating Counterfeiting And Piracy 
In The Single Market
61 COM (1998) 
717
01-12-98 1998 Proposal For A Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
Establishing A European Fraud Investigation Office
62 COM (1998) 
726
09-12-98 1998 Communication From The Commission To The Council 
And The European Parliament: For Further Actions In 
The Fight Against Trafficking In Women
63 COM (1999) 
140
17-03-99 1999 Amended Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION  
Concerning Investigations Conducted By The Fraud 
Prevention Officee
64 COM (1999) 
140 - 1
17-03-99 1999 Draft INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT Concerning 
Internal Investigations By The Fraud Prevention Office
65 COM (1999) 
140 - 2
17-03-99 1999 COMMISSION DECISION Establishing A Fraud 
Prevention Office
66 COM (1999) 
160
21-04-99 1999 REPORT On The Recovery Of Traditional Own Resources 
In Cases Of Fraud And Irregularities (Sample B98)
67 COM (1999) 
239
26-05-99 1999 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS On An European 
Union Action Plan To Combat Drugs (2000-2004)
68 COM (1999) 
307
23-06-99 1999 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Defining 4-MTA As 
A New Synthetic Drug Which Is To Be Made Subject To 
Control Measures And Criminal Provisions
69 COM (1999) 
349
14-07-99 1999 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE.  CRIME 
VICTIMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
REFLEXIONS ON STANDARDS AND ACTION
70 COM (1999) 
352
14-07-99 1999 Proposal For A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC Of 
10 June 1991 On Prevention Of The Use Of The Financial 
System For The Purpose Of Money Laundering
71 COM (1999) 
430
09-09-99 1999 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) Completing 
Regulation (EEC) N° 302/93 Establishing A European 
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72 COM (1999) 
438
14-09-99 1999 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION On 
Combating Fraud And Counterfeiting Of Non-Cash 
Means Of Payment
73 COM (1999) 
496
28-10-99 1999 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of An Agreement Between The European Community 
And The Kingdom Of Norway On The Participation 
Of Norway In The Work Of The European Monitoring 
Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction
74 COM (1999) 
588
16-11-99 1999 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Authorising 
The Provisional Application Of The Memorandum Of 
Understanding Between The European Community And 
The Government Of Vietnam On The Prevention Of 
Fraud In Trade Of Footwear Products
75 COM (1999) 
589
16-11-99 1999 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of A Memorandum Of Understanding Between 
The European Community And The Socialist Republic 
Of Vietnam On The Prevention Of Fraud In Trade Of 
Footwear Products
76 COM (1999) 
590
17-12-99 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 1998 - Protecting The Communities’ 
Financial Interests And The Fight Against Fraud - 
77 COM (2000) 
358
28-06-00 2000 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: Protection 
Of The Communities’ Financial Interests - The Fight 
Against Fraud: For An Overall Strategic Approach
78 COM (2000) 
492
26-07-00 2000 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION On 
The Protection Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting
79 COM (2000) 
718
08-11-00 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1999 : Protecting 
The Communities’financial Interests The Fight Against 
Fraud
80 COM (2000) 
737 - 1
16-11-00 2000 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Called For By The Joint Action On New Synthetic Drugs 
(97/396/JAI) Concerning Ketamine
81 COM (2000) 
737 - 2
16-11-00 2000 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Called For By The Joint Action On New Synthetic Drugs 
(97/396/JAI) Concerning GHB
82 COM (2000) 
786 - 1
29-11-00 2000 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
- The Prevention Of Crime In The European Union 
Reflection On Common Guidelines And Proposals For 
Community Financial Support
83 COM (2000) 
786 - 2
29-11-00 2000 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Establishing 
A Programme Of Incentives And Exchanges, Training 
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84 COM (2000) 
789
30-11-00 2000 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: Follow Up 
To The Green Paper On Combating Counterfeiting And 
Piracy In The Single Market
85 COM (2000) 
760
04-12-00 2000 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signing, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of The United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime And Its Protocols On Combating Trafficking 
In Persons, Especially Women And Children, And 
The Smuggling Of Migrants By Land, Air And Sea
86 COM (2000) 
828 - 3
14-12-00 2000 Proposal For COUNCIL DECISION Establishing A Second 
Phase Of The Programme Of Incentives, Exchanges, 
Training And Cooperation For Persons Responsible For 
Combating Trade In Human Beings And The Sexual 
Exploitation Of Children (Stop II)
87 COM (2000) 
854 - 1
21-12-00 2000 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 
Combating Trafficking In Human Beings And 
Combating The Sexual Exploitation Of Children And 
Child Pornography
88 COM (2000) 
854 - 2
21-12-00 2000 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION On 
Combating Trafficking In Human Beings
89 COM (2000) 
854 - 3
21-12-00 2000 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION On 
Combating The Sexual Exploitation Of Children And 
Child Pornography
90 COM (2000) 
890
26-01-01 2001 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: Creating A Safer 
Information Society By Improving The Security Of 
Information Infrastructures And Combating Computer-
Related Crime
91 COM (2001) 
44
07-02-01 2001 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3677/90 Laying Down Measures 
To Be Taken To Discourage The Diversion Of Certain 
Substances To The Illicit Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs 
And Psychotropic Substances
92 COM (2001) 
11
09-02-01 2001 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND EUROPOL: Preventing Fraud 
And Counterfeiting Of Non-Cash Means Of Payment
93 COM (2001) 
254
15-05-01 2001 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: 
Protecting The Communities’ Financial Interests Fight 
Against Fraud Action Plan For 2001-2003
206
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94 COM (2001) 
255
15-05-01 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2000: Protection Of The Communities’ 
Financial Interests And The Fight Against Fraud
95 COM (2001) 
248 - 1
22-05-01 2001 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Establishing 
A Training, Exchange And Assistance Programme For 
The Protection Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting 
(Pericles Programme)
96 COM (2001) 
248 - 2
22-05-01 2001 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Extending 
The Effects Of Decision Establishing A Training, 
Exchange And Assistance Programme For 
The Protection Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting 
(Pericles Programme) To The Member States Which 
Have Not Adopted The Euro As The Single Currency
97 COM (2001) 
259
23-05-01 2001 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION Laying 
Down Minimum Provisions On The Constituent Elements 
Of Criminal Acts And Penalties In The Field Of Illicit Drug 
Trafficking
98 COM (2001) 
301
08-06-01 2001 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT On 
The Implementation Of The EU Action Plan On Drugs 
(2000-2004)
99 COM (2001) 
397
13-07-01 2001 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning 
The Signing Of The United Nations Protocol, Annexed 
To The Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime, On The Illicit Manufacturing Of And Trafficking In 
Firearms, Their Parts, Components And Ammunition, On 
Behalf Of The European Community
100 COM (2001) 
536
28-09-01 2001 GREEN PAPER. Compensation to crime victims
101 COM (2001) 
734
06-12-01 2001 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Defining PMMA As 
A New Synthetic Drug Which Is To Be Made Subject To 
Control Measures And Criminal Provisions
102 COM (2001) 
771
13-12-01 2001 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Based On Article 11 
Of The Council’s Framework Decision Of 29 May 2000 
On Increasing Protection By Criminal Penalties And 
Other Sanctions Against Counterfeiting In Connection 
With The Introduction Of The Euro
103 COM (2002) 
71
11-02-02 2002 Proposal For A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE On The Short-Term 
Residence Permit Issued To Victims Of Action To Facilitate 
Illegal Immigration Or Trafficking In Human Beings Who 
Cooperate With The Competent Authorities
104 COM (2002) 
98
14-03-02 2002 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3677/90 Laying Down Measures 
To Be Taken To Discourage The Diversion Of Certain 
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105 COM (2002) 
328 - 2
25-06-02 2002 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On The Prevention Of 
Money Laundering By Means Of Customs Co-Operation
106 COM (2002) 
348
02-07-02 2002 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION: Protection Of 
The Financial Interests Of The Communities And Fight 
Against Fraud - Annual Report 2001 -
107 COM (2002) 
406 - 7
17-07-02 2002 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Amending Decision 
2002/187/JHA Setting Up Eurojust With A View To 
Reinforcing The Fight Against Serious Crime
108 COM (2002) 
406 - 9
17-07-02 2002 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 302/93 As Regards The Budgetary 
And Financial Rules Applicable To The European 
Monitoring Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction And 
Access To The Centre’s Documents
109 COM (2002) 
494
10-09-02 2002 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On Drug Precursors
110 COM (2002) 
500
12-09-02 2002 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signature And 
Conclusion Of The Agreement Between The European 
Community And Turkey On Precursors And Chemical 
Substances Frequently Used In The Illicit Manufacture Of 
Narcotic Drugs Or Psychotropic Substances
111 COM (2002) 
562
16-10-02 2002 Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on compensation to 
crime victims
112 COM (2002) 
599
04-11-02 2002 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT On 
The Mid-Term Evaluation Of The EU Action Plan On 
Drugs (2000-2004)
113 COM (2002) 
777
30-12-02 2002 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning 
The Conclusion Of An Agreement In The Form Of 
An Exchange Of Letters Between The European 
Community And The Republic Of Vietnam Amending 
The Memorandum Of Understanding Between 
The European Community And The Socialist Republic 
Of Vietnam On The Prevention Of Fraud In Trade In 
Footwear Products
114 COM (2003) 
20
20-01-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Concerning 
Customs Action Against Goods Suspected Of Infringing 
Certain Intellectual Property Rights And The Measures 
To Be Taken Against Goods Found To Have Infringed 
Such Rights
115 COM (2003) 
154
02-04-03 2003 COMMISSION REPORT Evaluation Of The Activities Of 
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) - Parliament And 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 And Council 
Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (Article 15)
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116 COM (2003) 
258-1
13-05-03 2003 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
called for by the Joint Action on New Synthetic Drugs 
(97/396/JAI) concerning TMA-2
117 COM (2003) 
258-2
13-05-03 2003 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Called for by the Joint Action on New Synthetic Drugs 
(97/396/JAI) concerning 2C-I
118 COM (2003) 
258-3
13-05-03 2003 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Called for by the Joint Action on New Synthetic Drugs 
(97/396/JAI) concerning 2C-T-2
119 COM (2003) 
258-4
13-05-03 2003 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Called for by the Joint Action on New Synthetic Drugs 
(97/396/JAI) concerning 2C-T-7
120 COM (2003) 
317
28-05-03 2003 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: 
On A Comprehensive EU Policy Against Corruption
121 COM (2003) 
323
03-06-03 2003 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL In 
View Of The European Council Of Thessaloniki On 
The Development Of A Common Policy On Illegal 
Immigration, Smuggling And Trafficking Of Human 
Beings, External Borders And The Return Of Illegal 
Residents
122 COM (2003) 
426
17-07-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning 
The Analysis And Cooperation With Regard To 
Counterfeit Euro Coins
123 COM (2003) 
445
23-07-03 2003 COMMISSION REPORT : Protection Of The Financial 
Interests Of The Communities And Fight Against Fraud 
- ANNUAL REPORT 2002
124 COM (2003) 
512 - 1
22-08-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of The United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime
125 COM (2003) 
512 - 2
22-08-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of The Protocol 
Against The Smuggling Of Migrants By Land, Sea And Air, 
Supplementing The United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime
126 COM (2003) 
512 - 3
22-08-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of 
The Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish 
Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women And Children, 
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127 COM (2003) 
532
03-09-03 2003 SECOND COMMISSION REPORT Based On Article 11 Of 
The Council Framework Decision Of 29 May 2000 On 
Increasing Protection By Criminal Penalties And Other 
Sanctions Against Counterfeiting In Connection With 
The Introduction Of The Euro
128 COM (2003) 
560
03-10-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Information 
Exchange, Risk-Assessment And The Control On New 
Narcotic Drugs And New Synthetic Drugs
129 COM (2003) 
681
12-11-03 2003 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On 
Coordination On Drugs In The European Union
130 COM (2003) 
751
04-12-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signing, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption
131 COM (2003) 
808
19-12-03 2003 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION On The European 
Monitoring Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction (Recast)
132 COM (2004) 
103
10-02-04 2004 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 Concerning Investigations 
Conducted By The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
133 COM (2004) 
104
10-02-04 2004 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Amending 
Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 Concerning 
Investigations Conducted By The European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF)
134 COM (2004) 
165
12-03-04 2004 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 
Crime Prevention In The European Union
135 COM (2004) 
221 - 1
29-03-04 2004 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
On Measures To Be Taken To Combat Terrorism And 
Other Forms Of Serious Crime, In Particular To Improve 
Exchanges Of Information
136 COM (2004) 
230
05-04-04 2004 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Based On Article 6 
Of The Council Framework Decision Of 26 June 2001 
On Money Laundering, The Identification, Tracing, 
Freezing, Seizing And Confiscation Of Instrumentalities 
And The Proceeds Of Crime.
137 COM (2004) 
244
07-04-04 2004  Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION 
Laying Down Rules For The Monitoring Of Trade In 
Certain Substances Used For The Illicit Manufacture Of 
Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances
138 COM (2004) 
262
16-04-04 2004 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT On 
The Prevention Of And Fight Against Organised Crime 
In The Financial Sector
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139 COM (2004) 
260
16-04-04 2004 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT On The Use Of 
Administrative Cooperation Arrangements In The Fight 
Against VAT Fraud
140 COM (2004) 
346
30-04-04 2004 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Based On Article 14 
Of The Council Framework Decision Of 28 May 2001 
Combating Fraud And Counterfeiting Of Non-Cash 
Means Of Payment
141 COM (2004) 
444
25-06-04 2004 Proposal For A COUNCIL COMMON POSITION On 
The Negotiations In The Council Of Europe Relating To 
The 1990 Convention On Laundering, Search, Seizure 
And Confiscation Of The Proceeds From Crime
142 COM (2004) 
448
30-06-04 2004 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On The Prevention 
Of The Use Of The Financial System For The Purpose Of 
Money Laundering, Including Terrorist Financing
143 COM (2004) 
457
06-07-04 2004 Report From The Commission On The Legal Transposition 
Of The Council Decision Of 28/2/2002 Setting Up 
Eurojust With A View To Reinforcing The Fight Against 
Serious Crime.
144 COM (2004) 
509
20-07-04 2004 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On Mutual 
Administrative Assistance For The Protection Of 
The Financial Interests Of The Community Against Fraud 
And Any Other Illegal Activities
145 COM (2004) 
544
09-08-04 2004 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: 
Protecting The Communities’ Financial Interests - Fight 
Against Fraud - Action Plan For 2004-2005
146 COM (2004) 
559 - 1
16-08-04 2004 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning 
The Signature Of The Agreement Between 
The European Community And Its Member States, 
Of The One Part, And The Swiss Confederation, Of 
The Other Part, To Counter Fraud And All Other Illegal 
Activities Affecting Their Financial Interests
147 COM (2004) 
559 - 2
16-08-04 2004 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Community 
And Its Member States, Of The One Part, And The Swiss 
Confederation, Of The Other Part, To Counter Fraud 
And All Other Illegal Activities Affecting Their Financial 
Interests
148 COM (2004) 
573
28-12-04 2004 Report From The Commission: Protection Of 
The European Communities’ Financial Interests And 
The Fight Against Fraud - Annual Report 2003 -
211
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149 COM (2004) 
679
20-10-04 2004 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, 
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND EUROPOL: 
A New EU Action Plan 2004-2007 To Prevent Fraud On 
Non-Cash Means Of Payment
150 COM (2004) 
707
22-10-04 2004 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: On 
The Results Of The Final Evaluation Of The EU Drugs 
Strategy And Action Plan On Drugs (2000-2004)
151 COM (2004) 
850
04-02-05 2005 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION: Report On 
The Follow-Up Of Traditional Own Resources In Cases 
Of Fraud And Irregularities
152 COM (2005) 6 19-01-05 2005 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION On 
The Fight Against Organised Crime
153 COM (2005) 
45
14-02-05 2005 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On 
A EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008)
154 COM (2005) 
124 - 3
06-04-05 2005 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Establishing 
The Specific Programme “Prevention Of And Fight 
Against Crime” For The Period 2007-2013 - General 
Programme “Security And Safeguarding Liberties”
155 COM (2005) 
127 - 1
06-04-05 2005 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND TO THE COUNCIL 
Concerning The Implementation And Continuation Of 
The Pericles Programme For The Protection Of The Euro 
Against Counterfeiting
156 COM (2005) 
127 - 2
06-04-05 2005 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Amending And 
Extending Council Decision Of 17 December 2001 
Establishing An Exchange, Assistance And Training 
Programme For The Protection Of The Euro Against 
Counterfeiting (The ‘Pericles’ Programme)
157 COM (2005) 
127 - 3
06-04-05 2005 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Extending To 
The Non-Participating Member States The Application 
Of Council Decision Amending And Extending 
Council Decision Of 17 December 2001 Establishing 
An Exchange, Assistance And Training Programme For 
The Protection Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting 
(The ‘Pericles’ Programme)
158 COM (2005) 
190 - 5
13-05-05 2005 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 302/93 On The Establishment Of 
A European Monitoring Centre For Drugs And Drug 
Addiction  As Regards The Director’s Term Of Office
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159 COM (2005) 
232
02-06-05 2005 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
“Developing A Strategic Concept On Tackling 
Organised Crime”
160 COM (2005) 
323
19-07-05 2005 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Protection Of 
The Financial Interests Of The Communities - Fight 
Against Fraud- Commission’s Annual Report 2004
161 COM (2005) 
399
31-08-05 2005 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On The European 
Monitoring Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction 
(Recast)
162 COM (2005) 
426
13-09-05 2005 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning 
The Signing, On Behalf Of The European Community, Of 
Council Of Europe Convention No 198 On Laundering, 
Search, Seizure And Confiscation Of The Proceeds From 
Crime And On The Financing Of Terrorism
163 COM (2005) 
479
11-10-05 2005 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
On A Customs Response To Latest Trends In 
Counterfeiting And Piracy
164 COM (2005) 
514
18-10-05 2005 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: 
Fighting Trafficking In Human Beings - An Integrated 
Approach And Proposals For An Action Plan
165 COM (2005) 
600
24-11-05 2005 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Concerning Access 
For Consultation Of The Visa Information System (VIS) 
By The Authorities Of Member States Responsible For 
Internal Security And By Europol For The Purposes Of 
The Prevention, Detection And Investigation Of Terrorist 
Offences And Of Other Serious Criminal Offences
166 COM (2006) 
65
20-02-06 2006 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Second Report Based 
On Article 14 Of The Council Framework Decision Of 
28 May 2001 Combating Fraud And Counterfeiting Of 
Non-Cash Means Of Payment {SEC(2006) 188}
167 COM (2006) 
72
21-02-06 2006 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION - Second 
Commission Report Based On Article 6 Of The Council 
Framework Decision Of 26 June 2001 On Money 
Laundering, The Identification, Tracing, Freezing, 
Seizing And Confiscation Of Instrumentalities And 
The Proceeds Of Crime. {SEC(2006) 219}
168 COM (2006) 
82
02-03-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption
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169 COM (2006) 
115
14-03-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Community 
And Norway On The Revision Of The Amount Of 
The Financial Contribution From Norway Provided For 
In The Agreement Between The European Community 
And The Kingdom Of Norway On The Participation 
Of Norway In The Work Of The European Monitoring 
Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
170 COM (2006) 
187
02-05-06 2006 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Based On Article 10 
Of The Council Framework Decision Of 19 July 2002 On 
Combating Trafficking In Human Beings
171 COM (2006) 
243 - 1
23-05-06 2006 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION To The European 
Parliament And To The Council Concerning 
The Implementation And Results Of The Pericles 
Programme For The Protection Of The Euro Against 
Counterfeiting
172 COM (2006) 
243 - 2
23-05-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Amending 
And Extending Decision 2001/923/EC Establishing 
An Exchange, Assistance And Training Programme For 
The Protection Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting 
(The ‘Pericles’ Programme)
173 COM (2006) 
243 - 3
23-05-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Extending To 
The Non-Participating Member States The Application 
Of Decision 2006/849/EC Amending And Extending 
Decision 2001/923/EC Establishing An Exchange, 
Assistance And Training Programme For The Protection 
Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting (The ‘Pericles’ 
Programme)
174 COM (2006) 
244
24-05-06 2006 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 Concerning 
Investigations Conducted By The European Anti Fraud 
Office (OLAF)
175 COM (2006) 
254
31-05-06 2006 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
Concerning The Need To Develop A Co-Ordinated 
Strategy To Improve The Fight Against Fiscal Fraud
176 COM (2006) 
255
01-06-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Community 
And The Government Of The Republic Of Bulgaria 
On The Participation Of Bulgaria In The Work Of 
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177 COM (2006) 
256
01-06-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Community 
And Romania On The Participation Of Romania In 
The Work Of The European Monitoring Centre For 
Drugs And Drug Addiction
178 COM (2006) 
257
01-06-06 2006 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Community 
And The Republic Of Turkey On The Participation 
Of Turkey In The Work Of The European Monitoring 
Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction
179 COM (2006) 
316
26-06-06 2006 GREEN PAPER On The Role Of Civil Society In Drugs 
Policy In The European Union
180 COM (2006) 
378
12-07-06 2006 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: Protection Of 
The Communities’ Financial Interests – Fight Against 
Fraud – Annual Report 2005
181 COM (2006) 
437
07-08-06 2006 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: 
Developing A Comprehensive And Coherent EU 
Strategy To Measure Crime And Criminal Justice: An EU 
Action Plan 2006 – 2010
182 COM (2006) 
906
22-12-06 2006 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending 
Directive 2005/60/EC On The Prevention Of The Use 
Of The Financial System For The Purpose Of Money 
Laundering And Terrorist Financing, As Regards 
The Implementing Powers Conferred On The Commission
183 COM (2007) 
218
25-04-07 2007 Recommendation For A COUNCIL DECISION 
Concerning The Accession Of Bulgaria And Romania To 
The Convention Of 26 May 1997, Drawn Up On The 
Basis Of Article K.3(2)(C) Of The Treaty On European 
Union, On The Fight Against Corruption Involving 
Officials Of The European Communities Or Officials Of 
Member States Of The European Union
184 COM (2007) 
267
22-05-07 2007 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: Towards A General 
Policy On The Fight Against Cyber Crime
185 COM (2007) 
328
18-06-07 2007 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Based On Article 9 Of The Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA Of 22 July 2003 On Combating 
Corruption In The Private Sector
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186 COM (2007) 
390
06-07-07 2007 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection Of 
The Financial Interests Of The Communities – Fight 
Against Fraud – Annual Report 2006
187 COM (2007) 
430
17-07-07 2007 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On Defining 
1-Benzylpiperazine (BZP) As A New Synthetic Drug 
Which Is To Be Made Subject To Control Measures And 
Criminal Provisions
188 COM (2007) 
524
17-09-07 2007 THIRD REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Based On 
Article 11 Of The Council Framework Decision Of 
29 May 2000 On Increasing Protection By Criminal 
Penalties And Other Sanctions Against Counterfeiting In 
Connection With The Introduction Of The Euro
189 COM (2007) 
525
17-09-07 2007 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 Laying Down Measures 
Necessary For The Protection Of The Euro Against 
Counterfeiting
190 COM (2007) 
644
23-10-07 2007 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
On The Role Of Eurojust And The European Judicial 
Network In The Fight Against Organised Crime And 
Terrorism In The European Union
191 COM (2007) 
716
16-11-07 2007 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Based On Article 12 
Of The Council Framework Decision Of 22 December 
2003 On Combating The Sexual Exploitation Of 
Children And Child Pornography
192 COM (2007) 
758
23-11-07 2007 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL Concerning Some Key Elements 
Contributing To The Establishment Of The VAT Anti-Fraud 
Strategy Within The EU
193 COM (2007) 
781
10-12-07 2007 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION On 
The 2007 Progress Review Of The Implementation Of 
The EU Action Plan On Drugs (2005-2008)
194 COM (2007) 
805
17-12-07 2007 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Pursuant To Article 6 
Of The Council Framework Decision Of 24 February 
2005 On Confiscation Of Crime Related Proceeds, 
Instrumentalities And Property (2005/212/JHA)
195 COM (2007) 
806
17-12-07 2007 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS Prevention Of 
Fraud By Building On Operational Results: A Dynamic 
Approach To Fraud-Proofing
196 COM (2008) 
109
22-02-08 2008 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT On 
Measures To Change The VAT System To Fight Fraud
216
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197 COM (2008) 
437
08-07-08 2008 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signature 
And Conclusion Of The Agreement Between 
The European Community And The Government Of 
The People’s Republic Of China On Drug Precursors 
And Substances Frequently Used In The Illicit 
Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs Or Psychotropic 
Substances
198 COM (2008) 
475
22-07-08 2008 COMMISSION REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND TO THE COUNCIL Protection Of The Communities’ 
Financial Interests – Fight Against Fraud – Annual 
Report 2007
199 COM (2008) 
567
18-09-08 2008 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION To 
The European Parliament And The Council On An EU 
Drugs Action Plan For 2009-2012
200 COM (2008) 
657
17-10-08 2008 COMMISSION WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation 
And Monitoring Of The Implementation Of The EU 
Plan On Best Practices, Standards And Procedures For 
Combating And Preventing Trafficking In Human Beings
201 COM (2008) 
766
20-11-08 2008 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
Proceeds Of Organised Crime Ensuring That “Crime 
Does Not Pay”
202 COM (2008) 
807
01-12-08 2008 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
On A Coordinated Strategy To Improve The Fight 
Against VAT Fraud In The European Union
203 COM (2008) 
839 - 1
10-12-08 2008 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signing, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of 
The Cooperation Agreement Between The European 
Community And Its Member States, Of The One Part, 
And The Principality Of Liechtenstein, Of The Other 
Part, To Combat Fraud And Any Other Illegal Activity To 
The Detriment Of Their Financial Interests
204 COM (2008) 
839 - 2
10-12-08 2008 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion, 
On Behalf Of The European Community, Of 
The Cooperation Agreement Between The European 
Community And Its Member States, Of The One Part, 
And The Principality Of Liechtenstein, Of The Other 
Part, To Combat Fraud And Any Other Illegal Activity To 
The Detriment Of Their Financial Interests
205 COM (2009) 
135
25-03-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION On 
Combating The Sexual Abuse , Sexual Exploitation Of 
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206 COM (2009) 
136
25-03-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 
On Preventing And Combating Trafficking In Human 
Beings, And Protecting Victims, Repealing Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA
207 COM (2009) 
170
20-04-09 2009 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on 
the application of Council Directive 2004/80/EC relating 
to compensation to crime victims
208 COM (2009) 
372
15-07-09 2009 COMMISSION REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND TO THE COUNCIL Protection Of The Communities’ 
Financial Interests — Fight Against Fraud — Annual 
Report 2008
209 COM (2009) 
427
18-08-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION On 
Administrative Cooperation And Combating Fraud In 
The Field Of Value Added Tax (Recast)
210 COM (2009) 
511
29-09-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE Amending 
Directive 2006/112/EC As Regards An Optional 
And Temporary Application Of The Reverse Charge 
Mechanism In Relation To Supplies Of Certain Goods 
And Services Susceptible To Fraud
211 COM (2009) 
618
06-11-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION Establishing 
The Position To Be Adopted On Behalf Of The 
Community Concerning A Mechanism For The Review 
Of Implementation Of The United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, To Be Adopted In The 3rd Session 
Of The Conference Of The States Parties To The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (Doha / Qatar, 
9 – 13 November 2009)
212 COM (2009) 
653
01-12-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Position 
To Be Taken By The European Union Concerning 
The Proposal To Amend The Annex A Of 
The Agreement Between The European Community 
And The Government Of The People’s Republic Of 
China On Drug Precursors And Substances Frequently 
Used In The Illicit Manufacture Of Narcotic Drugs Or 
Psychotropic Substances
213 COM (2009) 
669
10-12-09 2009 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION On 
The Implementation Of Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA Laying Down Minimum Provisions 
On The Constituent Elements Of Criminal Acts And 
Penalties In The Field Of Illicit Drug Trafficking
218
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214 COM (2009) 
707
17-12-09 2009 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Union 
And Iceland And Norway On The Application Of 
Certain Provisions Of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA 
On The Stepping Up Of Cross-Border Cooperation, 
Particularly In Combatting Terrorism And Cross-
Border Crime And Council Decision 2008/616/JHA 
On The Implementation Of Decision 2008/615/JHA 
On The Stepping Up Of Cross-Border Cooperation, 
Particularly In Combatting Terrorism And Cross-Border 
Crime, And The Annex Thereto
215 COM (2009) 
709
07-01-10 2010 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Pursuant To Article 
16 Of Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 Of The European 
Parliament And Of The Council Of 11 February 2004 
And To Article 32 Of Council Regulation (EC) No 
111/2005 On The Implementation And Functioning Of 
The Community Legislation On Monitoring And Control 
Of Trade In Drug Precursors
216 COM (2010) 
20
03-02-10 2010 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signature 
Of An Agreement Between The Republic Of Croatia 
And The European Union On The Participation Of 
The Republic Of Croatia In The Work Of The European 
Monitoring Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction
217 COM (2010) 
21
03-02-10 2010 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of An Agreement Between The Republic Of Croatia 
And The European Union On The Participation Of 
The Republic Of Croatia In The Work Of The European 
Monitoring Centre For Drugs And Drug Addiction
218 COM (2010) 
94
29-03-10 2010 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On Combating 
The Sexual Abuse, Sexual Exploitation Of Children And 
Child Pornography, Repealing Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA
219 COM (2010) 
95
29-03-10 2010 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On Preventing 
And Combating Trafficking In Human Beings, And 
Protecting Victims, Repealing Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA
220 COM (2010) 
382
14-07-10 2010 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Protection Of 
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221 COM (2010) 
493
15-10-10 2010 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On The Application 
Of Directive 2004/81 On The Residence Permit Issued To 
Third-Country Nationals Who Are Victims Of Trafficking 
In Human Beings Or Who Have Been The Subject 
Of An Action To Facilitate Illegal Immigration, Who 
Cooperate With The Competent Authorities
222 COM (2010) 
630
05-11-10 2010 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 2010 Progress 
Review Of The EU Drugs Action Plan (2009-2012)
223 COM (2011) 
32
02-02-11 2011 Proposal For A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE On The Use Of Passenger Name Record 
Data For The Prevention, Detection, Investigation And 
Prosecution Of Terrorist Offences And Serious Crime
224 COM (2011) 
176
12-04-11 2011 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND TO THE COUNCIL Based On Article 8 
Of The Council Decision 2007/845/JHA Of 6 December 
2007 Concerning Cooperation Between Asset Recovery 
Offices Of The Member States In The Field Of Tracing 




18-05-11 2011 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime
226 COM (2011) 
288
24-05-11 2011 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On Entrusting 
The Office For Harmonisation In The Internal Market 
(Trade Marks And Designs) With Certain Tasks Related 
To The Protection Of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including The Assembling Of Public And Private 
Sector Representatives As A European Observatory On 
Counterfeiting And Piracy
227 COM (2011) 
307
06-06-11 2011 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
On The Modalities Of European Union Participation 
In The Council Of Europe Group Of States Against 
Corruption (GRECO)
228 COM (2011) 
308
06-06-11 2011 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
Fighting Corruption In The EU
229 COM (2011) 
309
06-06-11 2011 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Based On Article 9 Of 
Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA Of 22 July 
2003 On Combating Corruption In The Private Sector
220
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230 COM (2011) 
335
08-06-11 2011 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On European 
Statistics On Safety From Crime
231 COM (2011) 
379
24-06-11 2011 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signing, 
On Behalf Of The European Union Of The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Between 
The European Union And Its Member States, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, The Republic Of Korea, The United 
Mexican States, The Kingdom Of Morocco, New 
Zealand, The Republic Of Singapore, The Swiss 
Confederation And The United States Of America
232 COM (2011) 
380
24-06-11 2011 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Between 
The European Union And Its Member States, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, The Republic Of Korea, The United 
Mexican States, The Kingdom Of Morocco, New 
Zealand, The Republic Of Singapore, The Swiss 
Confederation And The United States Of America
233 COM (2011) 
376
24-06-11 2011 Communication From The Commission To The European 
Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And 
Social Committee, And The Committee Of The Regions 
And The Court Of Auditors On The Commission Anti-
Fraud Strategy
234 COM (2011) 
595
29-09-11 2011 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection Of 
The European Union’s Financial Interests-Fight Against 
Fraud-Annual Report 2010
235 COM (2011) 
689
25-10-11 2011 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
Towards A Stronger European Response To Drugs
236 COM (2011) 
752
15-11-11 2011 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Laying Down 
General Provisions On The Asylum And Migration Fund 
And On The Instrument For Financial Support For Police 
Cooperation, Preventing And Combating Crime, And 
Crisis Management
237 COM (2011) 
753
15-11-11 2011 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Establishing, As 
Part Of The Internal Security Fund, The Instrument For 
Financial Support For Police Cooperation, Preventing 
And Combating Crime, And Crisis Management
238 COM (2011) 
910
19-12-11 2011 Proposal For A COUNCIL REGULATION Extending To 
The Non-Participating Member States The Application 
Of Regulation (EU) No …/2012 Establishing 
An Exchange, Assistance And Training Programme For 
The Protection Of The Euro Against Counterfeiting 
(The ‘Pericles 2020’ Programme)  
221
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239 COM (2011) 
913
19-12-11 2011 Proposal For A 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
Establishing An Exchange, Assistance And Training 
Programme For The Protection Of The Euro Against 
Counterfeiting (The ‘Pericles 2020’ Programme)
240 COM (2012) 
85  
12-03-12 2012 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On The Freezing 
And Confiscation Of Proceeds Of Crime In 
The European Union
241 COM (2012) 
140 
28-03-12 2012 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Tackling Crime In Our Digital Age: Establishing 
A European Cybercrime Centre
242 COM (2012) 
168
11-04-12 2012 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On The Application 
Of Directive 2005/60/EC On The Prevention Of The Use 
Of The Financial System For The Purpose Of Money 
Laundering And Terrorist Financing
243 COM (2012) 
286
19-06-12 2012 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The EU 
Strategy Towards The Eradication Of Trafficking In 
Human Beings 2012–2016
244 COM (2012) 
351
27-06-12 2012 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL On Concrete Ways To Reinforce 
The Fight Against Tax Fraud And Tax Evasion Including 
In Relation To Third Countries
245 COM (2012) 
363
11-07-12 2012 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On The Fight 
Against Fraud To The Union’s Financial Interests By 
Means Of Criminal Law
246 COM (2012) 
408
19-07-12 2012 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection Of 
The European Union’s Financial Interests - Fight Against 
Fraud Annual Report 2011
247 COM (2012) 
428
31-07-12 2012 Proposal For A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE Amending 
Directive 2006/112/EC On The Common System 
Of Value Added Tax As Regards A Quick Reaction 
Mechanism Against VAT Fraud
248 COM (2012) 
521
27-09-12 2012 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 Laying Down Rules For 
The Monitoring Of Trade Between The Community And 
Third Countries In Drug Precursors
222
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249 COM (2012) 
548
27-09-12 2012 Proposal For A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 On Drug Precursors
250 COM (2012) 
717    
30-11-12 2012 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
Evaluation Report On The European Union Crime 
Prevention Network
251 COM (2012) 
722
06-12-12 2012 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
An Action Plan To Strengthen The Fight Against Tax 
Fraud And Tax Evasion
252 COM (2012) 
732    
07-12-12 2012 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On The Implementation 
Of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA Of 23 June 2008 On 
The Stepping Up Of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly 
In Combating Terrorism And Crossborder Crime (The ‘Prüm 
Decision’)
253 COM (2013) 3 21-01-13 2013 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Signing, 
On Behalf Of The European Union, Of The Agreement 
Between The European Union And The Russian 
Federation On Drug Precursors
254 COM (2013) 4 21-01-13 2013 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion 
Of The Agreement Between The European Union And 
The Russian Federation On Drug Precursors
255 COM (2013) 
45
05-02-13 2013 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On The Prevention 
Of The Use Of The Financial System For The Purpose Of 
Money Laundering And Terrorist Financing
256 COM (2013) 
42
05-02-13 2013 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On The Protection 
Of The Euro And Other Currencies Against 
Counterfeiting By Criminal Law, And Replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA
257 COM (2013) 
154
22-03-13 2013 Proposal For A COUNCIL DECISION On The Conclusion, 
On Behalf Of The European Union, Of The Protocol 
Against The Illicit Manufacturing Of And Trafficking 
In Firearms, Their Parts And Components And 
Ammunition, Supplementing The United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
258 COM (2013) 
209
18-04-13 2013 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On The Functioning 
Of The Memorandum Of Understanding On The Sale Of 
Counterfeit Goods Via The Internet
223
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259 COM (2013) 
324
06-06-13 2013 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Stepping Up The Fight Against Cigarette Smuggling 
And Other Forms Of Illicit Trade In Tobacco Products - 
A Comprehensive EU Strategy
260 COM (2013) 
548
24-07-13 2013 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE  COUNCIL Protection Of 
The European Union’ Financial Interests — Fight 
Against Fraud 2012 Annual Report
261 COM (2013) 
588
14-08-13 2013 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
On The Evaluation Of The Programme For Exchange, 
Assistance And Training For The Protection Of The Euro 
Against Counterfeiting (‘Pericles’ Programme)
262 COM (2013) 
618
17-09-13 2013 Proposal For A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amending Council 
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA Of 25 October 2004 
Laying Down Minimum Provisions On The Constituent 
Elements Of Criminal Acts And Penalties In The Field Of 
Illicit Drug Trafficking, As Regards The Definition Of Drug
263 COM (2013) 
716
21-10-13 2013 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Firearms And The Internal Security Of The EU: 
Protecting Citizens And Disrupting Illegal Trafficking
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Appendix 5: Codebook on factors of attention
This codebook was developed to analyse the factors that trigger the attention of the European Council 
and the Commission and thus set an issue on their agendas.   
It includes 6 types of factors, namely, focusing events, professional concerns, EU institutional milestones, 
political signals, policy inheritances, and public concerns. Each category is explained below. 
Only explicit arguments, as they are found in the data, are coded. Otherwise, they are not considered. 
1. Focusing event
A salient, powerful and sudden socio-political occurrence.
 • It includes events that are natural (e.g. natural disaster) and manmade (e.g. incidents created 
by organizations). When the event is created, the actor that created the event must be different 
than the institution paying attention to a given issue. In case the actor is the same, it is not 
coded as focusing event. Instead, the factor that triggered such institution to create the event 
must be coded. 
 • It includes events in any policy domain and in and outside the EU, as long as they have an impact 
on OC.
 • It includes events with a negative connotation, such as occurrences that imply harm. It can also 
include events with a positive connotation, such as key political occurrences that demand or 
trigger mobilization on a topic.    
 • When the event is related to the core institutional framework of the EU, it must be coded as EU 
institutional milestone. 
2. Professional concern
A statement from a group of experts that estimates critical the status of a given condition. 
 • It includes indications on the critical status of a problem, such as, the unfavorable development 
of the problem, the increase of a negative condition, and the urgency to update policy due to 
a problematic situation. 
 • The concern must be done by experts. If it is done by political actors, it is coded as political 
signal.
 • It can make a reference to the specific group that raised the concern, but it is not mandatory as 
long as it refers to experts.   
 • It includes the concerns from EU agencies, as they are specialized bodies.
3. EU institutional milestone
A key development in the institutional framework of the European Union. 
 • The developments must be related to the framework of the EU as a whole, not to a policy area. 
 • It includes occurrences related to the evolution of the EU institutional framework. 
 • It includes events on the EU integration process, treaty revisions, accession of new members, 
development of intergovernmental conferences.
4. Political signal
An indication made by a political actor in order to address a given issue.
 • It includes signals from EU institutions and political organizations/actors in and outside the EU. 
 • It must include a concrete reference to the specific political actor making the input. 
 • The political actor that makes the signal must be different than the institution giving attention 
to the issue. Otherwise, it is coded as policy inheritance.
 • It includes direct signals (e.g. explicit invitations or requests to handle an  issue), as well as 
indirect signals (e.g. proposals, declarations, reports, recommendations, opinions) made by 
political actors. 
 • The signal does not need to be expressly for the institution that actually takes up such signal.
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5. Policy inheritance 
Previous policy decisions and political agreements that influence the consideration of current policy 
commitments.
 • The decisions and agreements were made by policy-making institutions in the EU framework. 
They can include commitments made outside the EU, only when the EU was involved in arriving 
at such arrangements or it has the responsibility as an international organization to act by them. 
 • The policy decisions are on concrete policies and legal instruments adopted in the past. Policy 
proposals are coded as political signal. 
 • The political agreements must be adopted –or decided, concluded, agreed, etc.- and include 
the specific date when such agreement happened. Conclusions of the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers, as well as Resolutions of the European Parliament do not need such 
references, as they represent decided political agreements. 
 • It includes the revision and update of the implementation of adopted programs and policies, as well 
as other tasks that have their origin in previous arrangements.
6. Public concern
A problem that citizens consider important to be tackled by the EU.
 • It includes statements that indicate that citizens themselves have a concern or have raised a 
concern. 
 • It does not include statements that indicate that the institutions themselves estimate that citizens 
could be affected by a given problem. 
 • Arguments that state that policies are created for the benefit of citizens are not included, but 
only when they show that the origin for doing that was actually a demand from the public. 
All categories are binary coded: 1, meaning factor found; and 0, meaning factor not found. 
In case a policy document includes an annex, it is necessary to identify the author of the annex before 
coding and identify in what way the annex and the main text are linked to be able to code accordingly.  
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Appendix 6: Allocation of attention across all OC issues on 
the agendas






1 Organized crime 26.51 19.05%
2 Drug trafficking 28.52 21.31%
3 Counterfeiting 1.63% 11.24%
4 Cigarette smuggling 0% 0.62%
5 Corruption 3.52% 4.94%
6 Human Trafficking 9.30% 12.58%
7 Environmental crime 1.13% 0.23%
8 Trafficking in works of art 0.50% 0%
9 Arms trafficking 1.01% 1.38%
10 Terrorism 13.44% 3.29%
11 Fraud 7.54% 18.16%
12 Trafficking in vehicles 0.50% 0%
13 Cybercrime 0.63% 1.46%
14 Money laundering 5.78% 5.72%
Total 100% 100%
The issues are presented in the order they appear in the codebook on OC issues (see Appendix 2), not  ranked.




Allocation of attention across all OC issues on the agendas 
 
 
Figure A. Allocation of attention across all OC issues on the European Council agenda 
  







Figure B. Allocation of attention across all OC issues on the Commission agenda 
  
Figure B. Allocation of attention across all OC issues on the Commission agenda
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Appendix 7: Vector Autoregressions (methods part)
Table A. Structure of the data 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test
European Council Commission
-4.738 -8.240 
Significance at 1 percent level
  
The results showed evidence to reject the null hypothesis99 that the series is non-stationary. This indicated 
that the time series do not have unit root.
Table B. Lag length selection 
Lag Likelihood ratio test
6 9.794 (0.044)
P-value100 reported in parenthesis
The likelihood ration test is a type of “top-down sequential testing”, which starts by a  maximum lag 
length and continues by discarding lower lags until the null hypothesis is rejected (Lütkepohl and Kilian, 
2017:51). The test finishes when the first lag with a significant statistical value is reached, beginning 
by testing the highest lag. In this case, the maximum lag to conduct the LR test was six, taking into 
consideration that a common practice for quarterly data is to set the lag length of the model directly on 
six (Freeman et al., 1989; Miller and Roberds, 1991). The test was statistically significant at this lag. 
The figure presents a snapshot of the results directly obtained in Stata. It includes two ways of observing 
this. When we look at the table on the left side, we can see that all the modulus of the eigenvalues are 
less than one. This indicates that the model is stable. In addition, Stata enables us to recognize this by 
literately indicating in the  legend at the bottom of this table that “VAR satisfies stability condition”. In 
the graph on the right side, the same result can be appreciated. The twelve points (two variables times 
six lags) represent the eigenvalues. The fact that all points are inside the circle indicates that the model is 
stationary. Actually, this is the graphical representation of the legend “All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit 
circle” at the bottom of the table on the left side.
99  A null hypothesis is the baseline hypothesis that the researcher tries to reject or confirm —depending 
on the research goal. 
100  A p-value is a probability score. It shows the level of statistical significance at which a test can be 
conducted and fail to reject the null hypothesis. Small p-values (minor to 0.05, i.e. 5%, or almost equal to 
zero) show evidence against the null hypothesis, as it means that the result has a small probability to occur 
if such hypothesis would be true. Therefore, the smaller the p-value, the stronger the evidence to reject it. 




Table C. Autocorrelation of VAR







Numbers reported are chi-squares with p-values in parenthesis
 










Figure A.  Stability of VAR 
 
  
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
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Figure B. Impulse response functions  
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Figure B. Impulse response functions 
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Table D. Impulse response functions values













0 0 0 0 -.201529 -.399057 -.004001
1 .014213 -.175392 .203818 .177703 -.016088 .371495
2 -.173072 -.363456 .017312 -.026079 -.219001 .166843
3 -.205474 -.396053 -.014895 .112097 -.079029 .303223
4 -.008673 -.201733 .184388 .003799 -.190603 .1982
5 -.046774 -.231964 .138416 .028213 -.168569 .224994
6 .21452 .014361 .414679 -.068653 -.263311 .126004
7 -.09295 -.226069 .040169 .024071 -.08196 .130103
8 .040234 -.091948 .172416 -.01689 -.114019 .080239
9 -.000877 -.116441 .114688 .016235 -.069107 .101576
10 .056299 -.045905 .158503 -.043609 -.124634 .037415
11 .012471 -.078998 .103941 .023759 -.043965 .091482
12 -.017355 -.100281 .065571 -.010425 -.070448 .049598
13 -.001445 -.07609 .073199 .011942 -.044718 .068602
14 .037279 -.026996 .101554 -.017496 -.066636 .031643
15 .004383 -.054114 .062879 .001604 -.044752 .047959

233
Research question and aim
This study examines the effects of the institutional designs of the European Council 
and the European Commission on the way each policy-making body sets the agenda of 
the European Union (EU) and on their interaction in the long run. The central research 
question is: How can the agenda dynamics in and between the European Council and 
the European Commission be explained? To address this question, the  study first 
looks into the processes of the agenda of each institution, referred to here as intra-
agenda dynamics. It then analyses the logics between the agendas, their inter-agenda 
dynamics. The aim of this research is to reveal and explain the underlying processes 
in EU agenda setting, as experienced over time by the two institutions. Analyzing 
such dynamics helps better understand how political institutions in the  European 
Union work and the implications for policymaking and policy change in this political 
system. The study focuses on the domain of organized crime, where EU competences 
have developed between intergovernmental and supranational levels and neither 
institution clearly dominates, in contrast to how it occurs in other policy fields.  
Motivation and puzzle 
Some scholars argue that the EU has a “peculiar institutional constellation” not found 
in any country (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011:53). The EU can be considered a unique 
political system, but whether it really differs from countries in how it attends policy 
problems is an empirical question (Carammia et al., 2012:43). 
In the institutional framework of the EU, the European Council and the European 
Commission play a similar role in agenda setting: the former institution gives political 
guidelines and the latter generates policy proposals. Thus policy issues enter the EU 
agenda placed by any of the two bodies (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). Particularly 
puzzling is that these institutions entail distinct designs, condition that can be 
seen at least in two ways. On the one hand, they have different political attributes. 
S u m m a r y
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The  European Council has considerably more political authority, being a venue 
where the closed circle of the EU top political leaders meet to discuss issues that 
require consensus at the EU level. On the other hand, the information-processing 
capacities of the institutions differ. In contrast to the European Council, the European 
Commission can simultaneously handle a great amount of issues, given its broad 
apparatus of experts and administrators. 
In domestic political systems, policy-making bodies often differ on what issues 
to attend on their agendas and how to deal with such policy problems. These 
differences are induced in part by their institutional designs (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005; Baumgartner et al., 2009). But does this circumstance also happen in the EU 
political system? More specifically, how do the European Council and the European 
Commission act and react? Do they set the agenda differently, according to their 
distinct institutional architectures? Or do they do it in the same way, according to 
their similar roles? 
We know little about the impact of the architectures of these EU institutions on agenda 
setting. Existing studies have mainly observed the information-processing capacities 
of the European Council. Moreover, research has hardly compared the patterns of 
the institutions. There is thus a gap in the EU policy-making literature; we practically 
lack knowledge on how similar or different the logics of the European Council and 
the European Commission are in setting the agenda. 
Another puzzling feature of the EU framework is that the relationship between 
the  European Council and the European Commission in agenda setting is not 
formalized. This contrasts with the case of the other EU institutions, whose 
interactions in the policy-making process are regulated by the Treaty. Therefore, we 
do not know whether both institutions are expected to interact in the first place 
and, if so, how their interplay is formally supposed to occur. But, most importantly, 
how does their interaction happen in practice? How do the different designs of 
the institutions affect their relationship? Who follows whom in agenda setting? Or 
do the institutions influence each other? 
Scholars have speculated about the relationship. Some have claimed that the European 
Council exerts important control on the European Commission; other scholars have 
argued that the European Commission is rather influential; and some authors have 
considered that the interaction is reciprocal. Little empirical research has been done 
to endorse the points in the discussion. The few systematic studies are limited to 
the  analysis of their interaction during only some years in this century. However, 
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there is no research on their behaviour over a longer period of time, in order to 
demonstrate the underlying trend in their interplay. 
Theoretical framework
To observe and explain the processes of the institutions in agenda setting, this 
study proposes a theoretical framework: the Agenda Dynamics Approach (ADA). 
This perspective integrates two existing theories of policymaking that so far have 
been used separately: the Disproportionate Information-Processing Model (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005) and the Agenda-Setting Routes Framework (Princen and 
Rhinard, 2006). These theories are the basis to build ADA and support its propositions. 
This theoretical framework is used to empirically analyze the intra- and inter-agenda 
dynamics. This is the first attempt to theorize and analyze altogether the individual 
and interactive dynamics of the European Council and the European Commission. In 
this way, the complete chain of ways the institutions perform in agenda setting is 
examined. 
The Agenda Dynamics Approach has two central postulates. First, it posits that 
the designs of the two bodies, in terms of their political attributes and information-
processing capacities, affect their patterns of attention to policy issues over time. 
Second, it argues that the individual processes of the institutions affect the way 
they interact in the long run. The empirical study confirms both expectations. First, 
the findings indicate that institutional designs highly matter in EU agenda setting. 
They impact the way the institutions take up issues on their agendas. Second, 
the results point out that knowing the intra-agenda dynamics helps in analyzing and 
understanding the inter-agenda dynamics.
Data and methods
The agendas are represented in this study by key policy documents issued by 
the  institutions over time. Accordingly, the European Council Conclusions and 
the COM docs of the European Commission are analyzed for the period between 
1975 and 2013. A longitudinal analysis is conducted because studying the agendas 
on a long-term basis allow us to capture the fundamental behaviors of institutions in 
the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
The development of the agendas is studied in the policy domain of organized crime. 
This policy field is the vehicle to identify the dynamics of the institutions. Choosing 
a single domain is done for methodological and analytical reasons. It is useful to focus 
on a policy area when making an in-depth empirical analysis of agenda dynamics, as 
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such study requires a well-founded knowledge and understanding of central debates 
and developments in a policy field and its context (Princen, 2009). In particular, studying 
organized crime allows us to examine the European Council agenda and the European 
Commission agenda under relatively equal conditions. The two political bodies deal 
with this policy field similarly, in contrast to the different way each institution regularly 
handles other policy areas. For instance, while the European Council deals specially 
with policy domains such as macroeconomics and the European Commission with 
other fields such as common market, it appears that neither institution is the ‘owner’ 
of the domain of organized crime. Furthermore, the development of organized 
crime in the EU framework has happened in such a way that it is neither a purely 
intergovernmental nor entirely supranational policy field, in contrast to other EU 
domains such as defense (intergovernmental) and agriculture (supranational). This 
is an important consideration to avoid bias, given that the European Council is 
an  intergovernmental organization and the European Commission a supranational 
one. These conditions suggest that none of the institutions clearly dominates in this 
field.
The analysis of the intra-agenda dynamics is largely conducted in a quantitative way, 
by means of content analysis and the use of statistical tools. It is complemented 
by a qualitative analysis that adds value and meaning to the numerical findings. To 
identify the inter-agenda dynamics, a new method for the study of the relationship 
between political institutions in the European Union is used, based on econometrics: 
vector autoregression techniques. Using this method, a time-series analysis is carried 
out to model EU agenda-setting scenarios. 
Analysis and conclusions
The empirical evidence reveals that, while the European Council and the European 
Commission have a similar agenda-setting role, their intra-agenda dynamics are 
predominantly different over time, because the designs of the institutions are 
different. The European Council agenda is considerably more erratic in how issues are 
addressed compared to the European Commission agenda, which is more gradual. 
The institutions attend issues on their agendas stimulated by at least six factors: policy 
inheritances, political signals, professional concerns, focusing events, EU institutional 
milestones and public concerns. The European Council is particularly triggered by 
political signals and policy inheritances to set issues on its agenda. The European 
Commission is mostly driven by policy inheritances. While both institutions often 
respond to policy inheritances, they do it to different degrees, for different motives 
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and with different political goals. Some similarities are present, yet to a lesser extent. 
Neither agenda is stable over time. Both show a punctuated equilibrium pattern. 
The inter-agenda dynamics display a unidirectional pattern in the long run. That is, 
the European Council mostly sets the agenda of the European Commission, but not 
the other way around. This does not mean however that the European Commission 
does not influence the European Council. It rather signifies that the European 
Council does not respond to the European Commission on a regular basis. While 
the European Council is the leading institution in agenda setting, it does not exert 
total control of the European Commission agenda. There is space for the European 
Commission to decide part of the issues to attend. Other factors, such as policy 
inheritances –or previous policy commitments-, play also a relevant role in triggering 
the European Commission to take up policy problems. Largely due to such policy 
legacies, the European Commission responds with delay to the new impulses from 
the European Council. The European Commission thus also works independently 
without a novel indication. This situation facilitates that the European Council 
turns its attention to other issues for some time, as it does not need to send signals 
recurrently to the European Commission. It is a continuous process. This indicates 
that policy inheritance highly matters in EU agenda setting.   
The fact that both institutions set the agenda and have distinct information-
processing capacities and political attributes enables the EU to handle a large number 
of problems, highlighting new policy issues, producing proposals and monitoring 
existing matters.
The intra- and inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council and the European 
Commission have implications for policymaking. The institutions have designs that 
complement their institutional capacities, stimulating the formation of policies. But, at 
the same time, their architectures promote mostly dissimilar patterns in and between 
the agendas, situation that is likely to rather hinder such formation to happen. This 
suggests that policy change is conditional on the interplay of the institutions. 
Finally, the findings in this study indicate that the EU system is not entirely unique. 
The EU is largely similar to domestic systems. Many behaviors and theories valid for 
the study of national agendas hold true for the study of EU agendas. However, some 
peculiarities are also present. The European Council and the European Commission 
have a hybrid performance, in that they act to an extent as both policy input and 
process agendas.  
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Onderzoeksvraag en doel van het onderzoek
Dit onderzoek gaat over de effecten van de institutionele opzet van de Europese 
Raad en de Europese Commissie op de wijze waarop deze beleidsorganen de agenda 
van de Europese Unie (EU) bepalen en op hun interactie op de lange termijn. 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag is: Hoe kan de agenderingsdynamiek binnen en tussen 
de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie worden verklaard? Om deze vraag 
te beantwoorden worden eerst de agenderingsprocessen per instelling bekeken: 
de zogenaamde intra-agenderingsdynamiek. Vervolgens wordt gekeken naar 
de wisselwerking tussen de beleidsagenda’s: de inter-agendadynamiek. Het doel van 
dit onderzoek is het blootleggen en verklaren van de onderliggende processen bij het 
opstellen van de EU-beleidsagenda aan de hand van de gang van zaken binnen de 
twee instellingen. Door deze processen te ananlyseren ontstaat een beter inzicht in 
de werking van de politieke instellingen in de Europese Unie en in de implicaties voor 
de beleidsvorming en beleidsverandering in dit politieke systeem. Het onderzoek 
is gericht op het domein van de georganiseerde misdaad, waar EU-bevoegdheden 
tussen intergouvernementeel en supranationaal niveau in zitten en waar geen van 
beide instellingen duidelijk de overhand heeft, anders dan bij andere beleidsterreinen. 
Motivatie en puzzel
Volgens sommige wetenschappers heeft de EU een “bijzondere institutionele 
constellatie” die in geen enkel land voorkomt (Lelieveldt en Princen, 2011:53). De EU 
kan worden beschouwd als een uniek politiek systeem, maar of beleidsproblemen 
er werkelijk anders worden benaderd dan binnen landen is een empirische vraag 
(Carammia et al., 2012:43). 
Binnen het institutionele kader van de EU spelen de Europese Raad en de Europese 
Commissie een vergelijkbare rol bij het bepalen van de agenda: de Raad geeft 
politieke richtlijnen en de Commissie genereert beleidsvoorstellen. Beleidskwesties 
S a m e n v a t t i n g
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worden dus door een van beide organen op de EU-agenda gezet (Princen en Rhinard, 
2006). De puzzel die ontstaat bij dit proces heeft te maken met twee structurele 
verschillen tussen de twee instellingen. In de eerste plaats hebben ze verschillende 
politieke kenmerken. De Europese Raad heeft aanzienlijk meer politieke autoriteit, 
omdat de hoogste politieke leiders van de EU hierin in besloten kring bijeenkomen 
om kwesties te bespreken die een consensus op EU-niveau vereisen. In de tweede 
plaats verschillen de instellingen wat betreft hun informatieverwerkingscapaciteit. In 
tegenstelling tot de Europese Raad kan de Europese Commissie, die beschikt over 
een breed apparaat van deskundigen en ambtenaren, een groot aantal kwesties 
tegelijkertijd behandelen. 
Beleidsorganen in individuele landen verschillen vaak wat betreft de onderwerpen die 
ze op de politieke agenda zetten en hoe ze met deze beleidsproblemen omgaan. Deze 
verschillen vloeien deels voort uit hun institutionele opzet (Jones en  Baumgartner, 
2005; Baumgartner et al., 2009). Maar treedt dit verschijnsel ook op in het politieke 
systeem van de EU? Om het preciezer te formuleren: hoe handelen en reageren 
de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie? Bepalen die de agenda elk op hun eigen 
manier, op basis van de verschillende institutionele structuur van beide instellingen? 
Of gebeurt dat op dezelfde manier, op basis van hun vergelijkbare rol? 
We weten weinig over de impact van de structuur van deze EU-instellingen op 
de  agendering. In bestaande studies is vooral de informatieverwerkingscapaciteit 
van de Europese Raad onderzocht. Bovendien is er nauwelijks onderzoek 
gedaan waarin de patronen van de instellingen worden vergeleken. Er is dus 
een lacune in de EU-beleidsliteratuur; het ontbreekt aan kennis over de verschillen 
en oveeenkomsten tussen de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie in de wijze 
waarop de agenda wordt bepaald. 
Een ander kenmerk van het EU-kader dat vraagtekens oproept is dat de relatie tussen 
de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie bij het vaststellen van de agenda niet 
geformaliseerd is. Dit is anders dan bij andere EU-instellingen, waar de onderlinge 
interacties bij de beleidsvorming worden geregeld in het Verdrag. Daarom weten we 
niet of er überhaupt een interactie tussen beide instellingen kan worden verwacht 
en, zo ja, hoe die formeel moet verlopen. Het allerbelangrijkste is echter de vraag 
hoe hun interactie in de praktijk verloopt. Welke invloed heeft de verschillende opzet 
van de instellingen op hun onderlinge relatie? Wie volgt wie bij het bepalen van 
de agenda? Of beïnvloeden de instellingen elkaar over en weer? 
Onder wetenschappers bestaan verschillende opvattingen over deze onderlinge 
relatie. Sommigen stellen dat de Europese Raad aanzienlijke controle uitoefent over 
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de Europese Commissie; anderen betogen dat de Europese Commissie vrij veel invloed 
heeft, en sommige auteurs zijn van mening dat ze elkaar wederzijds beïnvloeden. Er 
is weinig empirisch onderzoek gedaan om steun te vinden voor de verschillende 
opvattingen. Het weinige systematische onderzoek blijft beperkt tot de analyse 
van de interactie tussen beide instellingen gedurende slechts enkele jaren van deze 
eeuw. Er is geen onderzoek gedaan naar het functioneren van de Europese Raad en 
de Europese Commissie over een langere periode, waarmee een onderliggende trend 
in hun onderlinge relatie kan worden aangetoond. 
Theoretisch kader
Om de agenderingsprocessen bij de instellingen in kaart te brengen en te verklaren, 
wordt in dit onderzoek een nieuw theoretisch kader gehanteerd: De Agenda Dynamics 
Approach (ADA). Hierin worden twee bestaande theorieën van beleidsvorming 
geïntegreerd die tot nu toe afzonderlijk zijn gebruikt: het Disproportionate 
Information-Processing Model (Jones en Baumgartner, 2005) en het Agenda-Setting 
Routes Framework (Princen en Rhinard, 2006). Deze theorieën vormen de basis 
voor de ADA en de veronderstellingen die hieruit voortvloeien. Dit theoretisch kader 
wordt gebruikt om de intra- en inter-agenda-dynamiek empirisch te onderzoeken. 
Hiermee wordt de dynamiek binnen en tussen de Europese Raad en de Europese 
Commissie voor het eerst integraal theoretisch en empirisch onderzocht. Op deze 
manier worden alle schakels in de keten van de agendavorming bij beide instellingen 
bestudeerd. 
De Agenda Dynamics Approach gaat uit van twee centrale aannamen. In de eerste 
plaats wordt aangenomen dat de opzet van beide organen, in termen van politieke 
kenmerken en informatieverwerkingscapaciteit, van invloed is op de aandacht die in 
de loop van de tijd aan beleidskwesties wordt besteed. In de tweede plaats wordt 
aangenomen dat de processen binnen elk van de instellingen van invloed zijn op hun 
interactie op de lange termijn. In het empirisch onderzoek worden beide aannamen 
bevestigd. Ten eerste blijkt uit de resultaten dat de dat institutionele opzet van groot 
belang is voor de bepaling van de EU-agenda. Deze beïnvloedt de manier waarop de 
instellingen kwesties op de agenda zetten. Ten tweede wijzen de resultaten erop dat 
het kennen van de intra-agenda dynamiek helpt bij het analyseren en begrijpen van 
de inter-agenda dynamiek.
Data en onderzoeksmethode
In dit onderzoek vertegenwoordigen essentiële beleidsdocumenten die in de loop 
der tijd door de instellingen zijn uitgebracht de beleidsagenda’s. Het onderzoek is 
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gebaseerd op de conclusies van de Europese Raad en de COM-documenten van 
de Europese Commissie die tussen 1975 en 2013 zijn gepubliceerd. Longitudinaal 
onderzoek van de beleidsagenda’s maakt het mogelijk om het fundamentele gedrag 
van instellingen in het beleidsproces vast te leggen (Baumgartner en Jones, 1993). 
Het onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van de beleidsagenda’s is gericht op het 
beleidsdomein van de georganiseerde misdaad. Dit beleidsdomein dient om de 
dynamiek van de instellingen in kaart te brengen. De keuze voor één enkel domein 
is gemaakt om methodologische en analytische redenen. Bij een diepgaand empirisch 
onderzoek naar de agenderingsdynamiek is het nuttig om één beleidsdomein centraal 
te stellen, omdat dergelijk onderzoek gedegen kennis en begrip van belangrijke 
debatten en ontwikkelingen binnen een beleidsterrein en de context ervan vereist 
(Princen, 2009). Daarbij biedt onderzoek op het terrein van de georganiseerde misdaad 
de mogelijkheid om de agenda’s van de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie 
onder relatief gelijke condities te bestuderen. De twee politieke organen behandelen 
dit beleidsterrein op dezelfde manier, in tegenstelling tot andere beleidsterreinen die 
beide instellingen vaak op een verschillende manier behandelen. Zo houdt de Europese 
Raad zich bijvoorbeeld speciaal bezig met beleidsdomeinen als de macro-economie 
en richt de Europese Commissie zich op andere gebieden zoals de gemeenschappelijke 
markt, terwijl geen van beide instellingen de ‘eigenaar’ is van het domein van de 
georganiseerde misdaad. Bovendien is de georganiseerde misdaad in het EU-kader 
noch een zuiver intergouvernementeel, noch een volledig supranationaal beleidsterrein, 
in tegenstelling tot andere EU-domeinen zoals defensie (intergouvernementeel) 
en landbouw (supranationaal). Dit is een belangrijke voorwaarde om onderzoeksbias 
te vermijden, aangezien de Europese Raad een intergouvernementele organisatie is en 
de Europese Commissie een supranationale organisatie. Dit alles wijst erop dat geen 
van de instellingen op dit beleidsterrein duidelijk de overhand heeft.
De intra-agenda dynamiek is vooral kwantitatief onderzocht met behulp van 
inhoudsanalyse en statistische technieken. Ter aanvulling is kwalitatief onderzoek 
gedaan om betekenis te geven aan de kwantitatieve resultaten. De inter-agenda 
dynamiek is onderzocht met vector-autoregressie-technieken, een nieuwe methode 
voor onderzoek naar de relatie tussen politieke instellingen in de Europese Unie. Deze 
methode komt uit de econometrie. Hiermee wordt een tijdreeksanalyse uitgevoerd 
om de scenario’s voor het bepalen van de EU-agenda te modelleren. 
Resultaten en conclusies
Uit de empirische gegevens blijkt dat de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie 
weliswaar een vergelijkbare agenderende rol spelen, maar dat er verschillen bestaan 
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in de intra-agenda dynamiek, omdat de opzet van de instellingen anders is. De wijze 
waarop kwesties worden geagendeerd is bij de Europese Raad veel grilliger dan bij 
de Europese Commissie, waarin het geleidelijker gaat. Ten minste zes factoren zijn bij 
de instellingen van invloed op de agendering: beleidserfenissen, politieke signalen, 
professionele overwegingen, richtinggevende gebeurtenissen, institutionele 
mijlpalen van de EU en publieke overwegingen. De agenda van de Europese Raad 
wordt vooral bepaald door politieke signalen en beleidserfenissen. Bij de Europese 
Commissie zijn beleidserfenissen de belangrijkste factor. Beleidserfenissen zijn bij 
beide instellingen dus van invloed op de agendering, maar in verschillende mate, om 
verschillende redenen en met verschillende doelen. Er zijn enkele overeenkomsten, 
maar de verschillen zijn groter. Geen van beide agenda’s is door de tijd heen stabiel 
en beide vertonen een onderbroken evenwichtspatroon. 
De inter-agenda dynamiek vertoont op de lange termijn een eenrichtingspatroon. 
Dat betekent dat de Europese Raad meestal de agenda van de Europese Commissie 
bepaalt, en niet andersom. Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat de Europese Commissie 
geen invloed heeft op de Europese Raad. Het betekent eerder dat de Europese Raad 
niet met een vaste regelmaat reageert op de Europese Commissie. De Europese 
Raad heeft de leiding bij de agendering, maar oefent geen volledige controle uit 
op de agenda van de Europese Commissie. De Commissie heeft ruimte om te 
beslissen over een deel van de te behandelen kwesties. Ook andere factoren, zoals 
beleidserfenissen – of eerder gemaakte beleidsafspraken – vormen voor de Europese 
Commissie een aanleiding om beleidsproblemen aan te pakken. Vooral als gevolg 
van dergelijke beleidserfenissen reageert de Europese Commissie vertraagd op 
nieuwe impulsen vanuit de Europese Raad. De Europese Commissie werkt dus ook 
onafhankelijk en zonder nieuwe aanwijzingen. Hierdoor kan de Europese Raad de 
aandacht tijdelijk op andere zaken richten, want de Raad hoeft niet steeds weer 
signalen naar de Europese Commissie te sturen. Het is een doorlopend proces. 
Dit wijst erop dat beleidserfenissen van groot belang zijn voor de bepaling van 
de EU-agenda. 
Omdat beide instellingen de agenda bepalen en verschillen in 
informatieverwerkingscapaciteit en politieke kenmerken, kan de EU een groot aantal 
problemen aanpakken. Daarbij worden nieuwe beleidskwesties onder de aandacht 
gebracht, voorstellen gedaan en bestaande kwesties gevolgd.
De intra- en inter-agendadynamiek van de Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie 
hebben gevolgen voor de beleidsvorming. De opzet van de instellingen vormt een 
aanvulling op hun institutionele capaciteiten, wat de beleidsvorming stimuleert. 
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Tegelijkertijd bevordert hun structuur vooral verschillende patronen in en tussen 
de agenda’s, wat beleidsvorming eerder in de weg staat. Dit geeft aan dat 
beleidsverandering afhankelijk is van de wisselwerking tussen de instellingen. 
Ten slotte wijzen de resultaten van dit onderzoek erop dat het EU-systeem niet 
geheel uniek is. De EU is grotendeels vergelijkbaar met de nationale systemen. Veel 
gedragingen en theorieën die opgaan voor de bestudering van nationale agenda’s 
gelden ook voor de bestudering van de EU-agenda. Er zijn echter ook enkele 
bijzonderheden. De Europese Raad en de Europese Commissie zijn enigszins hybride 
in hun functioneren, omdat ze zowel beleidsinput leveren (policy input agenda) als 
bijdragen aan het proces van beleidsvorming (policy process agenda).
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P r o p o s i t i o n s  t o 
t h e   d o c t o r a l  d i s s e r t a t i o n
1. In order to better understand the inter-agenda dynamics of the European 
Council and the Commission, we need to look at their intra-agenda dynamics.
2. While the European Council and the Commission have a similar agenda-setting 
role, their intra-agenda dynamics are different because their institutional designs 
are different.  
3. In the long run their inter-agenda dynamics display a unidirectional pattern. 
The  European Council sets the agenda of the Commission over time, but not 
the other way around. 
4. The European Council is a serial processor and a high politics venue, while 
the Commission is a parallel-processor type of organization and a low politics 
venue. The ‘twin features’ of each institution shall be recognized and integrated 
in a single approach to study their policy dynamics.  
5. Policy inheritance highly matters in agenda setting in the European Union. Due 
to previous policy commitments, the Commission responds with delay to the 
new impulses from the European Council.   
6. Understanding the intra- and inter-agenda dynamics of the European Council 
and the Commission is an important basis for understanding policy change in 
the EU political system. 
7. The Disproportionate Information-Processing Model of Jones & Baumgartner 
(2005) and the Agenda-Setting Routes Framework of Princen & Rhinard (2006) 
have common assumptions and complementary postulates that together help in 
better explaining EU agenda setting.
8. More research on organized crime that applies theories of agenda setting 
and policymaking is needed to promote new perspectives to analyze the way 
organized crime is addressed in the European Union.  
9. Doing a PhD requires to make choices in sequence and simultaneously. Learning 
to deal with serial and parallel processing is one of the most difficult tasks not 
only in a PhD, but also in life.  
10. Writing a dissertation is more enjoyable and manageable when combining it 
with music. Especially in times of frustration. 
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